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CONCEPTUALIZING DECOLONIZATION

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ABSTRACT

Decolonization marks a decisive phase of human history. It not only signaled the demise of the colonial order, but also heralded the beginning of a new one, for the hundreds of millions of people in scores of the countries across the globe. On the other hand, its diverse patterns, pre-mature nature and the hidden agenda of its executers, made it quite complex as well as controversial. Moreover, those who wrote its very script used it as a veritable tool of transmutation of Imperialism into New Imperialism. All those developments make the discourse of decolonization, alluring and at the same time quite sorrowful.

Key Words
Decolonization, Imperialism, Neo-Liberalism, Diplomacy

This article seeks to explore the main dynamics of this phenomenon, through various perspectives. For instance, it problematizes the debate, by using various definitions, as well as explicating the other antecedent problems with these definitions. It encapsulates the other aspects pertaining to its history such as, periodization schemes and analysis of contributing factors. More significantly, it attempts to isolate certain paradigmatic trends,

associated with this process. Furthermore, it analyzes its fall outs on metropolitan world, decolonized countries, global configuration of power and the nature of imperialism.

This paper is divided into five sections. The first deals with definitions and other problematics of defining this phenomenon. The second seeks to historicize the process of decolonization in to a broader periodization frame work. The third part concerns with participant factors, whereas fourth seeks to infer certain trends from this phenomenon. The last portion analyzes its impact.

DECOLONIZATION: ITS DEFINITION AND OTHER EXPLANATORY OF PROBLEMATICS

In general parlance, it may be defined "as process by which a subordinated territory becomes a sovereign and independent state"[1] or it also signifies the "breakup or dismantling of what after c. 1890 a "globalized system of imperial domination centered upon Europe"[2]. Another definition explicates it in terms of a process, which involves transfer of "institutional and legal" control by colonial powers "over their territories and dependencies to indigenously based, formally sovereign, nation states."[3] Stein Tonnesson, in his article, isolates four essential prerequisites for decolonization, these include creation of a government, which should function at local level and is capable of "acting on behalf of the whole population"; transfer of sovereignty, in formal as well as practical terms, by the colonial power to this local government, agreement between the local government and colonial power, concerning the extension of the new national territory, and the acknowledgment of international recognition of the new state, and its membership in the UN.[4] A cursory look at this definition suggests that, this phenomenon is generally construed as a process.

The other set of definitions provides us a different perspective of conceptualizing this phenomenon. It defines decolonization such a process, which comes to pass as an outcome of movement, underpinned by vision of change. For instance, Frantz Fanon's formulations about decolonization provide us an idea about a process-cum-movement sort of conceptualization of decolonization. He conceives it as a phenomenon, which is accompanied by violence.[5] To him it is a program of "a total complete and absolute substitution" without "any period of transition"[6], which results in to replacement of a "certain species of men by another, species of men without any period of transition".[7] He considers it meaningful only when, it contests the whole colonial situation, as he argues that "In decolonization, there is therefore the need of a complete calling in question of the colonial situation".[8] In more unambiguous terms, he goes on to suggest that "If we wish to describe it precisely, we might find it in the well-known words, "The last shall be first and the first last. Decolonization is the putting into practice this sentence".[9] In this context it involves a process of complete transformation of the social structure "from the bottom up".[10] For Fanon, decolonization symbolizes an ontological empowerment of colonized, as it results in "the veritable creation of new men".[11] While further elaborating this theme, he avers that "it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors." Consequently, the "thing" which has been colonized becomes man, during the same process by which it frees itself".[12] Pransenjit Duara also construes decolonization as a movement. In his opinion, "the ideals of decolonization and the anti-Imperialist movement were built up on two pillars: socialism and the discourse of alternative civilization or what I call the new discourse of civilization."[13] He considers these two as "closely and

deeply intertwined in the twentieth century than we have customarily believed".[14]

If one analyzes these conceptualizations of decolonization, one thing, which strikes the mind, is the elusiveness of this concept. For instance, it neither represents a coherent event, nor a well-defined phenomenon, it betrays extreme variations in the timings and patterns.[15] Similarly, the legalist definitions of decolonization are constitutionality incapable of encompassing its diverse nature, as they are no more than the "handiwork of constitutional lawyers" as John Darwin puts it.[16] If understood in terms of a movement then its goals appear so much different, that they become absolutely incompatible. Similarly, Fanon's formulations are too much ideological and utopian, as his imagined future appears to be a reversal of an imperial past. The phenomenon of decolonization becomes furthermore complicated to define, in context of its much diverse patterns, which are difficult to unravel. For instance, what "we know" is "the end point" that is "the emergence of the independent state from the colonial rule."[17] In order to overcome such issues of definitional elusiveness, the scholars on decolonization have developed certain explanatory approaches for more meaningful explication of this phenomenon such as Nationalist, International and Metropolitan (Domestic) Explanations.[18] Each of these carries a diverse set of explanatory variables. But such approaches create their own problems, for instance, they betray such diverse meanings, which appear to be quite paradoxical, and tend to obscure the reality.

HISTORICIZING DECOLONIZATION

This whole process of decolonization may divided to three distinct phase of periodization, for instances, Osterhammel defines its first phase as phase of "national

emancipation of most European possessions in the New World between 1776 and 1825."[19] The second may be identified with slow transformation of settlement colonies of the "New England" into defecto autonomous states, this process found its explicit manifestations in Canada, since 1839.[20] The de facto autonomous states, after 1907, come to be known as "dominions" within the British Empire, opines Osterhammel.[21] The third phase of decolonization began in the second decade of the twentieth century. Though he concedes that it is difficult to pinpoint its actual beginning, nevertheless, he considers, "the endorsement of home rule" in Ireland in 1922", as the starting point of this phase. He describes this development as "the first major act of colonial liberation of the twentieth century."[22] Its contours were further sharpened with subsequent developments, associated with the official emancipation of the "colored" world.[23] The American Congress' announcement of independence of Philippines after a ten-year transition period heralded the onset of this process. Later, this process further gained momentum after League of Nations/ UN mandates were lifted between 1946 and 1949, which resulted into the liberation of various colonies from the yoke of American, Dutch and British imperialisms. Later nominal independence of French Indo-China may also be seen as a part of this process. However, this process was not very smooth, and came to be interrupted with a phase of renewed US Intervention in Indo-China since mid-fifties.[24] In Africa this phase of decolonization began with the Independence of Italian Libya in 1951. Later, with in next thirteen years, the larger part Africa had become independent.[25] This phase lasted till 1980s. The Independence of Zimbabwe may be described as its last episode.[26] This third phase of withdrawal of colonial rule had profound impact on the global politics, as it led to the virtual restructuring of international system.[27]

This scheme of historicization of decolonization appears too simplistic. Nevertheless, it enables us to develop some semblance of unity out of this diverse and too unwieldy process. However, there is another alternative scheme of periodizing this phenomenon of decolonization. For instance, John Darwin only includes the development of twentieth century within the ambit of this process. He divides decolonization into three phases.[28] He conceives the period since the World War II to 1960s as the first phase. Though he suggests that despite the disintegration of a Europe-centered colonial order by early the process of decolonization was still incomplete.[29]

In order to further corroborate this argument, he cites the example of "vast geopolitical niche in Northen Eurasia, the Soviet Empire"[30] as visible manifestation of prevalence of Imperial vestiges. It was characterized by "its closed society, ideological ramparts and super power capabilities" which rendered it "invulnerable to the solvents of Imperial power elsewhere."[31] He identifies the period 1960-1990 as another phase of decolonization during which, it also remained "territorially incomplete".[32] He holds bi-polar system of Cold War as main hindrance in the path of complete decolonization. This fierce bipolar competition progressively intruded "in to the spheres of colonialism." [33] Over the next two decades it made the world so intensely polarized, which rendered the prospects of "the emergence of a real post-colonial world of nations" also redundant. For instance, the world order shaped by the super power rivalries was "not only new" but appeared "more violent Imperial order" that led to the virtual partitioning of the world between them.[34] The disintegration of Soviet empire in late 1980s and eventual collapse of Soviet Union marked the culmination of "the protracted phase of Imperial breakdown."[35] Similarly, the end of white minority rule in South Africa in 1994 also

constitutes a defining feature of this phase.[36] However the stage of complete decolonization is yet to be reached. For instance, "the messy aftermath of Soviet Imperialism" suggests that "the diplomacy of colonial retreat may still be studied in the darker Caucasian recesses of the Russian empire."[37] Similarly, patterns of colonial retreat in Africa provide a "sharp remainder that dismantling of the colonial order was far from easy, where the power concerned was not susceptible to financial of or diplomatic pressure."[38]

FACTORS LEADING TO DECOLONIZATION

The most crucial aspect of decolonization debate pertains to the analysis of the very reasons, which impelled colonizers to decolonize. The factors that forced them to withdraw from their endeared possessions, their colonies, which had become part of colonialism imagination as symbols of prestige and grandeur the empires, and which were construed to be *Lieux de memoire*. There are number of plausible explanations ranging from international pressure from the new superpowers and their role as arbiters of world affairs[39], to the realization among colonial powers of the new power realities of emerging world order after the World War II. Similarly, another set of factors underscores the role of strong domestic impulses, in forcing the colonial power to decolonize their territorial possessions. These vary from changing perceptions of domestic public opinion towards imperialism and its growing opposition on the issues of resources utilization for the preservation of the colonies, to the emergence of new middle class in the metropolis, and its increasing pressure for diversion of resources, towards domestic welfare spending.[40] Though these factors cannot be discounted as altogether irrelevant for the analysis of decolonization, yet one may develop a

more insightful explanatory framework, on the basis of more recent debates, on the issue of decolonization. These include : (I) The economic crises faced by Britain, which rendered it increasingly incapable of maintaining territorial possessions; (II) Structural changes in the world economy, which provided space to the former colonial powers to maintain their control world economy, without the retention of formal colonialism; (III) The upsurge of anti-colonial nationalism and the increased realization on the part of former colonial power, regarding the limitations as well as counter productivity of the use of force; (IV) The reliance of the colonial powers on the support of the collaborative elites in the periphery, as an incentive for decolonization and (V) The role of unintended consequences in the collapse of the post war arrangements, made by the world powers to maintain their spheres of influence. This factor played an important role in British decolonization.

The most important factor, which led towards decolonization was economic crisis faced by Britain. It confronted this crisis immediately after World War II. For the next two decades, British governments tried to negotiate with this crisis, through various means that is: American lease borrowings in late 1940s and later Marshall plan.[41] Similarly, during the negotiations for decolonization it tried to ensure its financial interests, by keeping sterling countries between Suez and Singapore, within the ambit of British Imperialist influence. Therefore, it followed the policy of reliance on sterling countries "for dollar earnings required to make up the British trade deficit."[42] It moved towards sterling convertibility in 1958.[43] It also tried to link the "potential of Africa's minerals and vegetable products" for economic recovery.[44] But the subsequent developments not only underscored the inadequacy of such measures but also made one thing abundantly clear that "Britain's economic

decline was structural not simply the consequence of the costly world war and subsequent misfortunes".[45] Over the period of time it started taking its toll. For instance, it made British painfully aware of their inability to cope with escalating defense costs, in form of "cost of air and naval equipment, of the Eden campaign, of garrisons in South-East Asia and of the Rhine army, and of a second generation of nuclear deterrent weapon", since the early 1960s.[46] The sterling crisis of November 1967 further exposed the fragility of British economy. The situation had come to such a pass, that British lacked finances necessary defense procurement for serving the needs of empire.[47] All the major scholars on Imperialism and decolonization agree that this proved to be the last straw. As Osterhammel opines that "From then on the last Empire enthusiasts relinquished the idea of an imperial Britain."[48] John Darwin avers that it forced British to take "decisions in hours rather than decades."[49] Eventually, it was the economic factor, which made British reconcile to a European destiny. It profoundly changed the course of colonial politics, and while alluding to its connection with decolonization, John Darwin goes on to suggest that "nothing stimulated political mobilization in the British colonies more than London's effort to encourage economic development".[50]

The structural changes in the world economy in many ways accelerated the pace of decolonization. These changes made the colonial power cognizant of the new economic realities, these made them realize about the dysfunctionality of European colonialism, in context of "the operational necessities of the metropole."[51] Now colonial powers came to perceive the benefits of "hands-off" arrangements".[52] The most specific instance was British perimeter Macmillan's request in 1957, to manifest a "profit and loss account for colonies".[53] After making such assessments, the British expedited their efforts for

developing an informal empire[54]," as they realized that "British trade might be better served if independence came soon rather than later."[55] This change in perceptions, profoundly change the course of colonial developments. For instance, within two years "colonial controls were clearly no longer" considered "indispensable for metropolitan prosperity."[56] These changes highlighted that, what the white Hall was trying to do was not to sustain the empire, rather to monitor a sort of "self-generating and self-financing system", functioning for sustenance of empire.[57]

The upsurge of anti-colonial nationalism also introduced an element of urgency in the resolving the colonial question of expeditious basis. All the colonial empires were faced with the issues of rise of anti-colonial nationalisms. The Colonial powers like France tried to negotiate it, through the use of force, but the British were quick to anticipate the mischievous potentials of this option. They were taken by surprise, with the changing course of Indian nationalist movement, its penetration in the masses and its mobilizational potential. While alluding to their hapless position John Darwin avers quite succinctly that "The outcome in India had been dictated not by the blueprint laid down in London, nor even by negotiations between British officials and Indian politicians. It was the consequence, above all of local circumstances, while the policy makers in London were largely reduced to impatient and nervous onlookers."[58] Americans, on the other hand, were also apprehensive about the increasing susceptibility of these movements towards socialist influences. In this backdrop decolonization emerged as mere pragmatic option.

The element of anticipated support from collaborative elites further proved to be an incentive for decolonization. The colonial powers had nurtured these elements as intermediaries during the colonial period. In

most of the instances, the client rulers or proto-nationalist appeared "willing to enhance British power locally, with their own authority if it was their advantage".[59] The colonial powers did not seem to be un-oblivious of these prospective benefits accrued through this support, provided by collaborative elites to the imperialism, as "the scope and penetrative depth of imperialism was determined, not only by European drives, but also by local collaboration and resistance "opines Ronald Robinson.[60] The upsurge of nationalist movements further enhanced the dependence of the colonizers on the collaborative elites, in terms of their assistance to metropolitan rulers as well as their role in negotiating or counterpoising the nationalist elements. Similarly, in the case of liquidation of the colonial rule, they could fill in the role of a useful intermediary between the colony and the metropolis.[61] The collapse of British plans to reconstruct their postwar imperial order, so as to its maintain its sphere of influence in various regions from Africa to South East Asia, and Caribbean to Middle East, also impelled British to decolonize. The examples abound. One may mention a long array of British plans such as: the British failure to make new world system dependent upon Anglo-Dominion, functional in the post-world war II; the collapse of the Malaysian and Caribbean Federations; the setbacks suffered by British in Congo, Eden and Nigeria; British failure to avert the economic crisis through sterling area. All these developments played their role in convincing the British to relinquish their ambitions to order former imperial world according to their whims, particularly at that time when their country had reached the throes of economic and military decline.

