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4. MERITOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA  
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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY  
GOVERNMENT COLLEGE UNIVERSITY, LAHORE

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**MUSLIM IDENTITY AND THE CONSENSUS DURING THE LATE  
COLONIAL POLITICS OF PUNJAB**

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**ABSTRACT**

The politics of late Colonial Punjab engendered a unique singular conception of Muslim identity, connected with a certain definition of Islam, in the first half of the twentieth century. The singular Muslim identity, appeared in contesting Muslim political groups as a universal religious idea, considering, at the same time, other religious groups outside the fold of Islam. The emerging universal-singular religious idea, came as a gradual consensus on a few elements and retaining a few deviant forms outside. The singular Muslim identity while moving away from customary belonging gradually reterritorialized on the ideas such as historical distinctness of being Muslim and the finality of prophet-hood. The singular Muslim idea couldn't find its clear political expression unless varied Muslim groups merged with the politics of Jinnah's Muslim League that, although toed the features of the identity, absorbed even the excluded forms within its generalized singular identity.

**KEY WORDS**

Muslim Identity, Colonialism, Punjab, Ahrar, Sufism

To trace the development of the idea of singular Muslim identity, this article brings forward the contesting politics of groups, such as Majlis-i-Ahrar, Ahl e Sunna and Muttaahida Majlis e Ittihad e Millat along with the Muslim

political ideologues such as Allama Iqbal and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan during the decade of 1930s. Their political activities paved the way for the singular idea of Muslim identity developed and prevailed in the colonial politics of Punjab. However, the idea was unsuccessful to find a clear and distinct existence because of the varied political interests of the ideologues in the multi-communal spaces of colonial politics. With the emergence of Muslim League, the varied political religious-groups, leaving Ahrar, found a place to merge their ideas with the hope of realizing their politics without leaving reterritorialized attachments. This study explains the idea of religion employed by the Jinnah's Muslim League that otherwise used a general and a vacuous idea of Islam for attracting all kinds of Muslims of India in order to create a clear distinction from "Hindu."

There is a continuous debate between those considered colonial Islam as an unchanging permanent idea animating cultural spirit within people of India and those considered it as a universal idea emerged during the colonial politics of Punjab in 1920s and 30s that later on used by Muslim League for creating a religious nationalist state of Pakistan. The scholars, such as Faisal Devji and Katherine Ewing, considered the idea of Pakistan in the imagery of an empty container or as an "unspecified object of desire".<sup>1</sup> For them, the Muslim League held the universal but abstract idea of religion without any concrete basis in order to reduce the threat that otherwise might be "widening splits that divided the nation at birth (Ewing 1997: 67)." <sup>2</sup> However, this article tries to show that the politics of colonial Punjab had already developed some concrete features of Islam and even the Muslim League, although covered up the conflicting contours under its abstract universal religious stance, couldn't reduce these features to nothingness.

Rather the politics of Muslim League used these features in order to further its political agenda.

#### **COMMUNAL POLITICS, IQBAL AND AHRAR; STRUGGLING TO PREVAIL UNIVERSAL-SINGULAR ISLAM**

With the emergence of Ahrar in the politics of Punjab some very interesting changes took place, including the consciousness of the force of religious ideas for the common man, usage of common idioms, sometimes quite vulgar ones, during political speeches and pushing forward the necessity of singular Muslim identity even within the framework of the nationalist politics.<sup>3</sup> Ahrar took the Deobandi theological debates on the street, and encountered the theological opponents politically. From theologically wrapped socialistic stress and emphasis on the rights of small peasants and depressed classes, to the anti-British efforts, Ahrar stood for the political rights of Muslims of Kashmir and at the same time vocal against Muslim customary traditions and the shrine-based practices. Ahrar's politics jolted the land-based elites in Punjab at-least for some good years, and its politics also resulted into a kind of developing a platform for the later Muslim League politics after the promulgation of 1935 constitution and the communal franchising.<sup>4</sup>

Although the politics of Ahrar revolved around anti-colonial activities, its focus remained on pursuing the goal for the certain Muslim identity. From the very beginning, their politics imagined Kashmir as a coercive space from which the Muslims are to be liberated. Finding Qadiani leaders, whom are already considered non-muslims by Ahrar, at the forefront of the Kashmir cause, Ahrar unleashed their wrath against them. The Kashmir committee that was formed in 1930 in Lahore was headed by Ahmadi leader, Mirza Bashir ud Din Mahmud and Allama Iqbal was also part of it.<sup>5</sup> Ahrar

negotiated with Iqbal and waged a "war" against Ahmadis along with developing a full-fledged political campaign against Kashmir government.<sup>6</sup> Iqbal promised to rethink his position. After few years, Iqbal resigned from the presidency of Kashmir Committee and started distancing himself from Qadiani position. Ahrar challenged the Qadiani presence within Kashmir's politics but couldn't do much when the local politicians refused to give heed to theological differences.<sup>7</sup>