John Darwin accords great primacy to the collapse of these plans in convincing the British to move towards decolonization as a more feasible, alternative. In a rather sarcastic manner, he sees the application of Herbert

Spencer's law of unintended consequence behind these developments.[62]

DECOLONIZATION: MAJOR PARADIGMATIC TRENDS

There were certain paradigmatic trends, which virtually defined the whole contours of the decolonization process. These include: (i) The compromises not only among the major powers, but also among the colonial powers and the elites in periphery; (ii) The bargaining on the part of colonial powers to safeguard their territorial, strategic and economic interests; (iii) The disorderly and haphazard nature of the decolonization process; and (iv) The influence of Anglo-American Alliance over the process of decolonization. The most conspicuous aspect of this process was manifested through the negotiations for decolonization. It revealed a whole gamut of secret understandings, whimsical deals and insidious changes in policies of the major powers. All these found their manifestations, in the transfer of power arrangements, territorial concessions and decisions to delay or expedite the pace of decolonization. The compromises among the world powers involved mutual accommodation, resolution of issues concerning conflicting interests, joint collaboration for reinforcing capitalism against the Communist threat, identification of common enemies as well as choice of allies. The compromise between US and France in Indo-China led to the resolution of differences between the two countries, concerning the US perceptions about French policy in Indo-China. Similarly, the Americans agreed to accommodate the British interest in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East[63]. On the other hand, British collaborated with American policy of containment of communism. They withdrew from Greece and gave up their Turkish commitment[64]. British even agreed to play the role of a junior partner in Anglo-American alliance after the war and it was publically

acknowledged by British Prime Minister Macmillian during his meeting with Eisenhower in 1957[65]. These compromises were not limited to the colonial powers rather some of these involved nationalist elites. For instance, the Indian Nationalist agreed to join British Common Wealth, as dominion in lieu of certain concessions by British. Therefore, it is not surprising that "India was admitted to the Common Wealth as a republic. A year earlier, London had refused precisely that concession to the Burma, which then left the Common Wealth"[66]. At colonial level, the British did not hesitate to offer "unequal accommodations to client rulers or proto nationalists"[67]. There are numerous instances of unequal bargains struck between the imperialists and the imperialized, in different countries from time to time[68]. Frantz Fanon provides very insightful analysis about the very logic of compromise, in the colonial context, particularly, during the process of decolonization. While alluding to this aspect, he construes the ulterior motives of compromise. For instance, he argues that "it is very far from being a simple one" it involves, "the colonial system and the young nationalist bourgeoisie at the same time"[69]. In his opinion, it is equally attractive for both. For instance, as regards the colonizers are concerned they resort to compromise, out of apprehension that "masses may destroy everything"[70], on the other hand, the nationalist bourgeoisie also apprehend the "possible consequences of the rising storm" therefore, it starts projecting itself as real representative of the people it "never stops saying to the settler "we are still capable of stopping the slaughter"[71].

Another trend, which appears quite conspicuous during the negotiations for decolonization, is the carefully calculated bargaining, on the part of formal colonial powers, to safeguard their vital interests, in the postcolonial world order. The instances of the British

bargaining, during decolonization provide case in point. These mainly revolved around certain important aspects, which include: desire for Anglo-Dominion Common Wealth; British concerns for protection of financial assets; their desire to gain control or maintain sphere of influence in certain strategic locations, so on and so forth. While referring to this aspect John Darwin avers that "they set about rebuilding as much as possible the pre-war imperial order to recreate the zone of monopoly influence they had enjoyed before"[72]. Their specific instances range from British efforts to secure the control of naval base in Singapore to their maneuvers to retain control a dominant position in the Middle East. The successive Defense White Papers from 1961-69, provide further idea about the British territorial ambitions in Indian Ocean.[73]

New findings about the decolonization, as a result of declassification of documents, official publications, accesses to more archival sources, proliferation of the new genres of Imperial History, Post-Colonial History and Subaltern History, have provided altogether new insights about colonization. Therefore, it is not surprising that many myths about decolonization have been contested or stultified. One of such myths was the construction of decolonization process as an ordered, phased, carefully executed and controlled project, which unfolded according to the calculations of the colonial powers. This myth about an ordered semblance of this process virtually stands challenged "the more closely we peer at actual course of Britain's retreat from the empire, the more difficult it is to see any ordered pattern",[74] opines Darwin. The whole process of dismantling the empire defied time table[75]. The instances of decolonization in Asia, Africa, Caribbean, neither fit into any pattern, nor appear to follow any criteria. In some places this process was expedited, at others it was deferred, delayed or postponed. Moreover, this process also exposed the

infirmity of retreating colonial powers. For instance, "India's independence was a humiliating reversal of the hopes and intentions of pre-war and wartime policy-makers".[76]

IMPACT OF DE-COLONIZATION: AN ASSESSMENT

The most conspicuous aspect of this whole process of decolonization was that it was regulated by Anglo-American alliance. This alliance managed this process as a multi-national corporation manages its corporate interests. The American domination of over this process also implied that, the exigencies of Cold War took precedence over the requirements of decolonization. These paradigmatic trends had profound impact on the whole process of decolonization. If seen from the perspectives of colonizers and empire, decolonization resulted into the emergence of a new empire that was "increasingly Anglo-American rather than British"[77]. Instead of dismantling the domination of Imperialist powers, it facilitated the transformation of Imperialism into new Imperialism. It became informal, more structural, but not necessarily less exploitative. According to Robert Young it heralded the triumph of neo-liberalism[78]. The process brought an insidious shift in the power configuration within the imperial world. Though the British apparently managed, to procure certain advantages from this process, in the form of protection of their vital interests, through calculated and tactful bargaining during the negotiations of transfer of power, with client rulers, collaborative elites, proto-nationalist as well as other colonial powers. However, these advantages could not fructify, into tangible gains, in the wake of collapse of Britain's post war territorial arrangements. Moreover, its continued economic decline further prevented it from regaining ascendency, in the post-colonial configuration of power. The exigencies of cold

war necessitated the preservation of empire rather its dissolution. Therefore, the empire was preserved as a grand alliance of capitalist powers, under the flag ship of US ascendency. Thus, the US, by virtue of its ascendant position in the post imperial world, became the leader of the capitalist world as other European capitalist powers resigned themselves, to a collateral role of a junior partner. This power vacuum created as a result of reversal of position of old capitalist powers, also proved beneficial for US in certain respects. For instance, the post-war capitalist order was regenerated on American wealth and power[79]. Furthermore, the newly emerging informal imperialism was fully compatible, with the US model of informal imperialism. Therefore, through its expansion of informal capitalist imperialism, it swallowed up the empire[80]. Moreover, it also occupied political turf of British imperialism in South and Southeast Asia, Middle East, Caribbean and Africa.

If the fallouts of this process are viewed from the perspectives of the colonized empire "instead of being decolonized" was infact "neo-colonized"[81], under the informal imperialism. Though the system of control and imperial economy of the old imperialist was replaced with the liberal economic system of free world trade, yet this system instead of rectifying the ills of imperialism, tended to solidify them, through the institutionalization of disparities, inequalities and injustices. Though it provided the ex-colonies more space for political freedom but deprived them from opportunities of its utilization according to their own choice[82]. This disorderly retreat of colonizers further left a long trail of problems for the newly liberated colonies. For instance, the hasty withdrawal of British from India, bequeathed a bitter legacy of problems, ranging from unfinished agendas of partition to the water, territorial and boundary dispute, which continue to haunt Pak-India relations till present.

One of the enduring legacies of decolonization has been "the appearance of national historical consciousness", but the realities of New Imperialism have not allowed its internalization, into the human emancipation and its articulation in meaningful expression of sovereignty of the former colonies. That is why "the great programmatic designs of Afro-Asiatic emancipation" seemed to have relegated into pale of insignificance[83]. Fanon's message couched in Sartre's words very succinctly sums up the most enduring legacy of de-colonization. As Sartre contends that decolonization has not provided the colonized the real independence but the "simulacrum of phony independence", which is the ultimate reality.

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SHRINES, PAKISTAN AND INVENTED TRADITION

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ABSTRACT

This article intends to understand the relationship between the state and shrines in Pakistan, since 1947. The intention is to understand shrines, historically, as a site of interaction between the policies of state and spiritually engaged practices thereupon. The article focuses upon the shrines situated in the urban areas of Punjab, Pakistan. The study brings forward the essential character of Sufism generating and prevailing through the "ideologically driven,"[1] "projective"[2] activity, of the state that translated the "traditional patterns"[3] of Sufism into a modern spiritual practice. The study would show that a kind of "invented tradition"[4] emerged through the impact of the policies of the state directed towards achieving well-settled goals. The spiritual practices get affected through the projective policies of the state and the internal spiritual development moves in

that projected direction. It shows further
that the learned practices not only manifest
the newly acquired character but also
enable Sufism to negotiate and participate
within state's projective activity.

Key Words

Pakistan, Shrines, Sufism, Traditions, State, Auqaf

Shrines are the traditional sacred site of the popular
expression of religion embedded in the spirit and
practices of Sufism around the tomb of a venerated
sufi-saint. Shrines varied with the allegiance of a dead
saint and his/her already dispersed popularity. The
name and order (*Silsila*) of a dead saint, normally,
defines the condition of the cult association built
around tombs. The cult-associations take their life
from the dispersed spiritual charismatic qualities
(*Baraka*) and properties (*Karama*) through spiritual
care taker of the shrine, traditionally understood as
Sajjada Nashin (literally, 'he who sits on the prayer
carpet') or *Gaddi Nashin* (literally, 'he who sits on the
spiritual seat'). The phenomenon of shrine therefore
entails both the tomb and the space around it where
spiritual practices take place. People, *Murid*
(aspirants) or visitors, pay visit to the shrines either on
important occasion like *Urs*, the death anniversary of
the saint considered to be the sacred meeting of saint
with God, or in the time of personal crisis for asking

help from the dead saint. People collect *Baraka* (religious charisma) and *Faiz* (religious blessings) from the spirit of the dead saint considered to be looming around his tomb or inhering into the figure of the spiritual heir, that is, *Sajjada Nashin* (the spiritual inheritor) who also acts as a religious leader.[5] Each shrine finds greatest numbers of visitors at *Urs*. Most of the times, the *Urs* coexists with the *Mela* (Festive), making *Urs* the moment of pleasure and festivity. The site of shrine not only presents itself as a sacred space but also the abode of multiple social, ritual and literary practices.[6] These practices provide ways to the participants for spiritually developing himself/herself through the broader charisma of a dead saint.

The shrines can be seen divided in Punjab, Pakistan, since the promulgation of Auqaf Department in 1959, into two categories: one includes those run and managed by Auqaf department while the other includes all else still lying outside the control of Auqaf. Both categories can further be divided as having living /active *Pirs* or *Sufis* associated with the shrine or not. On many shrines, like Syed Suf near Delhi Gate, Lahore, one does not find any living *sufi* around. The *Mohalla* Committee with the help of Auqaf department manages the shrine activities. While, on shrines like Mian Mir, the committee, though exists and manages the working of the shrine yet the *Sajjada Nashin* (the spiritual

inheritor) of the shrine also sits there and while spreading his spiritual *Baraka* (religious charisma) to the visitors, takes *Bait* (Vow of allegiance) from *Murid* (Aspirants). It is however the department of Auqaf that takes possession of the bulk of *Nazranai* (the monetary rewards) during the shrine practices, in both the cases. The *Sajjada Nashin* (the spiritual heir) or *Khadimin* (the servicemen at shrine) are, either to work hard for snatching their part of the reward as at the shrine of Shah Daula Daryai (d.1664 A.D.), Gujarat where one of the *Sajjada Nashin* also sits with the Auqaf's money Box only to show his presence to the visiting public for collecting money, or as in the case of Mian Mir's (d.1635 A.D.) shrine, where *Sajjada Nashin* operates from a place distanced from shrine[7]. At Shrines, however like that of Jamat Ali Shah Lasani (d.1938A.D.) that is though controlled by Auqaf Department there still exists the strong tradition of an active *Gaddi* (spiritual/ hereditary hold of shrine) through the activities of a living Sufi Pir / *Gaddi Nashin*[8]. The shrines falling outside the control of the department of Auqaf are also run and managed by *Sajjada Nashins* or *Gaddi Nashins* (the spiritual inheritors). At such shrines, along with the tomb of the venerated saint, the activities of the living *Sajjada Nashins* who are also considered to be a *Sufi-Pir*, constitute a major role. The *Murid* (Aspirants) pay visit to the living-*sufi-pir*, shares their problem with him and gets spiritual solutions, like *Taweez* (Amulation)

or *Dam* (Incantation). Sometimes the sufi-saint also directs the visitor to recite certain *Kalamat* (the blessed phrases), like *Ayat-ul-kursi* (the verses, 255-257 from the Surah Bakara of Quran) or *Kalama sharif* (the basic religious phrases for being counted as a Muslim). Many such shrines, like that of *Karmanwala Sarkar[9], Pir Mubarak Ali Shah[10]* or *Mohammad Shair Sharakpur Sharif Naqshbandi[11]*, also hold a large number of land or businesses, enabling them (living sufi-saints, or their immediate relatives) to take part in the politics of the area.

The shrines-based sufistic practices, that one finds, looming large in today's spiritual world, however, is only a stage[12] in the history of Sufism. One can trace the history of Sufism emerging out of individual ascetic practices in the eighth and ninth century A.D. or second and third Hijrah in the world of Islam. The personalities like Hasan Basri (d.728 A.D) and Rabia Bint Ismail al-Adwiya (d.802 A.D) showed the way for making relationship with a higher reality through love.[13] At the margins of the development of the purifying Islamic Laws, that is *Shariat as a Fiqah*, within Islamic world few souls opened up "ways" for gaining richer experience (*Maarifa*) of higher reality. Around such ascetic individuals, disciples started gathering to take guidance. The search for an ascetic master who could show the inner depths of the religious scriptures kept them mobile. From one master to another, the disciples moved and sat to

form a temporary association. This loose association of "master" and "disciple," gradually, gave way to the stronger ties hooked up in the allegiance of disciples to a certain master who was to articulate the spiritual practice.[14] By eleventh century it was common to find "companionships" (*suhbat*) observing rules and manners of associations.[15] Such "companionships" though retained individualistic groupings of itinerants, and remained temporary, yet the allegiance to the living or dead sufi-master emerged out of them. The spiritual places of "companionships," gradually turned into settlements/hospices supported through endowments (*Awqaf*) or alms. Such hospices, also called *Khankah* or *Ribat,* started to be seen at the frontiers of the settled urban areas with or without the tomb of the venerated master after eleventh century A.D.[16]

The loose associations built within and around hospices (*Khankah*) gradually gave way to the doctrine-based practices. Each hospice started getting famous with the spiritual belonging to the certain master who was supposed to formulate and teach his own method/way of reaching Reality. The struggle for "ways" transformed into *Tariqa*, 'a practical method (other terms were *madhab*, *riaya*, and *suluk*) to guide a seeker by tracing a way of thought, feeling and action, leading through a succession of 'stages' (*maqamat)*, in integral association with psychological

experiences called 'states', (*ahwal*) to experience of divine Reality'.[17] This phase, that is, twelfth and thirteenth centuries have seen the emergence of figures like, Ibn-Arabi, Suhrawardi, Abdul Qadir Jilani, Maulana Rumi, Jami and many others whose given directions and doctrines even till now are considered essential to understand respective ways of *Tasawwuf* (Sufism). For some time, *Tariqa*, remained only an acknowledged "way" of a master for showing the stages of *Maarifa (gnosis)* to the gathered disciples. The four famous orders (*Silsilai),* Suharwardya, Chishtya, Qadrya, Naqshbandya, in India, like many others in the Islamic world, found their existence through *Tariqa* practices of their respective masters. These *Tariqas* developed their discipleship and associations around the teachings of the master/s who had initiated, with the passage of time those orders (*Silsilai*).[18] No famous *Tariqa/Silsila*, it is interesting to note, develop only within master's family. Disciples took their master's teachings to the far-flung areas and stretched their ways to the organized spiritual practices. It was when spiritual search got burdened through the elaborated doctrinaire and procedural practices the *Tariqa already associated with the order (Silsila)* of a certain sort. At this stage, around fifteenth and sixteenth century,[19] the spiritual search had already lost its individualized struggle for attaining higher reality and reduced to taking *Baraka* (religious charisma) from

the *Wilaya* (spiritual lineage) of the dead saint with or without the mediation of a living Sufi.[20]

Till sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the sufistic practices were already well entrenched in India. Not only areas at the western borders of India, that is Punjab and Sind had become abode of famous Sufi ascetics, but also the central and southern India had already associated itself with the *Dargah* (a Sufi hospice), shrines and Sufi practices. Individual Sufis though already walked into India since ninth and tenth centuries, the first *Tariqa* order, that is Chishti, the oldest within India, appeared and prevailed in twelfth and thirteenth century A.D. *Suhrawardy* Order didn't take long and only after few years joined Chishtis in promoting the cause of Islam through spiritual ways.[21] Qadri and Naqshbandi orders waited for fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to get penetrated into the land of India. Before these orders could penetrate and produce such figures as Fareed-ud-Din Ganj Shakkar (d.1265 A.D.), Nizam-ud-din Auliya (d.1325 A.D.), Shah Rukan-e-Alam (d.1335 A.D.), Sheikh Ibrahim Fareed-ud-Din Sani (d.1575 A.D.), figures that initiated the process of alloying between Indian and Turko-Persian traditions,[22] Punjab had already familiarized with the spirit of Sufism and shrine's *Baraka* (religious charisma) through the figures and shrines of Ali Hajwairi Ganj Bakhsh (d.1090 A.D.), Miran Hasan Zinjani(d.1050 A.D.), and Bibia Pakdaman (719-720 A.D.). All four

orders *(Silsilai)* though arrived as a foreign religion's spiritual "ways" (*Tariqa)* yet carried on producing indigenous spirits to keep alive the search for God and self-development while keeping their association with the masters of their respective orders. Mian Mir (d.1635 A.D.), Shah Hussain (d.1599A.D.), Sheikh Haji Muhammad Nausha Ganj (d.1692 A.D.) and Shah Daula Daryai (d.1664 A.D.) not only searched in their own unique ways the Reality of God but also impressed rulers and public alike to follow and respect their accommodating struggle. Their teachings showed the "Indianization" of Islam[23] and their shrines soon became the centers for dispersing spiritual *Baraka* (religious charisma) to the public at large, irrespective of their religion.

When British marched into Punjab in 1849,[24] they found shrines and sufi-pir practices all around. Alive though this phenomenon was however the sufistic practices were already showing the signs of being gripped in an elaborated doctrinaire condition associated with a saint-cult, getting routinized and popularized.[25] The struggle of individualized sufistic souls to chart their own ways, though, had already waned out and had given ways to the shrine based sufi practices, the spirit to reform hadn't died out completely. The reformist and revivalist movements had already begun within the sufistic movement. The internal sufistic development was taking shape in three directions: Chishti revivalism,[26] Emotional

revivalism and urban-shari-sufism.[27] Chishti revivalism in Punjab remained however orthodox in its direction. It created the impulse for ethical revivalism by focusing closely on Muslim identity and for penetrating further deeply into the remote areas of Punjab, like D.G Khan and Shahpur districts. The Chishti revivalism impressed a large number of Sufis and triggered to develop such important monasteries as that of Sial Sharif, Taunsa Sharif and Golra Sharif. However, this movement couldn't penetrate at a large level into the urban centers of central Punjab.

The urban centers though got influenced through Chishti Revivalistic spirit, yet a large number of shrines either carried forward the spirit of emotional and recreational belonging to the saints or moved towards rationalistic Islam. The Naushahi sub-order that took its birth in the teachings of Sheikh Haji Muhammad Nausha Ganj (d.1692 A.D.) in a small village near the bank of Chinab in Gujranwala district, took lead in the emotional revivalist movement. Lot of small groups and shrines were associated with this emotional revivalism in nineteenth century Lahore[28], and other urban centers of central Punjab. *Naushahi* sub-order was associated with Qadri order (*Silsila*), however, its emotional overtones related it with *Malamati* or Qalandri orders (*Silsilai*) largely considered as *Be-Shari* (without Shariat). One could find these emotional overtones closer to the frenzied activities of *Mela Chiragha* (Festival of Lights) at Lal

Hussain's shrine and *Kadam Mela* (Foot Festive) at Sakhi Sarwar's abode in Anarkali. Lahore got empty during the *Mela* Chiragha and one found hardly any place to walk in Shalamar Bagh and all the adjacent areas to the shrine of Lal Hussain on that day. The shrine of Lal Hussain kept its syncretic tradition alive due to the famous biographical narration of the love of Lal Hussain (the Muslim Saint) for Madhu Lal (the Hindu boy) and the supporting political conditions. Therefore people, irrespective of their religion participate in the *Mela* (Festivity) and celebrate with liquor and other drugs. The elite, however, avoided visiting Lal Hussain's shrine even on *Urs* or *Mela* days, and even disliked the frenzied activities of Naushahi practices.[29]

The prevalence of rationalistic Islam appeared either through urban-Shari-Sufism or distancing altogether from sufistic practices. The Urban-Shari-Sufism was a significant development that was prevailing large in urban areas and that was going to change a lot the shrine practices in coming years. Largely, Qadri and Naqshbandi orders remained instrumental in enhancing Shari- sufistic practices in urban areas. The shrine of Makhdoom Ali Hajveri was gaining central position in this regard. This shrine, it is claimed by many nineteenth century sources,[30] built in the days of Lahore's ruler, Sultan Zaheer-ud Daula Ibrahim Ghaznawi (d.1109 A.D.). If not the shrine, at-least the sufi-saint Makhdoom Ali

Hajvery had gained high repute, as found through contemporary hagiographic literature, after the days of Mughal king Akbar (1542-1605 A.D.). In late seventeenth and eighteenth century contemporary sources, like Dara Shikoh's *Safinatul Aulia* and Shah Muhamamd's *Haqeeqat-ul Fuqara* written in Aurangzeb's *shara*-based rule, the figure of Makhdoom Ali Hajvery was visible as a respected spiritual position attaching wherewith a *sufi* could justify his spiritual stature.[31] However, the writer of *Haqeeqat-ul Fuqara* (1686A.D.) introduced the respected position of Makhdoom Ali Hajvery to justify the spiritual ascendancy of a personality as eccentric as that of Lal Hussain whose eccentricity even kept Dara Shikoh to include his name within Qadri order (*Silslia)*.[32] It seems Aurangzeb's political ideals and policies transformed the pattern of historical writings and for a person writing almost hundred years after the death of Lal-Hussain had to associate him with Makhdoom Ali Hajvery's spiritual ascendancy. Even Dara Shikoh's work, *Safinatul Aulia,* written three or four decades earlier than *Haqeeqat-ul Fuqara* (1686A.D.) already showed the Mughal dynasty's taste for shara-based sufism. His work presented Makhdoom Ali Hajvery as a writer of the famous and respected *Kashf-ul Mahjub*, but at the same time introduced him as a scholar, from Julab and Ghaznain, the areas of Ghazna city, who initiated "Islamic" teachings even in Lahore.

The *Kashf-ul Mahjub* of Makhdoom Ali Hajveri though attained a high value for giving spiritual guidance to the struggling *sufi* since long, yet because of the saint's position that transcends spiritual orders (*Silsilai*), as he came Lahore almost hundred and fifty years earlier than the commencement of the first *sufi* order (*Silsila*) through Chishti saints, this shrine remained less significant than the shrines of famous *sufi* orders. It is interesting that in eighteenth and nineteenth century the shrine of Makhdoom Ali Hajveri started getting linked with Chishti order through a historical story of Mueen-ud-din Ajmeri's pilgrimage to this shrine and his spending here for forty days (*Chilla*) in spiritual meditation.[33] The *Tibbi* (mound) of Fareed-ud-din Masood Ganj Shakkar famous for the saint's abode in Lahore was also getting linked with the shrine of Makhdoom Ali Hajveri. The shrine even started getting position of an initiator of Chishti order (*Silsila*) in India. While for the Qadiri order the shrine of Makhdoom Ali Hajveri was taking a center stage for observing and dispersing the teachings of Ghaus-al Azam, Abdul Qadir Gilani. The shrines embedded in their own sub-orders and their respective master's tradition remained reluctant to introduce the practices attached directly with the Master of the Order, Ghaus-al Azam, Abdul Qadir Gilani. Practices like observing *Gyarhwi Sharif* at the shrine of Makhdoom Ali Hajveri started taking its roots.[34] The shrine started acquiring the position of

shari-sufism, as even on *Urs* days, people came to read Quran and general prayers.[35] The shrine had been associating increasingly with the Muslim elites and the emerging middle class oriented towards *shari* practices. The dances of Market-girls outside the shrine, though still remained a practice almost through out the whole nineteenth century, the overall picture of shrine however was transforming as a shari-sufistic shrine**.**

These internal developments within Sufism though remained not concealed to the otherwise perceptive eye of British colonial authorities, yet their impact they thought as insignificant for creating a better world for the local Muslims.[36] They took no time to conclude that one of the biggest reasons for this country to remain under-developed is to get engaged in shrine-based religious practices.[37] They found such practices not only strange but also superstitious and prone to block the *will* to progress. In their perseverance to teach this part of the land new civilized course of life, they remained at a distance from this form of religion. However, soon, the practical necessities let them engage with the powerful positions within *sajjada nashins* as they found these figures controlling most of the village, and at some places even urban population. The initial distaste transferred into a policy of collaboration and distance transferred into a policy of providing and preserving lands to an already strong Sufi-pir.[38] The

balance however remained fragile as the inefficiency of the care takers to take care of the Shrine-Waqf property, when the British authorities were making their efforts to transform Punjab as an agricultural colony, often surfaced criticism. The policy to take control of Auqaf property by state[39] or distancing from certain sufi-pirs as in the case of Qureshis and Syeds of Chinab canal colony[40] resulted due to the perceived inefficiency of the sufi-pir.

The encountering with the British rule opened up new horizons both for economic and spiritual development for the local population. This opening up of the horizons came along the sharp religious segregation and self reflective rationality. The religious nationalism started gaining its feet through multiple reformist and revivalist movements, especially in urban areas of India. Most of these movements considered lagging behind in the educational matters the reason for the backwardness of Muslims. For a group emerged through running a seminary/madrasa at Deoband[41] it was ignoring the traditional knowledge of religion that was the reason for depriving Muslims of their power, while for the modernist reformist emerged around Ali Garh movement, it was not acquiring the British knowledge that was essentially the reason for the Muslims' backwardness. The later stressed for understanding the traditional knowledge in the light of modern Reason. Their emphasis further oriented the Muslims

of India for taking jobs in the government sector. The Deobandis however stressed on going back to the basics and founding knowledge on the scriptural religious tradition for the Muslim. Both of these movements, triggered many other sub-movements in time, however, acquired the very same organizational rationality as that of their British rulers. Education, traditional or modern, was to be organized in modern schools, whether through Muslim *Madrassa* or British colleges. In the zest of their articulation these movements forgot their very rootedness of their tradition. The Deobandi School, the leading Muslim revivalist movement, emerged out of Naqshbandi and Chishti revivalist movement. However their acquired rational articulation let them conceal this rootedness and helped them criticizing the archaic practices of piri-muridi relationships at shrines. The same was the case for the movements followed the lead of the Aligarh movement. Largely an urban religious and political movement, both Deoband and Aligarh movements considered shrine based practices as an irrational trace of the Muslim past that has to be wiped out from a Muslim's life.

The internal development within the rationality of the Muslims coupled with the British rule triggered changes in the shrine-based sufistic practices. The British rulers avoided largely interfering with the shrine practices however remained busy in consolidating their colonial agenda. For them the land

of Punjab could be profitable in two ways; agricultural economy and induction of "martial race" in the army. Their agenda for development in both these directions initiated changes in both economic and social life necessitated the need for cultural reorientation. The British rulers interfered in the shrine life only for pursuing their developmental agenda. For example, they acquired the land of Mian Mir shrine for making cantonment and railway station and built building at the land of Shah Chiragh's shrine for the residential purposes for their administrative officers. However, by and large they let the traditional *Maafia* and/or Waqf property in the control of traditional claimants. The emergence of middle class oriented towards the urban rationality triggered changes in building relationship with shrines. The practices those were considered to be seen as the spiritual effects of the sufi-saint now a large number of increasing Muslim middle class and elites considered strange.[42] The traditional pilgrimage practices now called into question through the newly articulated rationality. The turning towards Islamic simplicity of the time of Prophet (PUH) and early Caliphates gradually started transforming the orientation towards shrines. Traditional practices at shrines were still going on yet the emphasis upon simple Islam started influencing. The shrines like those of Ghorai Shah, where people used to give *Nazranai* (the monetary rewards) of horse-toys, the

shrine of Hassu Taili, where oil sellers used to come for lightening lamps, the shrine of Pir Mohka or Maulvi Nizam-ud-Din where people used to visit for curing their "Mohkai", in Lahore, though still popular yet the impact of Islamization started changing its structure.

The spirit of development and colonial modern rationality transformed the shrine life in both apolitical and political directions. The shrines of Makhdom Ali Hajvery and Mian Wadda were showing the signs of change. The shrine of Makhdum Ali Hajvery opened itself for a large number of Islamic practices. Amid the multiple stories of receiving respect from almost each Muslim Indian ruler, the shrine however showed a meager position. The dedicated Muslims turned their attention for improving the condition of that place of the personality who initiated that very Islam getting popular at that time. The mosque at the shrine built in the early part of the nineteenth century.[43] The same mosque was built again in 1921.[44] Both times the reasons were dreams to the Muslims already dedicated to this shrine. These constructions attracted gradually a large number of Muslim elites and *Shurafa* (aristocrats) started paying visits and *Nazranai* (the monetary rewards) to the saint's shrine. It is condoled however that despite being the most sacred shrine the shrine keepers hadn't got the proper response. People must give more attention to

the shrine and give more money to build this shrine.[45] In another shrine of Shah Daula of Gujarat, the developmental spirit operated in a different way. This shrine was famous for its *Faqeers* (beggars) and *Chuhas* (The Rat-children of Shah Daula). The master of this shrine, Shah Daula Daryai never accepted any *Nazrana* (the monetary rewards) from a Muslim ruler despite being respected even by Aurangzeb Alamgir. The traditional way of meeting the needs of the shrine remained for collecting food through begging. After the death of Shah Daula Daryai, a story developed and got famous for sheltering Chuha (The Rat-children of Shah Daula) at the shrine.[46] This phenomenon remained sacred for almost the whole nineteenth century. However in the later part of nineteenth and early part of twentieth century this phenomenon was increasingly considered to be criminal. The British authorities started believing that under the cover of Chuha (The Rat-children of Shah Daula) phenomenon Faqeer of this shrine were engaged in the trading of women.[47]

The emergence of sufis like Pir Jamat ali Shah, in Narowal and Pir Mohammad Sher, at Sharakpur, both directed towards Islamizing Sufism expressed the political directions in central Punjab. Both of the personalities were initiated in Naqshbandi order and they dedicated their lives in preaching Islam and promoting Shari-sufism. Pir Jamat Ali Shah remained engaged in political matters more actively than that of

Pir Mohammad Sher. He led the movement for Shaheed Ganj mosque,[48] a conflict between Muslims and Sikhs of Lahore emerged on the ownership of the land of the mosque. Pir Jamat Ali Shah and his son also took part actively in the elections of 1937 and 1946, in Jalalpu Jatta, Jehlum, for pursuing locals to vote only to those who gave primacy to the Muslim identity.[49] In this regard, his position came quite close to the Muslim League. He even termed Mr. Jinnah as Wali Ullah when Deobandi-school opened criticism on Jinnah for not following and showing his identity as a Muslim, and still pursuing the rights of Muslims of India. On the other hand Pir Mian Mohammad Sher Rabbani though never remained vocal in political matters, as he died nine years before the birth of Pakistan and some years ago the popularity of Muslim League, however during his meetings with Sir Mohammad Shafi who was also his cousin and Iqbal were famous for pointing out his emphasis on Muslim identity. In both those meetings he lamented them for not having beard. His son, and sajjada nashin of the Khankah Naqshbandia Mujaddadia Mian Mohammad Sher Rabbani, at Sharakpur, took active part in the politics. He successfully arranged the first public meeting of Muslim League in his town and advised Muslims to take side of Jinnah against Unionist party's politics.[50]

As the struggle of Pakistan emerged and prevailed, the *sajjada nashin* who were standing with

the Unionist party's politics and policies till then and providing support to the ruling system devised by the British authorities, started shifting to the cause of Muslim League. [51] A large number of Sufi-Pirs started favoring the struggle of Pakistan, thus taking the cause of a Muslim independent state to the village.[52] The merging of urban religious ideologue with the rural shrine-based sufistic practices consolidated the position of Muslim League and provided that very political weight to Jinnah needed to win the politics of center. The struggle for separate homeland for Muslims of India won the day but at the same time made fragile the association with sufi-pirs. The state of Pakistan stood for modern religious ideologue proclaiming to transform the otherwise backward life by opening up developmental possibilities, especially and only, for Muslims. This religious ideologue empowered through its rational-scriptural formation considered the shrine-based Sufistic practices devoid of modern rationality. Forgetting their role in the struggle for Pakistan, the Sufism was considered the major reason for keeping the modern Islamic state backward. Soon the policies have been devised for controlling, manipulating and guiding the site of shrines, in order to reform them.

The state of Pakistan emerged out of the colonial heritage and followed through its existence the orientations already set by the colonized modernity[53]. This modern rationality appeared not

only in the agenda and orientation of the state but also in the modern scriptural Islam[54] to transform the traditional patterns of life. The state, geared for transformation and reformation, consolidates itself into military-bureaucratic authoritarian order[55]. The ruling elite, standing upon the unique political and historical situation, fought for gaining the same control that colonial masters had enjoyed[56]. The 'absence of constitution' attained highest political objective yet the process of forming constitution stretched long and orthodox reformist religious positions those otherwise remained distanced from Muslim League's struggle for dividing India for the cause of Muslims gaining their way into the state corridors as justified constitutional alternatives.[57] The struggle for power found religious consciousness as a suitable form to guise material concerns. The peripheral economy[58] generated "*will to change"* the existing condition while finding solutions in the symbolic religious ideologues. The desire of economy to open itself for free market operations generated the desire to rationalize the land ownerships. The process to rationalize land ownerships however when translated into religious consciousness the state found it more "rational" to take into its control *Shrines* and its property existing as a *Waqf*. [59]

Auqaf, as a separate ministry and a state department, developed and prevailed upon *Shrines*, as pursuing the postcolonial state's agenda to

transform the sites of shrine into a modern civility.[60] Since its inception in 1959, emerging out of the modern reformist spirit of Ayub Khan,[61] each successive government kept the reformist agenda and treated shrines as a passive site ready for state's ideological imposition. The state activities brought changes in the structure of shrines and each government leaves its unique traces upon the map of shrines. Driven to transform the site of shrines either through modernizing reforms or Islamizing[62] these sites, each government generates its discursive agenda and focuses its attention on implementation of its programme. Each time, however, where state enabled to infuse changes, there its programme also met the weaknesses inherent in the structure of a post-colonial state.[63] The ideological claims to pursue programmes universally while ignoring the infrastructure and monetary constraints define the very character of the state. This weakness results in the selected working, the profitable working indeed, and selected imposition of state's power. The left out portion remained free to follow its traditional existence. However, this traditional existence couldn't move freely as an alternative traditional existence. This portion of society, under the compulsion of following state's generated values, pursues the values already displayed by the state though through some distance.

With the shift in the policies of state, the emphasis upon reforming shrine shifts. All the governments since 1947 kept Islamic ideologue as their beacon of light. However, each government shows forth its own conception of Islam and its relation and engagement with the affairs of State. First thirty five years, or till the middle of Bhutto's reign, the reformist Islam seems to be overburdened by social reforms. For Ayyub Khan, the Mullahism and Sufism was detrimental to the growth of individuals. For him the best route to develop *Imam* is to follow the medieval jurist model where Qazi (judge) not only performs judicial duties but also disseminates the sultan's religious agenda. He conceives Maulvi in the form of a cultural and social reformer who would remain busy not only in religious matters but also elevating the quality of life in his area. The shrine and mosque therefore must be transformed into a space from where people could get both quantitative and qualitative benefits. In Ayyub's rule, the medical centre was developed at the shrine of Data Darbar. For Bhutto, however, to take people's attraction was more important. His gift of a gold-door to the shrine of Data Darbar, letting it flourishes on its own, showed his distancing from a reformist position of previous government. Yet his interest in the shrine-based activity as they appeared through his gifts and promotion of cultural saint-sites showed his conception of Islam. However, it is with Ziaul Haq and

after his rule, the activities of a modern reformist Islam changes considerably and the shift shows signs of the modern-Militant – Islam, already emerged and developed in the wake of Afghan-Russia war at the borders of Pakistan.[64] During the democratic decade of 1990s, the Islamic emphasis though staggers and political maneuverings played more important a role, yet it keeps its existence in the context of state's increased alignment with the Taliban and militant organizations supporting state's Kashmir policy. Another shift takes place with the emergence of "Moderate Enlightenment" when state promotes Sufistic ideas, while keeping its half-hearted attacks against the militants,[65] and thus keeping the prevalence of the militant reformist Islam. This phase coincides with the prevailing of large scale consumerism and a shift of state's policy towards policies of introducing multinational mobile companies and banks. This position promotes both Militant Islam and Sufism. A large increase of the organized lovers in the name of Muhammad (PBUH), pilgrimages to the state-based shrines and popularity of *Naat* in big cities and their vicinities were signs of increasing popularity of urbanized sufisitic practices.

Islamizing Shrines provided framework that helped reducing the distance between the "irrational" discursive practices embedded within the tradition of Sufism to "scriptural- Shariat based Islam".[66] Leaving the Ayyub's era aside, that ironically initiated the very

control on Shrines through creating the Auqaf department, and carried forward the reformist spirit of colonized modern Salariat class[67], in this sense carried forward the spirit of modern Islam of Sir Syed and Iqbal,[68] while keeping distance at the same time from Ulema-based scriptural Islam[69], each successive government pursued the policies of re-shaping Shrines through orthodox reformist scriptural Islam. The Bhutto government emphasizes on Sufism, in an effort to find democratic moment of creative potential. The debate for giving Punjabi primacy[70] in the rule of Bhutto discovered Punjabi poets and their poetry as a Sufi expression. The shrines of Waris Shah, at Jandiala Sherkhan in Sheikhupura and Bullah Shah, at Qasur, found prominent place in the projective working of Auqaf department. With Zia-Ul Haq, as the state in his rule owned and pursued the model of Maulana Maududi and Deobandi Islam that so far remained as an alternative Islamic state position, the Shariat based Islamization penetrated at the site of shrine.[71] The changes, occurred through the state policies, eased the way of transformation for shrines as embodying, at-least ostensibly, primacy of the elements of scriptural Islam. It was the construction of the mosque at the site of Data Darbar in which Zia-ulHaq took personal interest in 1981.[72] Interestingly one can contrast it with Ayyub Khan's interest in constructing Medical center at the same shrine in the decade of 1960s. Increasingly the site of mosque and

practices related with it like *Aitiqaf* gained primacy within the sacred spaces of shrine, in this case, of Ali Hajvery (Data Ganj Bakhsh).

The control of state on shrines though blocked some traditional ways yet opened up many others for spiritual development. The banning of Sajjada Nashin and Khadmins made the shrines free from a personified spiritual presence thus transformed these spaces into saint-less shrines. The character of state controlled shrine, with an emphasis on saint-less space, remain open for every one, with the Shariat based environment all around, coupled with the stress upon enhancing financial condition acquires another stage in the organizational history of Sufism. The ideal type of this form of Sufism can be seen in the living shrine of Nuri Bori Sarkar, near Kot Abdul Malik, Sheikhupura Road Lahore. This is a shrine of a living sufi who had been living in his tomb for last forty years. He seldom appeared in public and seldom sees the sun light. People visited him as he was already dead. His *Urs* used to take place and murids visit to gather Barakat from him as already a dead saint. He had not made any Khalifa or gave Khillat to any one else. He was as he was not. Yet his existence has been changed. For last few years, his presence is in a sense remodeled. A huge tomb has been built with a mosque in front of his old and humble residence. A large plot, worth millions of rupees, has been walled around for placing visitors

arriving on his *Urs* held at May 31, June 1-4 each year. His spiritual activities seem to be operating in modern ways where advertising and shrine management has been taking place professionally. He seems to be depicting the ideal type of contemporary Sufism. His presence as absence negates the existence of a living sufi or even the justification of a living sufi, that otherwise remained a hallmark of the movement of Sufism. The monetary engagement at his shrine turning his presence as only an element in a modern business project makes his shrine stand markedly. The movement of Sufism that emerged out in the early history of Islam as an active struggle of few individuals searching for the spirited religion, and engagement with the living Reality, already in the second half of the twentieth century, however, entered into a new form where the need for a living sufi seems to be reduced to the minimum and dynamism of society provides its direction.

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[1] "In order to define the ideology of Islam and to apply it to present conditions of life, and especially to the conditions of life in Pakistan," president and Field Marshal Ayyub Khan, in 1959, requested scholars to ponder and express their thoughts. Field Marshal found the thesis of Dr. Javid Iqbal, a "brilliant effort" that "provides a rational and enlightened approach to some very fundamental problems." Javid Iqbal, The Ideology of Pakistan and Its Implementation (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali And Sons, 1959), xi-xii.

[2] "The requirement," Field Marshal Ayyub Khan opined, is to find out answers of the questions related to "the ideology of Islam" and living in a newly liberated state of Pakistan, in "simple, brief, but catchy language which will also appeal to reason. It should be comprehensible and attractive to the largest number of people and capable of being put into practice. [my emphasis]" Ibid. xi.

[3] In the debate between Modernity and Tradition, the later phenomenon is considered to be fixed while Modernity introduces changes. For details see, Robert Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism Unbound: Politics and Piety in Twenty-first Century Pakistan (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5-9.

[4] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-14.

[5] David Gilmartin, Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1979), 485-517.

[6]Uzma Rehman, (2008). Sufi shrines and identiy-construction in Pakistan: The mazars of Saiyid Pir Waris Shah and Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai. (Denmark: University of Copenhagen, Ph.D. thesis.). 3-4.

[7] The current Sajjada Nashin of Mian Mir shrine, Shahzad-ul-Hasan Gilani Chan Pir, runs an Astana (a holy abode of a sufi saint) near Packages Factory, Walton Road, Lahore.

[8] "Pir Syed Ghulam Rasul Shah" is the current Sajjada Nashin of the shrine of Pir Jamat Ali Shah Lasani (d.1938) of Rasul Syedan, Narowal.

[9] This Gaddi (spiritual seat of shrine) runs on a shrine of a sufi saint, Karmanwala Sarkar (Ismail Shah Bukhari d. 1385 H) from a Naqshbandi order situated at the border of Okara and Qasur districts. This Gaddi also have lot of Murid (Aspirants) from Lahore and an associated shrine of a famous saint at Lahore in Mughal Pura.

[10] This Gaddi runs on a shrine of Pir Fazal Shah(d.1974) from Qadri Qalandri order situated at Mandhair Sharif, Narowal.

[11] For details see, Muhammad Nazeer Ranjha. Tareekh wa Tazkara Khankah Naqshbandia Mujaddadia Sharakpur Sharif (Islamabad: Purab Academy, 2007)

[12] Malik understands Sufism, even in a post-colonial environment, as a developing phenomenon. One can find for heuristic reasons at-least seven stages in the history of Sufism on the basis of changes in themes. See Jamal Malik and John Hinnells (eds.). "Introduction". Sufism in the West. London: Routledge, 2006. One can contrast this position of Malik with Trimingham's position, in which, though the development within Sufism have already attained three stages, Khankah, Tarikah and Taifa, in the organizational history of the order of Sufism, however, the

development within Sufism has finally exhausted its potential to grow: "The orders had now attained their final forms of organization and spiritual exercises. Innovations had become fully integrated and their spirits and aims were stereotyped. No further development was possible and no further work of mystical insight which could make a new point of departure in either doctrine or practice was to make its appearance." See Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 104. For Katherine Ewing the position of Trimingham manifests a Colonial bias that appreciates development within the history of the colonized but intends to mitigate its worth in present. "Trimingham obviously thought that the system deserved to be overthrown by Western thought, which like his construction of early Sufism, celebrates the autonomous creativity of the individual. In Trimingham's work … a series of signifiers was fixed vis-à-vis the dichotomy of modernity versus tradition. Tradition was aligned with superstition, error, stasis, and corruption." Katherine Pratt Ewing, Arguing Sainthood : Modernity, Psychoanalysis and Islam (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 1997), 41.

[13] Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India. Vol.1. (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2004), 27-31

[14] Two figures, Al-Junaid Baghdadi (d.298/910) and Abu Yazid Taifur Al-Bistami (d.260/874), are considered to articulate initial spiritual practices. However, their practices can at best be considered as "schools of thought" and not the initiators of Orders. Spencer Trimingham. The Sufi Orders in Islam. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 4.

[15] Annemarie Schimmel, The Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 104.

[16] Ibid., 105.

[17] Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, 3.

[18] For example, Shihab ad-din Abu Hafs 'Umar (539/1145-632/1234) is considered to be the founder of the Suharwardi Silsila (Way). He was not only an author of 'Awarif Al-Maarif' that every Sufi even today reads, but also a very good teacher (Shaikh). For details see, Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India. Vol.1. (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2004)

[19] Trimingham understands this stage as Taifa, the stage when Sufism immersed in the elaborated practices defined within certain order alongside with the transmitted allegiance of the saints of Silsila. Sufism becomes a popular movement and orders (Silsilas) getting branched off into numerous other sub-Silsilas hooked up at the same time with the saint-cult. Spencer Trimingham. The Sufi Orders in Islam.

[20] Richard M. Eaton, Sufis of Bijapur 1300-1700: Social Roles of Sufis in Medieval India (Princeton University Press, 1978),.

[21] Bahaud-Din Zikrya (d.1262 A.D.) came to India and settled in Multan in the later first half of thirteenth century. He was contemporary of Fareed-ud-Din Ganj Shakkar (d.1265 A.D.) who was disciple of Qutubuddin Bakhtiar Kaki who himself was a disciple of (d.1235 A.D.) Mueen-ud-din Chishti Ajmeri (d.1236), the founder of Chishti order in India. See, Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India. Vol.1, 141-197.

[22] Muzaffar Alam, The Languages of Political Islam: India, 1200-1800 (London: Kings Hurst and Co. Publishers, 2004), 3.

[23] Richard M. Eaton (ed.), India's Islamic Traditions: 711-1750 (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), 6.

[24] Tan Tai Yung, The Garrison State: The Military Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947 (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), 33

[25] Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, 173.

[26] From late eighteenth century, the internal development of Tasawwuf was showing signs of change. Within the order of Chishtis, a revivalist movement emerged through the teachings of "Shah Kalim Ullah of Dehli (1650-1729)". This movement though remained orthodox, helped directing Tasawwuf towards re-creating muslim identity and ethical revivalism. Figures like, Khwaja Suleman of Taunsa (1770-1850), Khwaja Shamsud Din Sialwi (1799-1883) and Syed Mahr Ali Shah of Golra Sharif (1856-1937), owned and pursued this movement. For details see, David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989)

[27] Emotional revivalism emerged through the teachings of Mohammad Nausha and popularized in Lahore through Faqir family. The emergence of Naqshbandi and Qadri revival produced gradually urban-shari-based sufistic practices within or around the urban areas.

[28] In Lahore, near Masti Gate, a Naushahi shrine of Fazal Shah (d.1854 A.D.) was famous. In Gujranwala the shrine of Pak Rahman (d.1740) was attracting hundreds of thousands of visitors at Urs.

[29] Noor Ahmed Chishti, Yadgar-e-Chishti (Lahore: Nigarashat Publishers, 2007), First published, 1859, pp.130-132.

[30] Mufti Ghulam Sarwar Lahori, Khazinat-ul Asfiya (Qadriya). trns. Pirzada Allama Iqbal Ahmad (Lahore: Maktaba-e-Nabwiya, 2010). Also, Noor Ahmed Chishti, Tahkeekat-e-Chishti (Lahore: Al-faisal Nashran, 2006), First published, 1859.

[31] One can find a reference in the writings of Tahir Ali Bandagi. For details see, Khurshid Hussain Bukhari, Hazrat Sheikh Tahir Bandagi (Sheikhupura: Fakhar Brothers publishers, 2003), 53.

[32] There is no mention of Lal Hussain in Dara Shikoh's Safinatul Aulia.

[33] Syed Muhammad Latif, Tarikh-e-Lahore (Lahore: Takhlikat publishers, 2004), first published, 1874, 252. Also, Noor Ahmed Chishti, Tahkeekat-e-Chishti (Lahore: Al-faisal Nashran, 2006), first published, 1859, 166-167.

[34] Chishti, Yadgar-e-Chishti, 135-136.

[35] Ibid., 128-129.

[36] S.S. Thorburn, Musalmans and Money Lenders in the Punjab (Lahore: Book Traders, 1874), 14-15.

[37] Ibid., 15.

[38] Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, trans. Tahir Kamran (Lahore: Takhliqat, 2006), 76.

[39] R.Upadhyay, *Auqaf WAQF* (CHARITABLE ISLAMIC TRUST) -Under sustained controversy in India (Retrieved on 04-10-2004) < http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers12%5Cpaper1136.html > (Retrieved on 12-05-2010).

[40] Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 76

[41] Deoband Madrasa was developed in 1867 by two figures: Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-1877) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905). Both these figures were students of Imdadullah (1817-1899) a Naqshbandi scholar in the lineage of both Syed Ahmed of Sirhind, famous as Mujaddad Alif Sani (d.1624 A.D.) and Syed Ahmed Brelvi (d.1831 A.D.). Rashid Ahmed, however, also descended from a Chishti lineage of Muhammad Abdul Qaddus Gangohi (d.1537 A.D.). The Deoband movement, however, found its impact largely from that Islamic revivalist spirit that was sweeping across the regions of the Muslim Middle East, Africa and Asia in eighteenth century. Out of this spirit emerged figures like that of Abdul Wahab in Middle East, Shah Waliullah in India and Abdas Samad Al Palembeni in Indonesia. It was Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) of Naqshbandi order, the prophet of Muslim unity, who initiated this spirit within eighteenth century Muslim India. His visit to Meccah and return after studying and teaching Hadis and Quran remained vital for effecting refinement and changes in his ideas. For details see, Barbara Daly Mercalf, Islamic Revival in British India; Deoband, 1860-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For comparative details see, R. Michael Feener, Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives (ABC-CLIO Inc., 2004), 189-190.

[42] Chishti, Yadgar-e-Chishti, 68-69.

[43] Mohammad Din Fauq, Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh (Lahore: Gauhar Publications, 2008), 140.

[44] Ghafir Shahzad, *Data Darbar Complex: Tameer sai Takmeel Tak* (Lahore: Book Home, 2004), 27.

[45] Mohammad Din Fauq, Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh, 136-137.

[46] E.D Maclagan and H.A. Rose, A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Provinces. trns. Yasir Jawad (Lahore: Book Home, 2006), 137-139.

[47] Ibid., p.139.

[48] David Gilmartin, Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1979), 489-490 < www.jstore.org/stable/312311> (Retrieved on 13-05-2010), 502.

[49] Ibid., 503-504.

[50] Muhammad Nazeer Ranjha, Tareekh wa Tazkara Khankah Naqshbandia Mujaddadia Sharakpur Sharif (Islamabad: Purab Academy, 2007), 98-99.

[51] David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 505-508.

[52] Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, trans. Tahir Kamran, 214-215.

[53]Alavi, *Authoritariaism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan*. *The Post-colonial state in Asia: Dialectics of Politics and Culture*. Subrata Kumar Mitra (ed.) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1998), 22-23.

[54] Modern scriptural Islam remained distant from "reformist" though orthodox scriptural Islam of Deoband order. For details see, Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 11-14. Also, Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996)

[55]Alavi, Authoritariaism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan, 22.

[56]Waseem. Politics and the State in Pakistan,.

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[57]Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkley: University of California Press, 1963), 7-9.

[58]Alavi, Authoritariaism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan, 23.

[59]Katherine Ewing, *Arguing Sainthood: Modernity, Psychoanalysis and Islam* (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 1997), 70-71.

[60] Javid Iqbal, Ideology of Pakistan and its implementation (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1959), 28-29.

[61] Ibid. ix-xiii

[62]Islamizing here refers to the transformational process pursued by the state through giving primacy to the scriptural Islam generated in opposing to the colonial authoritarian order though imbibing the same logic of articulation. See, Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996)

[63] Even today, one finds a huge difference between the shrine of Makhdoom Ali Hajvery Data Ganj Bakhsh, a very profitable project for Auqaf, and that of Madhu Lal Hussain that is not that much a profitable project.

[64] Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 11-12.

[65] Ibid., 224.

[66] For the ideological basis of Muslim League's point of view one regarding sufism can see, Abu Lillais Siddiqui, Iqbal aur Maslak-e-Tasawwaf (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1977)

[67]Hamza Alavim, Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology, in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds.) State and

Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan (London: Monthly Review Press, 1988), pp.69-71.

[68] Ibid. and also see, Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900*, .x.

[69] Javid Iqbal, Ideology of Pakistan and its implementation, ix-xiii. See also Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan.

[70] Tariq Rahman, Language, Ideology and Power (Oxford university Press), 413-416.

[71] Jamal Malik and John Hinnells (eds.), Sufism in the West (London: Routledge, 2006), 7

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LAWYERS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA: VANGUARDS OF LAWYER'S MOVEMENT (2007-2009)

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ABSTRACT

Lawyer's movement galvanized the all circles of the society due to its multidimensional aspects; the lawyer movement was unique as compared to other movements in our political and constitutional history. Undoubtedly, the lawyers were the torch bearer of this movement but the success of the lawyer's movement would be dependent upon the support it received from the civil society and the media of Pakistan. When chief justice was sacked, the legal community from all over the country started peaceful, non-violent and selfless struggle for the independence of judiciary and rule of law which was supported massively by civil society and projected by vibrant media.

KEY WORDS

Pakistan, Civil Society, Media, Lawyers, Rule of Law, Judiciary

The Lawyers' Movement for the restoration of judiciary is one of the most significant events in the history of Pakistan. The Lawyers' Movement was unique in many aspects as compare to other Movements in the history of Pakistan, like the Movement against President Ayub Khan in 1969, Separatist Movement in East Pakistan, The Nizam-i-Mustafa Movement of 1977 and the movement for the restoration of Democracy during General Zia

period because it never happened before in our history that almost all circles of society had attached with any movement for so long period as with the Lawyers' Movement. It was pathetic and probably the "Black Day" in our country's history when Chief Justice of Pakistan was detained in the custody of Army Chief on 9 March 2007 when he was asked to either resign or face the reference. It added fuel to fire when Chief Justice of Pakistan was humiliated and mishandled when he was appearing to Supreme Judicial Council with his family members. When Chief Justice of Pakistan was deposed by Military dictator illegally and unconstitutionally, the legal community from all over the country started peaceful protests and boycotts of the courts which greatly supported by the civil society of Pakistan and projected by a vibrant and independent media with great spirit. "While the judiciary is the custodian of the constitution, lawyers are the custodian of the judiciary".[1]

The Bench and Bar are part and parcel of judicial system and our history tells us that Bar has always stood for a strong and independent judiciary. It is judiciary of Pakistan who stuck and abide by the "Law of Necessity", however the legal community of Pakistan had always struggled for the independence of judiciary and rule of law. Immediately after the removal of Chief Justice, the lawyers of Pakistan came out to protest and they launched a historic, peaceful movement for the supremacy of the constitution. According to Chaudary Aitzaz; "let me assure you that yours courageous and self-less struggle for the independence of judiciary and rule of law had not example even in those countries" which we consider the pioneers of rule of law and judicial independence.[2]

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF LEGAL COMMUNITY

In order to understand the role of lawyers' community for the restoration of judiciary, it is very important to study the organizational structure of lawyers' community because it was

one of the key factors of their success. The lawyers' community is the most professional organization and having mechanism of organizational structure and elections process which is consisted on Pakistan Bar Council, Supreme Court Bar Council, Punjab Bar Council, Sindh Bar Council, Khyber Pukhtun Khaa Bar Council, Balochistan Bar Council, High Court Bar Councils, District Bar Councils and Tehsil Bar Councils.[3] This organizational structure was very beneficiary for the unity and common cause of the legal community because if any one tried to violate the rules and interests of the community, his membership of Bar and Licence would had been cancelled. During Movement the licence of Pro-Government lawyers, like Naeem Bokhari, Wasi Zafar, Sher Afgan, Ahmed Raza Kasuri, Malik Qayyum and Khalid Ranjha were cancelled by their respective Bars. Pakistan Bar Council, Sind Bar Council, Punjab Bar Council, Sarhad Bar Council, Balochistan Bar Council, all High Courts Bar Associations of all provinces, protested and showed solidarity with Chief Justice.[4] It was due to its organizational structure and unity that immediately after the dismissal of Chief Justice, on the call of Pakistan Bar Council and Supreme Court Bar Association there was a countrywide protest of lawyers on 12 March 2007. Lawyers from Karachi to Khyber were united and registered their protest. "The Bar and Bench are frequently compared to two wheels of the same chariot. I prefer to term as fellow sailors on a ship".[5]

The entry of PCO judges including chief justice Abdul Hamid Dogar was banned by the Supreme Court bar association, High court bar associations and District bar associations. Justice Dogar was not invited by the bars of the countries to address except Sukar, Larkana and Ghotki bars in July, 2008.[6] All the Bar Councils of Pakistan have been a history of democracy and elections within Bars regularly with certain laws and bye-laws. The democratic tradition of elections had purified the lawyers' leadership during movement. The elections of the Bars were held every year during the movement and no effort was made to

postpone the elections because it supported the movement in many ways. The democratic traditions and elections in bars provided alternative leadership as in football match the fresh player is substituted by tired player. When Aitzaz Ahsan became the president of Supreme Court bar, he brought tremendous spirit in the movement but when he criticized after controversial decision of ending the long march he was replaced by another popular leader Ali Ahmad Kurd.[7] The lawyers' commitment and devotion with the Movement remained stick and the leadership was substituted without any harm to Movement.

NON-POLITICAL AND NON-VIOLENT MOVEMENT

One of the allegations of the Lawyers' Movement was quoted by Musharaf government that the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Lawyers' community that they have politicized an issue that was purely a constitutional issue. The reference against Chief Justice had two aspects, one was purely legal and constitutional aspect, the other was purely political aspect when Chief Justice and other judges of superior courts were detained, arrested and it was direct attack on the independence of the judiciary which was challenged by political parties and civil society. However, the Movement for the restoration of judiciary was sustained and headed by lawyers' not political parties although they supported it. The workers or leaders of any political party who were allowed to participate in the meetings of working council of any bar association. Only those lawyers who were members of "bar as well as political party could represent the feelings of that political party in the meeting".[8]

The Lawyers' Movement was a struggle for the rule of law, concept of independence of judiciary, democracy and constitutionalism. Although this Movement was supported by political parties because they wanted to get support from public for their vote bank but the lawyers' community had no political agenda. The Lawyers' Movement was supported by all circles of society because the independence of judiciary was concerning

issue of every citizen of Pakistan above his association with any political party or not, every Pakistani wanted the security of his or her fundamental rights and justice. When Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudary started his visits to address the various Bar Associations of Pakistan, his speeches were purely academic and non-political, mainly based on the issues of separation of powers, supremacy of the rule of law, fundamental rights of people and independence of the institutions. He never talked on political issues and even the political parties were not allowed to attend the seminars arranged by legal community.

One of the great characteristics of the Lawyers' Movement was that it was peaceful and non-violent Movement except few incidents. Almost two years the lawyers of Pakistan have written a new chapter of courage and bravery in our history and except the few counter attacks on police they remained peaceful. The former federal minister Dr. Shar Afgan Niazi was brutally tortured by lawyers in Lahore but this incident was controlled by president of SC bar Aitzaz Ahsan and called it a sabotaging effort to peaceful lawyers' movement. He announced his resignation in protest of this violent incident which could defame the lawyers' struggle.[9] An effort was made by some official agents to sabotage the non-violent movement of Lawyers, a strong reaction came from legal community when Ch. Aitzaz resigned after Sher Afgan incident, in response to this 73 Bar Associations of Pakistan warned to resign in case Aitzaz did not back his resignation. The strong reaction and protest of legal community strengthened the Movement. It was peaceful struggle of lawyers and Aitzaz had proudly called, that after two successful Long Marches and two years struggle, the lawyers of Pakistan have not broken even a single plant. The lawyers of Pakistan have written a new chapter of courage and bravery.[10]

SACRIFICES OF THE LAWYERS

The sacrifices that have been given by the lawyers' community of Pakistan for the independence of judiciary and Rule of Law have no parallel in modern history of Pakistan. The first phase of Lawyers' Movement started when Chief Justice of Pakistan was removed illegally and unconstitutionally by General Musharraf on 9 March 2007, the second phase of Lawyers' struggle started when on 3 November 2007 once again dictator attacked on independent judiciary, hence a new chapter of courage, bravery and sacrifices of legal community continued till the restoration of judiciary. Most of the junior or young lawyers remained "hand to mouth" during the Movement but they never compromised on their superior cause for the independence of judiciary. On 12 March 2007 the call of protest and boycott the courts was announced by Pakistan bar council and Supreme Court Bar Association in all over the country, in Lahore High Court the police brutally attacked on lawyers which resulted some serious injuries to protesters.[11]

It is significant and historic to acknowledge that the role of Punjab was very crucial and vital in Lawyers' Movement. In our history, the role of Punjab and Punjabi Judges is associated with establishment and pro-Military but first time in the judicial history of Pakistan the Punjabi lawyers particularly Lahore High Court Bar, Lahore District Bar, Punjab Bar Council and Punjabi judges removed the old allegations and they stood with rule of law. After the removal of Chief Justice when joint call was announced on 12 March 2007, the first significant protest was registered by the lawyers of Lahore High Court on Mall Road when they brutally charged by law enforcement agencies, it was probably the beginning of Movement. On 17 of March 2007, the Lahore High Court Bar Association arranged an All Pakistan Lawyers Convention, attended by large numbers of lawyers, the worst form of lathi charge, tear gas shells and tortured was made by police on peaceful lawyers' protest in order to disperse their

Convention.[12] Once again the Lahore High Court Bar took an initiative to hold a lawyers' convention which was targeted brutally by police.

The lawyers' struggle for the independence of judiciary will be written in the history with golden words. On 12 May 2007, the chief justice scheduled visit to Karachi to address the lawyers' convention was sabotaged the provincial government. Chief Justice had scheduled visit to Karachi to address the lawyers' convention on 12 May 2007. In order to create fear two days ago to visit few unknown assailants had fired at the house of the President Supreme Court Bar and active leader of lawyers' movement Muneer A. Malik, which was condemned by all circles of society.[13] "On 12 May 2007, Karachi was sealed, lawlessness and fascism was reached at its peak which resulted 40 precious lives".[14] To sabotage the Lawyers' Movement the fascism and brutality was seen by the whole world when Chief Justice came to address the Sindh High Court Bar Association at Karachi, 40 precious lives were lost including two active members of Movement, Raja Riaz and Pervez Akhtar Kiyani, and the law enforcement agencies were totally disappeared. In response to these events the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan stated, the aim is to silence, depress and repress the civil society of Pakistan. It was a terrorist act to suppress the freedom of expression. The roads blocking, weaponised Muthidda Qaumi Movement (MQM) militants was deliberate attempt of government to destroy the Chief Justice's visit. It was added fuel to fire when on 12 May 2007 evening, General Musharraf addressed to a public rally in front of Parliament and said that they want to show power, "let them tell that power is with us".[15] On the night of 4 May 2007, Sahiwal Bar Association arranged a peaceful torch bearing really in the support of sacked chief justice from the Sahiwal District Bar to the centre of the city. Meanwhile the police threw bottles of petrol and acid on the faces of the lawyers which burned their faces.[16] It was a shameful act of police

and law enforcement agencies to attack on peaceful procession of lawyers. The lawyers of Sahiwal District Bar have written a history of great courage with their blood.

EMERGENCY AND LAWYERS RESPONSE

Before the proclamation of emergency on 3 November 2007, the lawyers of Pakistan registered their protest at massive level on 29 September 2007, the date of scrutiny of Musharraf candidature as a President for new term. The emergency or martial law was followed by massive crackdown. The entire leadership of the lawyers' community, Aitzaz Ahsan, Ali Ahmad Kurd, Muneer A. Malik, Hamid Khan, Justice Retired Tariq Mehmood, Rasheed A. Rizvi, Imdad Ali Awan, Latif Afridi, Muhammad Shah and Qazi Muhammad Anwar were sent to jails or detained in their houses which were declared sub-jails. The Lawyers' Movement was started by a group of legal community for the rule of law and independence of the judiciary. But due to massive support of general public and all circles of the society soon it turned into a mass movement. When chief justice of Pakistan started series of address to various bars councils of the country on their invitation, a large number of public belong to multiple classes of the society participated in rallies and expressed their solidarity with lawyers' movement. The public associations with chief justice and the movement reached at its zenith when chief justice started his journey from Islamabad to Lahore on 5 May 2007.[17] One of the greatest achievements of the Lawyers' Movement was that although this Movement was started and launched by the lawyers' community but it turned into mass movement and significantly attracted by all circles of society.

In order to getting public support at massive level, it was strategy of the lawyers' leadership that Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudary should address the Bar Associations, Seminars and conventions arranged by the lawyers. The tours of the Bar Associations attracted by huge crowd and the print and

electronic media had given extensive coverage to the Lawyers' Movement. After successful journeys of Sukkar, Hyderabad and Peshawar, the visit of chief justice was scheduled in the heart of Pakistan the city of Lahore. The Lahore high court bar association is the biggest high court bar association and the Lahore bar association is to be considered the biggest district bar association in South Asia. The other important aspect of this visit was that almost all the national movements in Pakistan's history succeeded only when Lahore endorsed support on their back[18]. The visit of Chief Justice to address the Lahore High Court Bar Association was historical in many aspects. In our history Lahore had remained the hub of All Political Movements. The Lahore High Court Bar Association and Lahore Bar Association were the vanguard of the Movement and both bars played vital share in Movement. The journey of Chief Justice from Islamabad to Lahore took 24 hours, hundreds of thousands of people lined up on both sides of G.T. Road; they expressed their love and support to Chief Justice.[19] The most important aspect of this address was that 17 judges of Lahore High Court attended the address and showed their support to Chief Justice.[20] The role of Punjab in Lawyers' Movement was decisive and vital; not only the Lahore High Court Bar and Lahore Bar Association have contributed but Punjabi judges compensated their role in the past history of Pakistan. After the visit of Chief Justice to Lahore, the Lawyers' Movement turned into mass Movement as it was historic and record breaking journey of Chief Justice. Similarly, Chief Justice received great response during his addresses to Islamabad Bar Association, Peshawar Bar Association, Sukkar and Hyderabad Bar Association, Abbottabad and Faisalabad Bar Associations.

The Pakistan Bar Council, Supreme Court Bar Association and all the Bars of the country used different methods to fulfill the goals of the Movement. The boycott of the courts sometimes full day boycott and sometimes few hours in a day. Later on "Thursday" was fixed as weekly boycott day. On Thursday all the

courts of the country were boycotted and registered their protest on roads. However, the lawyers took a clear and staunch stand against PCO judges. Many efforts have been made by PPP government to make any compromise between lawyers and PCO judges but the lawyers' leadership categorically denied any formula and boycotted the PCO judges. One of the strategies of lawyers was the arrangement of hungers strike camps in different bars of the country where lawyers sitting for hours. In Lahore high court bar a permanent hunger strike camp was established. The lawyers' leadership detained in jails continued their hunger strike as a protest against their illegal detention. Later on LHBA decided "token hunger strike from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. daily". [21] On 31 January 2008, the legal community of Pakistan observed "Iftikhar Day" with great zeal and zest and boycotted the court activities throughout the day. Their registered their protest against dismissal of judges after 3 November 2009 Martial Law and they paid great tribute to Justice Iftikhar and other courageous judges. The lawyers' community had observed, "Black Day" on 9 March 2008 over completion of one year of illegal steps taken by General Musharraf against deposed Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudary. Again Black day was observed by lawyers on 12 May 2008 to mark the first anniversary of killings in Karachi. They also protested raised slogans against PPP Government that the issue of the restoration of the deposed judges went to cold store and government using delaying tactics.[22] Adylia Ki Azadi Tuk Jang Rahay Gi", "Go Musharraf Go" was the most popular slogan of lawyers.

LAWYERS LONG MARCH

When the collation government led by PPP after General Elections of 2008 had failed to restore the Pre-November 3 Judiciary, the leadership of the lawyers after the consultations of all lawyer bodies had adopted a new strategy of Long March. All the political parties, pressure groups, traders, professionals and the members

of civil society were invited to join lawyers' call of Long March for the restoration of judiciary. Two Long Marches were launched by the lawyers, first was started on 10 June 2008 from Karachi and Quetta. In Multan, the participants of Long March were received by deposed Chief Justice and Aitzaz Ahsan with other leaders. On 13 June 2008 it reached in front of the Parliament in Islamabad where it ended after controversial decision when participants were dispersed after few hours. The second long March was launched in March 2009 that ended with fruitful results, the victory of the movement. The two years historic struggle started by legal community for the independence of the judiciary finally ended with victory when Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced the restoration of all deposed judges included Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary.[23]

The Long Marches had started a new beginning and "became an instance of great mobilization in our history", due to many aspects.[24] The participants of the Long Marches were beyond all expectations and calculations. Their numbers were reached at final stage in thousands. The most significant aspect of this strength was that almost all circles of the society, lawyers, professors, doctors, traders, journalists, retired officers, workers, political activists, members of political parties and social organizations participated in Long Marches and it was received and welcomed by large number of people with great zeal and fervor. It was also credible that millions of people were participated in long marches but not a single incident of violence took place during Long Marches.[25]

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

It is acknowledged by one of the leading figures of the Lawyers' Movement and the ex-President of Supreme Court Bar Association Muneer A. Malik that "It was our belief that the success of the Lawyers' Movement would depend upon the support it received from the common man, the media, civil

society and political leadership of the country".[26] The term "Civil Society" was used very frequently in Lawyers' Movement, it was reflection of different sections of the society including lawyers, students and teachers, organizations, doctors, kisan movement, trade unions, former diplomats, former defence officers, intellectuals and writers, NGOs, Human Rights organizations, clerks' associations, representatives of missing persons, political parties and pressure groups.

The Lawyers' Movement had multi-dimensional aspects and it can be called a movement of middle class backed by media, human rights organizations, professionals, Diplomats, Clerks, Teachers, Trade unions, doctors and retired civil and military officers. "It was collective experience of Pakistanis and black coat had become the symbol of this experience".[27] It was first time in our history that the civil society of Pakistan remained intact and committed with any Movement, the movement for the restoration of judiciary makes Pakistani civil society proud of its achievement because every individual and circle of society supported and participated in Lawyers' Movement. In fact, the civil society of Pakistan was frustrated over the issues of dictatorial rule of Musharraf, missing persons, corruption in society, murder of Nawab Akbar Bughti, Lal Masjid episode, the privatization and sale of national assets and increasing gap between rich and poor due to the economic policies of Shaukat Aziz government. So, the civil society of Pakistan got opportunity and made joint hands with the Lawyers' Movement for the restoration of judiciary.

The civil society of Pakistan not only participated and protested in lawyers seminars, functions, rallies, calls for Black Day, Iftikhar Day, strikes, boycotts and Long Marches but also played very vital role in mobilizing international community, international human rights organizations and international Bar Associations. One of the great achievements of lawyers' movement was that it was recognized by the bar councils of

different countries, "the Malaysian Bar Association, the Australian Bar Association, the American Bar Associations, Lawyers' Organizations in the United Kingdom, Canada, France and the international democratic lawyers associations", expressed their support and solidarity with Lawyers' Movement.[28] It was result of civil society and particularly NGOs of Pakistan that the Lawyers Movement was recognized internationally. Almost all the lawyers' organizations and bars associations of the world acknowledged the lawyers' strength for the supreme cause of justice, rule of law and independence of the judiciary. On 24 May 2007, a seminar was held by lawyers' community in Supreme Court building; ambassadors of 50 countries including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Japan participated in the seminar and showed their solidarity with the legal community. The human Rights Commission of Pakistan, other NGOs and the civil society of Pakistan galvanized movement and mobilized international community. The Chief Justice of Pakistan was awarded by Howard School of Law; the New York Bar Association announced honorary membership to Chief Justice and the lawyers of Pakistan. The awards were announced for Aitzaz Ahsan and Muneer A. Malik. The famous poet Ahmed Fraz returned his award to government in protest. A famous organization "Allao" protested in favour of Chief Justice and Lawyers' Movement.[29]

All Pakistan Professors and Lecturers Association (APPLA) had participated with great zeal and courage in all rallies and protests arranged by the lawyers. The role of NGOs was very significant, particularly the NGO "Dastak" run by Asma Jhangir and her sister Hina Jillani. The students of Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad, Punjab University Lahore and Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) arranged processions in support of Movement. The Pakistan Labour Party, leftist Workers Organizations, the employees of PTCL and employees of Karachi Steel Mills protested and managed processions in favour of the Lawyers' Movement and the judiciary.[30] The Trade Unions,

National Trade Union Federations, Kisan Unions, Humdard Council of Pakistan, even Transport Associations, provided their support to Movement.[31] The recent civil society movement led by the lawyers for the rule of law and the independence of judiciary was a historic and turning point in our history. In recent era, it is experienced by many countries of the world "that true democracy cannot flourish without the active involvement of the civil society". The concepts of justice and rule of law in society are symbol of national integration and tool of motivation in all "stable democracies of the world".[32] The civil society of Pakistan remained intact and committed with Lawyers' Movement and stood against the dictatorial actions of General Musharraf.

ROLE OF MEDIA IN LAWYERS' MOVEMENT

The universal declaration of Human Rights says, everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The print and electronic media played a vital role in the Lawyers' Movement and it would not be wrong to say that the Movement got the real blood and soul by vibrant media of Pakistan. The extensive coverage of Chief Justice and Lawyers' Movement through visualized events and talks shows by Electronic Media popularized Movement and connected it with the public. The free media became a big advantage to lawyers' movement because it was free media which connected the public with the lawyers' movement. It was generally believed that without staunch support of print and electronic media it was difficult for the lawyers to keep momentum of the movement.[33]

In the modern concept of nation state the media is ranked as the fourth pillar of the state after executive, judiciary and legislature. The role of media is very important in all over the world as it is called a "watch dog" over the misuse of the powers of other institutions like executive and legislature. Although General Musharraf government claimed that they had granted freedom to the media but it is not wholly true because

courageous journalists had been working for its freedom since the period of General Zia-ul-Haq. It was turning point of our judicial history when Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudary refused to surrender against military dictator General Pervez Musharraf. The popular stance of Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudary was supported by all circles of society and it got real momentum when this hot issue projected by print and electronic media specially led by Geo and Jang Group. Although General Musharaf government claimed that it had provided freedom to print and electronic media, "however the annual survey (2007) by Reporters, Pakistan ranked 152 on world press freedom out of 167 countries, even Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Ethopia, Angola and Zimbabwe ranked higher than Pakistan".[34]

COUNTER MEASURERS OF GOVERNMENT

Geo and Jang Group particularly played vital role in the extensive coverage and reporting of the Lawyers' Movement and they became the worst target of dictatorial regime. In order to counter media support to Movement, first action was taken against one of the most popular programs on Geo, "Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Saath" which was banned on 16 March 2007.[35] The brutal form of action was taken against Geo office in Islamabad on 17 March 2007 when police attacked on Geo office and tortured several journalists.[36] The attack on Geo TV is a significant event in the history of the media in Pakistan. In Dickens's memorable phrase, "it was the best of times, it was the worst of times", "Best" because the media of this country made it clear that it would not be brow beaten, "worst" because the state or at least some of its functionaries could descend to such levels of hooliganism against such a big TV channel in full public view."[37] Geo network banned for many days and faced lot of economic issues after Musharraf second coup of 3 November 2007, as Musharraf demanded ban on at least three anchors from Geo and two reporters from the News. On 29 September, in Islamabad police attacked on

journalists outside the Election Commission Office which resulted torture and some severe injuries of several journalists. The Chief Justice of Pakistan had taken suo motto action and suspended few senior police officers after looking the videos of police torture.[38]

> During Lawyers' Movement Pakistan's main stream private TV news channels remained under pressure throughout the year. Even before the closure of around 45 TV channels mainly news channels on 3 November, The Pakistan Electronic Media Regularity Authority (PEMRA) which is supposed to regulate things infact turned into a police force. The three main channels Geo, ARY and Aaj became the prime target. [39]

The prime channels became the worst form of victim and remained under ban through draconian laws introduced by PEMRA. The government was particularly under concerns about T.V. "Talk Shows" Capital Talk by Hamid Mir, Mairay Mutabaq by Dr. Shahid Masood, Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Sath, Live with Talat Hussain by Syed Talat Hussain and off the record by Kashif Abbasi. On 12 May 2007, in order to sabotage the Lawyers' Movement, the brutality was at its peak when 40 innocent persons were killed on behalf of provincial government. The office of Aaj T.V. was particularly victimized and it came under massive firing that lasted for many hours.[40] The anchor of Aaj Channel and famous journalist Syed Talat Hussain showed great courage. He continued his live coverage under gun fire and written a chapter of great bravery and professional spirit.[41] Similarly the print and electronic media had continued their extensive coverage when Musharraf imposed emergency on 3 November 2007. Media once again became the victim of dictatorship and almost all news channels were banned by government. Another very important advantage of Media was that it was best tool for the lawyers' leadership to present their case in public through T.V. Talk Shows. These talk

shows were also source of great knowledge for understanding constitution, separation of powers, rule of law and fundamental rights of the citizens for common man.

The Lawyers' Movement was the hot issue and both the electronic and print media provided it extensive coverage. In print media the leading newspapers of Pakistan, Jang, The News, The Dawn, Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, the Nation, Express, Daily Times, Masawat and Din had given massive coverage in their headlines on front pages and articles. In Magazines, Roohey Buland, Muneer Mahnama, Jehad-e-Haq, Manshoor, The Thinker (International), News Lines, Herald, Akhbar-e-Jehan, Tukbeer, Wakkula ka Jadoo, Jehd Num, Sunday Magazine of Roznama Jang, Sunday Magazine of Nawa-i-Waqt and Family Magazine contributed and separated lawyer's movement at large scale.[42] Media had written a new chapter in the history of independent journalism and emerged as effective watchdog throughout the judicial crises and lawyers' movement. It had provided awareness and educated the masses through talk shows, live discussions in electronic media and through editorials and top stories in print media. The extensive coverage of lawyers' movement by vibrant media not only popularized the movement but also provided awareness to general public over the issues of rule of law, separation of powers, basic fundamental rights and independence of the judiciary.

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SECTARIAN POLITICS IN PAKISTANI PUNJAB: A REAPPRAISAL

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ABSTRACT

Pakistani Punjab has witnessed the re-emergence of sectarianism and posing a serious challenge to the state of Pakistan. This study intends to explore the main features of sectarian politics in post-colonial Punjab of Pakistan against the back drop of the movement against Ahmdiya sect in 1950s, Iranian Revolution and the rise of Shia-Sunni antagonism role of Islamization in the creation of exclusionary streak between Shia-Sunni, and the formation of rival organizations such as Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqa Jafriya (TNFJ) and Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).

The state of Pakistan adopted an 'Islamic identity' which paved the way for theological differences and sectarian political movements in Pakistani Punjab. The famous slogan 'Islam in Danger' was extensively used during the campaign for the creation of Pakistan and it remained a dominant rallying cry for religion oriented politics. The

All India Muslim League profoundly used Islam by
claiming that it was threatened by the All Indian
National Congress. It also received the help of *pir* and
sajjada nashin who attracted the Muslim voters towards
the All India Muslim League.[1]

One of the ways of explaining sectarian identities
in post-colonial Pakistani Punjab are purely constructed
and imagined. Benedict Anderson argues that nation is
constructed from social process through which residents
share nationality in common. Nation is imagined
because its members never know their fellows but they
have image of their communion in minds.[2] Anderson's
idea has a number of problems such as Partha
Chatterjee contends that the imagination of
communities has been limited by the British colonialism
and nationalist institutions forms were imposed on
colonized with no option but to follow. He further
argues that though the processes of 'print capitalism'
were important, but, the way Anderson formulated
them is too simplistic to impose on the multicultural,
multilingual, and power relations of the colonial
situation.[3]But still this idea is useful because it helps in
explaining the social construction of nation and
nationalism. A number of scholars have used this
concept for analysing nationalism, others have used it
for explaining religious and sectarian identities such as
Muhammad Qasim Zaman argues that sectarian
identities are constructed and redefined through a
process of political imagining.[4] Sectarian politics in post-
colonial Punjab can also be interpreted through the
'discourse of power' and 'sectarian posturing'[5] which
indicate that militant religious-political activism of

Punjabi sectarian organizations which were there to grab greater power to dominate rival sect.[6]

The roots of sectarian differences between the Shia and the Sunni had existed in colonial Punjab and both sects used to denounce each other. For instance, *Manazra*[7] tradition was very famous in colonial Shahpur.[8] There were various religious centres to train debaters with sound knowledge of the rival sects. One of the important and main centres was *'Shia Shanasi'*[9] centre in Sial Sharif under the supervision of Pir Qamar-ud-Sialvi who had to head the manazra in the colonial Shahpur. There were some sub centres to study about Shias in Bunga Surkharo,[10] Muazmabad,[11] Bhabara.[12] These sectarian trends took new forms and manifestation in post-colonial Pakistani Punjab.

This paper is divided into three sections. First section deals with the adoption and impact of the Objectives Resolution 1949 and how it gave birth to the anti-ahmdiya movement in which various religious political parties and religious groups participated with zeal. The following section talks about the emergence of Shia-Sunni antagonism as a result of Iranian Revolution 1979 and coming of General Zia into power. The last section sheds light on the Zia's Islamization and sectarian militancy by rival organizations of Shia and Sunnis.

OBJECTIVES RESOLUTION AND THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-AHMDIYA MOVEMENT[13]

The first sectarian uprising in Pakistani Punjab was the Ahmdiya controversy which was the direct outcome of the adoption of Objectives Resolution 1949. The

Resolution had a Janus-faced. One face indicated that it was the 'Magna Karta' for the drafting of the first constitution of Pakistan, but, the second face anticipated the agenda of some religious pundits. It not only divided the members of the Constituent Assembly on communal lines through the politicization of Islam but its terms also differed from the basic views of Jinnah. First, he (Jinnah) had said that sovereignty would rest with the people in the new state whereas the Resolution accorded sovereignty to God.[14] Secondly, he (Jinnah) had stated that there would be 'no minorities on religious basis whereas there is a reference to protect minorities' right to practice their religion.[15] Furthermore, he (Jinnah) had declared that the Christians, Parsis, and Hindus, 'will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens'[16] of Pakistan whereas the Resolution declined this right to minorities.

The Objectives Resolution was severely criticised by the non-Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly. Prem Hari Barma proposed to launch a motion for eliciting public opinion on this Resolution. The motion was moved in the Constituent Assembly on 30 April 1949. It was supported by Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya[17], Birat Chandra Mandal,[18] Bhupendra Kumar Datta[19]. Chattopadhyaya said "we thought that religion and politics could not be mixed up. That was the declaration of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in this house. But the Resolution before us has a religious basis".[20]Mandal reminded on 9 March 1949, "the founder (Jinnah) of this dominion most unequivocally said that Pakistan will be a secular state".[21] Datta also criticised the Resolution, "Sir I feel- I have reason to believe that were this resolution to come before this

house with in life time of great creator of Pakistan, the Quad-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah it would not have come in its present shape".[22]There were seventeen amendments proposed by the non-Muslims members which were disallowed by the house by ten votes against twenty-one.[23]

Jamat-e-Islami greatly influenced drafting and the adoption of the Objectives Resolution. The 'Islamic Lobby'[24] successfully expounded its rejectionist rhetoric.[25]According to Vali Nasr, when Maulana Maududi was in jail in 1949, he directed Jamat's two provisional *amirs* Abdul l-Jabbar Ghazi and Adbul'l Ghaffar Hassan to contact Deobandi *ulmas* especially Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani[26] in order to create a cohesive religious front against the Government of Pakistan. The immediate aim of these meeting was to influence the contents of the Objectives Resolution.[27] By using Usmani as a chip, Mawdudi manipulated the situation in his favor and brought *ulmas* into the main stream politics in Punjab.

The first major compromise took place between the Islamists and secularists and the unamended Objectives Resolution was adopted on 12 March 1949. Later on, the Pakistan's governments under General Ayub, General Yahya and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto continued to strive for compromise with the Islamists.[28] Jamat declared that the adoption of the resolution is the victory of Islam and it is first foundational stone towards the 'Islamization' of Pakistan.[29] The Resolution sowed "the seeds of suspicion, alienation, and distrust among the minorities against the majority".[30]

Majilis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam[31] (Society of free Muslims) and Pan-Sunnite movement[32] Majlis-e Khatm-e

Nubwwat[33] (Organization for the finality of the Prophethood) were the sole organizations which demanded that the Ahmadiya be declared as a non-Muslim sect and they should be removed from the influencing position in state apparatus.[34] The passage of the Objectives Resolution provided an ample opportunity to Ahrari leaders to utilize the state's professed loyalty towards Islam and to launch anti-Ahmadiya movement.[35] Moreover, the Ahraris argued that Ahmdiya prosperity and prominence was responsible for the misery of poor in Punjab.[36] It was supported by a large community of urban lower middle class from Lahore and Sialkot.[37]

In January 1953 an All-Pakistan Muslim Parties' Convention appointed a Committee of Action, and threatened direct action if the government did not accede to the demands. Disturbance was much more serious in the Punjab, where the Ahmadi minority was quite sizable and influential, and they were covertly encouraged by the provincial government of Mumtaz Muhammad Dawlatana. Under a 'direct action' programme, a civil disturbances movement, which soon assumed a form of mob violence and looting, began in the Punjab. The government imposed martial law in Lahore in February 1953, just in time to save the city from unruly anti-Ahmadi mobs.

The sectarian politics in post-colonial Punjab gave birth to new trends in the politics of Pakistan. The rise of Ahmdiya controversy soon after the independence of Pakistan brought two major Sunni groups such as Deobandis and Jamaat-e-Islami in the main stream of sectarian politics.[38] It is interesting to note that neither Deobandis nor Jamaat-e-Islami leaders had supported

the movement Pakistan. Sectarian politics provided an ample opportunity to both these groups to carve out a political role and declare themselves as true protectors of Islam.[39]

The question of 'Muslim identity' remained one of the key issues during the 1960s. Although, Ayub Khan had relativly secular dispensation, but, his government had to face a controversy over the sectarian tendencies. He decided to engage with the Sunni religious political parties who restricted Shia activities in the Sunni majority state.[40] During the 1970s, the legacy of Islamic romanticism left a sobering impact on the secular social democratic government. In the start of 1974, an eight-party alliance of religious political parties launched a campaign of hundreds day against Ahmedis and compelled Zulfqar Ali Bhutto to call a special session of the National Assembly which was conducted behind the closed doors.[41] Ahmedis were declared a non-Muslim minority on 7 September, 1974 by introducing second amendment in the third Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Ulmas had become very influential in the House and they were the main opposition group lead by Mufti Mahmood. Bhutto was in a very difficult situation and he did not deny them to play the influential role during the proceedings of 1974. Mufti Mahmud after the proceedings concluded in a public speech that "we failed to achieve whatever we wanted to achieve back in 1953 because we did not have political power and were not represented in the Assembly. Now that we are in the Assembly, we have been able to achieve that."[42] General Zia-ul-Haq further aggravated the identity question by imposing a lot of restrictions on Ahmdies. He forbade

them to identify themselves as Muslims and introduced various criminal penalties to stop the violation of this law. The constitutional definition of a Muslim contained the germs of Shia-Sunni antagonism. Zia's regime used more or less same methods against Shias.

IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE RISE OF SHIA-SUNNI ANTAGONISM

In Pakistan, Shia-Sunni division is political rather than doctrinal.[43] No other event than the Iranian Revolution of 1979 created a sense of greater insistence among the Islamist groups such as Deobandi to combat Shi'ism.[44]After Iran, Pakistan has the second largest population of Shias.[45] It was quite natural that Iran focused its attention on Pakistan after revolution. There were four hallmarks themes through which Iran attempted to export revolutionary spirit in Pakistan which include: call for Muslim unity, the centrality of supreme leader Imam Khomieni, and Iran, authority of the _ulmas_ and religious awakening, and most importantly political activism.[46] The Iranian Revolution brought Iran's Shia clergy into power which exported the rhetoric of revolution to help the Shia minority worldwide. Prior to revolution Iran's Shia clergy was linked with Pakistan historically, but, these links were purely religious not politicized. This relation got politicized due to the rivalry between Iran and Saudia Arabia and the Zia's Islamization. The emergence of this revolution provided a push to the rise of sectarianism in post-colonial Punjab in many ways.

The outlook of Imamia Students Organization[47] (ISO) changed after 1979 at a great level. It used to manage the financial and material support of Shia students in the educational institutions and helped to manage Shia religious gatherings in post-colonial Punjab, but, after the Iranian Revolution a new form of relationship developed between the Shia clergy and Punjabi students. The major outcome of this new connection was that the first two leaders of Shia in Pakistan were Jafar Hussain[48] and Arif Hussain Al-Hussani[49]studied at Qom and had come into close contact with the Iranian supreme leader Ayatolla Khomeini.

After the death of Jaffar Hussain, Al-Husaini 1984, became the sole leader of TNFJ and represented the modern reformist tendencies[50] and followed the lead of his supreme leader in 1980s and 1990s in order to create a united Muslim front, especially by preaching in favour of religious dialogue with Sunnis in Pakistan.[51] He represented a new and enthusiastic generation of Shia leadership which is politically more assertive and inspired by the Iranian Revolution.[52] Moreover, Marriam Abou Zahab, in her article *The Politicization of the Shia Community in the 1970s and 1980s* opines that nearly 4,000 students from Pakistan mostly from Punjab received scholarships from the government of Iran immediately after the revolution to spend one and half years in the religious institutions especially in Qom. Upon their return, they were sent to the Punjab countryside for Shia revivalism.[53]

Sunni majority in Pakistani Punjab unconsciously ignored Shias minority until the 1979 Islamic revolution. But, the question of 'identity' again became a source of

trouble. This time it was between Shia and Sunni. Sunni started considering Shia as potential revolutionaries sponsored by Iran. Shia in post-colonial Punjab became centralized and clericalists. The revolution reinforced the emotional and religious bonds of Shia with Tehran.[54]All this fuelled to produce an 'imagined community' of intolerant Sunnism in Pakistan.[55]

ZIA'S ISLAMIZATION AND THE FORMATION OF SHIA-SUNNI RIVAL ORGANIZATIONS

In 1977, shortly before the Iranian Revolution, the top military general of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq took power in the country. He was a conservative Sunni and intensely impressed by the Islamic fundamentalism. His Islamaization process empowered the Sunni clergy at the expense of Shia's minority. He adopted religious orthodoxy. He attempted to redefine the state trough his 'Islamization Programme' which was formulated in correspondences with Sunni *ulmas*.[56] Because to this 'Sunnification'[57] or the 'Deobandification'[58] of the state, the Shia's demand for the protection and provision of political and religious rights was considered as a symbol of potential Iranian subversion. As the response to the Iranian's state bankrolling the Punjabi Shia's organizations, zia invited Saudis to combat Iranian influence through sponsorship of Sunnis organizations.[59]

Vali Nasr in his book quotes that Khomeini once sent a message to the Pakistani military ruler Zia ul Haq, telling him that if he mistreated the Shia, he would do to him what he had done to the Shah.[60]However, in this context, there emerged an exclusionary streak between Shia and Sunni which paved the way for the emergence

of rival organizations such as *Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqa Jafriya* (TNFJ) and Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).

Imposition of '*zakat*' exacerbated sectarian politics in Punjab.[61] Mostly, Sunni religious institutes such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Deobandi were funded by this collection of money. The ulmas of these religious institutes had close ties with the Saudi ulmas. They denied paying *zakat*, because, according to the Shia belief the collection and distribution of Zakat is purely a private matter.[62] However, Zia issued a decree to deduct forcibly 2.5 per cent of all bank savings every year to deposit it in the government zakat account. The Shia considered the Zakat Ordinance as an attempt to achieve the 'Sunnification of Pakistan'.[63]

The imposition of zakat, paved the way for the Shia clergy to come forward. Mufi Jaffar Hussain,[64] a more prominent Shia religious scholar of the Punjabi origin formed *Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-FiqaJafriya* (TNFJ) in the district of Bahhakr in March 1979.[65] Syed Wazarat Hussain Naqvi, the guardian of a local Shia shrine, arranged a convention of all Pakistan Shia in Bhakkar in 1979. TNFJ was created in this convention. Naqvi was nominated its founding general secretary.[66] This Movement for the implementation of Jaffriya (Shias) law later became Tehrik-e-Jafriya.[67]

Soon after the Zia decree of *zakat* deduction, TNFJ started agitating against the decision and it also demanded an effective representation for Shias in the management of state affairs at highest level especially an advisory body on matters of Islamization.[68] On 5 July 1980 there was a siege to the government federal headquarters lead by Jaffar Hussain and by a large Shia demonstrators from all over the country. As a

consequence, the government had to back down and exempted Shia from compulsory zakat deduction. The decision did not please the Sunni Islamist groups who were aiming to contain Shia's potential threat of Iranian inspired political awakening. Zia retreat before Shia demonstration made his Islamic fundamentalist supporters deeply unhappy.[69]

The first response against Shia demonstration came from a Deoband cleric, Mulana Saleemullah Khan, the founder of Sawad-e-eAzamAhl-e-Sunnat (Greater Unity of the Sunni) in 1980, demanded that Pakistan should be declared a Sunni state and the Shias hould be declared non-Muslims.[70]The *sawad-e- Azam* paved the way for the creation of strongest Sunni organization Anjuman-e- Sipah-e- Sahaba, (Society of the Army of the Prophet's Companions). Later on its name was changed as Sipah-e- sahaba Pakistan (the Army of the Prophet's Companions. It was formally established by a young Punjabi Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in 1985 in the central Punjab district of Jhang. As his name indicates, he was a native of the Jhang district. He had a great inspiration from the Ahrari leader especially from Atta Ullah Shah Bukhari and used to copy his oratory style in speeches against the Shias and also used to hold a wooden hatchet in his hand.[71]

The Sipah-e- Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) gained influence in Jhang within a short span of time by criticising the Shia landowners such as Syeds and Sial that they had close ties with the British who pleased them by giving large land holdings. Moreover, the landed gentry not only did the socio-economic exploitation of peasants but has had also led them astray even in the matters of religion. In 1980s and

1990s the district of Jhang remained the epicentre of violence against the Shia. Tahir Kamran contextualises the rise of sectarian militancy and sectarian politics in Jhang. He is of the view that in Jhang *biradaris* such as *Syeds* and *Sials* rivalries used sectarianism as a vehicle for political gain not only in electoral contests but also as source of violence.[72] From Jhang it spread to Faisalabad, Bhakkar, and Sargodha.[73] In Jhang city, there also emerged an urban commercial and merchant class which was previously locked out of political arena by the Shia landowners who traditionally dominate the district.[74] Justin Jones is of the view that in Jhang, Shia-Sunni discord has emerged from enduring enmity between a Sunni-dominated urban commercial class and an established aristocracy of Shia Syyieds and rural landlords, the former rebelling against the perceived socio-political dominance of the latter.[75]

In recent time, sectarian militancy has greatly increased in Bhakkar district. According to official statistics, Shia and Deobandi have almost equal proportion with the percentage of thirty and twenty eight respectively of the district population. In Punjab, after Jhang, Bhakkar is being considered the main sectarian flashpoint since the creation of TNFJ. In 1985, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, also delivered public speeches in Bhakkar and set up a branch of SSP organisation in this district.[76] The epicentres of sectarian tensions in Bhakkar are Kotla Jam[77], Tibba Habib Shah[78], Panjgaraeen[79] and Darya Khan[80]. The sectarian violence is increasing as a consequence of exodus of Shias from the neighbouring district Dera Ismail Khan. Around two hundreds Shia activists have been shifted to Kotla Jam and Tibba Habib Shah in the recent years which have given a new

dimension to the sectarian violence in the district of Bhakkar.[81]

CONCLUSION

The study has proved that Sectarianism in Post-colonial Punjab was not of religious kind only but had political dimensions. Some of the sectarian leaders were responsible for radicalization and politicization in the Pakistani society. Consequently, tussle and conflict between different sects in Punjab generated the 'identity crises' in the society. First, Ahmadiya and later the Shias became target of their sectarian bigotries. It is alleged that these radical groups were used by Iran and the Saudi Arabia who were reported have been fighting their proxy war generally in Pakistan but particularly in post-colonial Punjab..

It also appears that the last three decades have seen an immense increase in Shia-Sunni ferocity in Pakistan which cast an imminent menace to the ideological and political viability of Pakistan. Sectarianism which was only limited to some central towns of Punjab has recently appeared in a large span of villages, towns and cities across all Pakistan and it has accelerated the emergence of increasingly complex religious groups and organizations which are spreading religion-political violence rapidly. Unfortunately, sectarianism has become a part of life and the foremost vehicle of religious change in Pakistan and people are interpreting Islam through their sectarian lenses.

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[3] For detail see, Partha Chatterjee, *Whose Imagined Community?* in Gopal Balakrishnan, (ed) *Maping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996), pp.214-26

[4] Muhammad QasimZaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities," *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 32,3 (July 1988): 689.

[5] Syyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan, in Chritophe Jefferelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without A Nation (New Delhi: Monhar Publishers & Distributers, 2002), p.85

[6] Syed Vali Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979-1998," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 32,2 (January 2000): 171.

[7] Publically holding of a religious dialogue among different sects especially between Shia and Sunni

[8] The Colonial Shahpur district was one of the six districts of the Rawalpindi Division. It was divided into equal portions by the river Jehlum. There were Khushab tahsil on the western side, Shahpur tahsil in the middle, and Bhera tehsil in the east. J. Wilson, I.C.S, *Gazrtteer of the Shahpur District 1897*, (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1897), p.1

[9] A centre for the study of the shi'ism in Sial Sharif , in Colonial Shahpur was established by Peer Qamar-ud-Din Sialvi.

[10] It is located near Bhera in Sargodha.

[11] Its old name is Marollay wala. It is near Kot Momin in Sargodha.

[12] Interview with Sabzada Nadeem (Principal of Madrassa Muhamdiya) , at Sargodha on 10-01-2015

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[13] For details see, Ali Usman Qasmi, Politics of Religious exclusion in Pakistan (London: Anthem Press, 2014)

[14] Mian Mumtaz Daultana observed that this resolution was 'a personal favour' to Muolana Shabir Ahmad Usmani by Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan to acknowledge the sovereignty of God. For details see, Afzal Iqbal, *Islamization of Pakistan* (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1984) p.41

[15] Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia*, (Lahore: Vanguard Book LTD, 1979), p.36

[16] Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches As Governor General of Pakistan 1947-48, (Karachi, n.d.), p.9

[17] He was an opposition leader from East Pakistan.

[18] He was the first Minister of Law and Labour in Pakistan

[19] He was the member of Pakistan National Congress (PNC) from East Pakistan.

[20] The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume V-1949, p.9 and see http://pakistanspace.tripod.com/archives/49sris.htm (Accessed on 30.12.2015)

[21] The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume V-1949, pp.13-17

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[24] Muhammad Waseem, *The Politics and the State in Pakistan*,(Islamabad:NIHCR,2007),p.124

[25] Khalid Ahmed, *Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and Its Links to the Middle East*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.24

[26] Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was then the member of the Constituent Assembly and he was showing a great interest in Mawlana Mawdudi ideas which were being relayed to him

by Abdul Jabbar Ghazi. Furthermore, a congratulatory message was sent to Mawlana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani by Mawlana Maudud when he got the news of Objective Resolution's passage.

[27]Syed Vali Nasr, *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp.123-24

[28] Stephen Philip Cohen*, The Idea of Pakistan*, (Washington: The Brooking Institution, 2004), p.168

[29] For details see, Syed Vali Nasr, *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp.124-25

[30] Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan,* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.65

[31] For details see, Dr.Tahir Kamran, Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam: religion, socialism and agitation in action*,* Centre of South Asian Studies and Wolfson College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK. Published online:19 Aug 2013. And Samina Awan, Political Islam in Colonial Punjab: Majlis-i-Ahrar 1929-1949, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010)

[32] Jamal Malik, *Islam in South Asia: A Short History*, (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan Ltd,2012), p.383

[33] It was founded in 1950 by Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Hazarvi to launch a movement against Ahmdia. Masjid Wazeer Khan remained the centre for the meeitng of this movement.

[34]Removal of Sir Chaudhary Zafarullah Khan was demanded by the Anti-Ahmadiya movement. For details, see Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964,* (London: Oxford University Press,1967),p. 240

[35]Syed Vali Nasr, *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 132

[36]Ibid., p.131-.

[37]Tahir Kamran, "Main Merney Ko Pher Raha Houn, Merney Ko: Genealogical Sociology of Sipah-I-Sahaba Pakistan",*The Historian,*Vol.7 (1)(July-December 2009), 8.

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[40] Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (London: Hurts & Company,2009), 62

[41] Ibid, 62

[42]Interview of Ali Usman Qasmi Published in weekly magazine 'The News on Sunday', September 7, 2014

[43] Amin Saikal, Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, (London: I. B. TAURIS, 2014), 4

[44] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'I and Sunni Identities, Cambridge University Press, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 32 No. 3 (JUL.,1998),p. 704, Accessed 19-08-2014 , 04:19 UTC

[45] In Pakistan Shia population is 15 to 18 percent.

[46] Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, Third Wave Shiism: Syyaid Arif Hussain Al Hussaini and the Islamic Revolution in Pakistan*, Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, Vo. 24, Issue No 3, July 2014, p.502

[47] Shia Students organization was founded by Dr. Syyed Muhammad Ali Naqvi in 1972 at University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore.

[48]Jafar Hussain was the founder of Tehrikh-e-Nafazay-e-Fiqha-Jafriya (TNFJ).

[49] Successor of Jafar Hussain and dominating Shia leader in 1980s.He was assassinated in August 1988. His assassination was a major setback for the Tahrik-I Jafriyya Pakistan (TJP). For details see, [49] Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan's Shia Movement: An Interview with Arif Hussain, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10. NO.2. Islam and Politics, April 1988.

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[51] Francis Robinson, Introduction: The Shi'a in South Asia, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 24, Issue 03, July 2014, p.357

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[58] Interview with Malik Naseer Hussain (Principal of Muhmadia Madrassa in Sargodha), on 10-01-2015

[59] Justin Jones, *Shia Islam in Colonial India: Religion, Community, and Sectarianism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 239

[60]SyyedVali Reza Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How conflict within Islam will Shape the Future*, (New York: W.W Norton &Campany, 2007), 138

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[61] 2.5 per cent annual contribution Muslims must make toward charity based on their net assets value

[62]The Shia and sunni have different opinion regarding the collection and distribution of zakat. The Shia take it as private affair of individuals and according to Hanfi School of sunni the government has this right.

[63] Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History* (U.K: Oxford University Press, 2012), 128

[64]Jaffar Hussain was born in Gujranwala (Punjab), in a notable Shia family. He studied in local sunni madrassa, Lukhnow (India), and later in Najaf (Iraq). He taught in a local Shia madrassa. He actively participated in public meetings of Shias. He served the Government of Pakistan being the part of advisory committee for Islamic Provisions for 1956 Constitution and later on he remained in the Council of Islamic Ideology, both in the time of Ayub and Zia, but, he resigned from the membership in1979. In the same year he was chosen as the leader of the Shia community in Pakistan.

[65] During 1950s the prominent Shia organization was Tahafuz-e-Haqooq-e-Shia (Protection of Shia Rights), but, Syed Muhammad Delhivi changed its name as the Shia Mutalabat Committee (Shia Demands Committee).

[66] Herald, March 23, 2015

[67] Its name was change shortly, because of the severe criticism of the opponents that this movement is being launched to reinforce Shia's laws on Sunnis, but TNFJ denied this allegation and change the name. In 1988, the name of Tehrik-e-Jafriya was changed as Tehrik-e-Jafriya Pakistan. It did not promote Shia political activism and It emerges with moderate and pacifist stance and try to defuse the sectarian divisions. For detail see, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'I and Sunni Identities, Cambridge University Press, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 32 No. 3 (JUL.,1998), 697, Accessed 19-08-2014 , 04:19 UTC

For the manifesto of TNFJ see, Muhammad Usman and Mas udAshar, (eds), Pakistan ki Siyasi Jama'atain, (Lahore: Sange-i-Mil Publications, 1988), 774-811

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[69]Syyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How conflict within Islam will Shape the Future*, (New York: W.W Norton &Campany, 2007), 161

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[72] For details see, Tahir Kamran, "Main Merney Ko Pher Raha Houn, Merney Ko: Genealogical Sociology of Sipah-I-Sahaba Pakistan",*The Historian,*Vol.7 (1)(July-December 2009)

[73] As the consequence of the establishment of TNFJ and SSP and their sectarian policies, there emerged militant groups of both religious organizations. Theses radical groups gave birth to the sectarian violence not only in Punjab but throughout Pakistan. The Shia Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (Army of Muhammad in Pakistan) was established by Ghulam Raza Naqvi in 1991. The Sunni Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Jhangvi's Army) was founded by a sectarian hitman Riaz Basra in 1994. For the detail study of Jihadi outfits see, Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, then Army and America's War on Terror*, (USA: M.E Sharpe, 2004)

[74] For details see, Tahir Kamran, "Main Merney Ko Pher Raha Houn, Merney Ko: Genealogical Sociology of Sipah-I-Sahaba Pakistan",*The Historian,*Vol.7 (1)(July-December 2009), 8., and Tahir Kamran, Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan:

A Case Study of Jhang, Journal of Islamic Studies, published online, 8 August 2008.
[75] Justin Jones, *Shia Islam in Colonial India: Religion, Community, and Sectarianism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 239
[76] Herald, March 23, 2015
[77] A Shia majority village. Its Hussaini Chowk is the main bone of contention between Shia and Deobandi Sunni. The main controversy is over the name of this chowk. Shia named it as Hussaini Chowk and Deobandi wants to change its name as 'Farooq Chowk'.
[78] It is the name of an Imambargh at outskirts the Kotla Jam and famous for the Shia political activities.
[79] It is a Deobandi majority area in Bhakkar district.
[80]It is also a Deobandi majority area in Bhakkar district
[81] Herald, October 2013, p.49-50

Notes for Authors

1. Research papers, concept papers, review articles, comments, rejoinders and book reviews (in English) should be sent to historian@gcu.edu.pk

2. Papers will only be accepted for consideration on the understanding that they are original contributions to the existing knowledge in the field of Humanities and Social Sciences.

3. Each paper should be typed and should carry a margin of an inch and a half on the left-hand side of the typed page.

4. The first page of the research article should contain the title of the paper, the name(s), abstract and any acknowledgements.

5. Tables for the main text and each of its appendices should be numbered serially and separately. The title of each table should be given in a footnote immediately below the line at the bottom of the table.

6. Endnotes should be numbered consecutively.

7. All references used in the text should be listed in alphabetical order of the author's surnames at the end of the text. References in the text should include the name(s) of author(s) with the year of publication in parentheses. Attempt should be made to conform to the style of the Journal. Further information on questions of style may be obtained from the Editor.

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