Ahrar's anti-Qadiani position however already won over the most influential figure of Allama Iqbal. Iqbal changed his position to the point of declaring them as non-Muslim after 1934, almost at the same time when Unionists supported Sir Zafar Ullah Khan for the Central Legislative Assembly. Allama Iqbal brings forward his position on clearly political and historical ground without needing to go into theological debates.<sup>8</sup> His main argument lies that a sect "arising from the bosom of Islam, which claims a new prophet-hood for its basis, and declares all Muslims who did not recognize the truth of its alleged revelation as Kafirs, must therefore be regarded by every Muslim as a serious danger to the solidarity of Islam." For Iqbal, the threat which such views as those of Qadianism was posing to the political existence of Muslim society within British India that had already ushered a political process based on religio-communal lines, stood as a grave threat for the collective political power of Muslims in India. Almost aligning his views with Ahrar's standpoint, saving and owning Orthodox Muslim from the liberal criticism of both Orientalists and non-Muslim politicians like Jawahar Lal Nehru, and becoming precursor of the later politics building upon the ideas of "Muslim" and "Islam" as universal identities and existence, Iqbal paved the way for opening up the possibilities of new form of political development and "Orthodox" identity.

In a postscript to his essay, "Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims", Allama Iqbal clarifies his position that led towards a suggestion for the government to suppress Qadianis by force. To him, the policy of non-interference was a bad policy, and so far the British Government carried on this policy further, each religious community will have the right to resort to safeguard their interests by using suitable means.<sup>9</sup> In his enthusiasm Iqbal followed the Orthodox Hindus' demand for protection against religious reformers in the new constitution.<sup>10</sup> Instead, the demand ought to have been first made by the Muslims who unlike Hindus, entirely eliminate the race idea from their social structure, maintained Iqbal.<sup>11</sup> However, Iqbal suggested that the British Government should declare Qadianis a separate community within British India.<sup>12</sup>

#### STATE AND SAJJADA NASHIN RELATIONSHIP

Iqbal's criticism on Ahmadism not only brings forward his political understanding but also his sufistic approach. Earlier, though claimed to be following a *suistic* line in his works, like following Maulan Rumi and Mujaddad Alif Saani,<sup>13</sup> he already developed a criticism of a certain form of Tasawwauf, may be termed as Wahdat ul Wajud (Unity of Being),<sup>14</sup> along with prevailing form of shrine based culture and Sajjada Nashin attached thereby. In his poem, Punjab kai Pirzado Sai, he already made his point clear that he does not consider the Sajjada Nashin of the shrines of Punjab as sufi-faqir. And the main reason he brings forward is the close connection of the Sajjada Nashin with the Colonial State that allow them to develop in esteem at the cost of spiritual degeneracy. He idealized the sufi-figure, through his spiritual meeting with Mujaddad Alif Sani, as the one who has the "passion

for Rightfulness (Kalmai Haq)," and as he was unable to find it within the Sajjada NAsjin of Punjab, the spiritual voice of Mujaddad Alif Sani damned the death of sufistic spirit in the land of Punjab. Iqbal's criticism not only brings forward his criticism of the Sajjada Nashin of the Punjab but also his valuing the spirit of Mujaddad Alif Sani who, as he thinks in the poem, did not surrender in front of Jahangir.

Iqbal's criticism of shrine based practices however remained selective. He was though critical of what was taking place in Punjab,<sup>15</sup> he liked to recall many past sufistic personalities and did not abhor going to their tombs. Rather, he has some very deeply ingrained sacredness for many shrines of India, like Nizam ud Din Aulya, Khwaja Muin ud Din Ajmer Sharif and Syed Ali Hajvery Data Ganj Bakhsh Lahore.<sup>16</sup> He not only often visited these shrines but also said verses in the praise of these sufi saints and shrines.<sup>17</sup> Even in his criticism of Qadianis he seems to be standing perplexed on the question of "spiritual elevation" of the founder. Although he thinks the founder's psychological level during his spiritual experience was not up to the mark, yet the ability to have such experience was never a question for him. All what mattered is what should be the limit and what should be the reaction of the experiencing being after wards, as he stressed on the "Finality" of the prophet-hood of Muhammad (PBUH). Many of his writings suggest his liking for following the spiritual teaching of Mujaddad Alif Saani.<sup>18</sup>

#### **SINGULAR ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY AND PLURALISTIC CHARACTER OF POLITICAL GROUPS: MASJID SHAHEED GANJ**

The incidence of Masjid Shaheed Ganj<sup>19</sup> can be considered as both showing the signs of the strength of the Colonial administrative system of cooption with local

elites and signs for the future politics moving towards the prevalence of congealed religious communal identity. The political direction that took place from last fifteen years or so, almost from the promulgation of Montague Chelmsford reforms of 1919, at the one end, enhanced the political power and role of rural-religious-military influential groups there at the same time the compulsion of electorate system also necessitated the need for giving importance to constituencies and public feelings. For many religious leaders or *pirs* in small towns and rural areas it was easy to merge with the land-based rural cultural system. On the other hand, for the religious leaders pursuing the abstract and universal Muslim identity, within semi-urban and urban Colonial areas things were difficult. Finding their constituencies almost everywhere, wherever the conflict or tension within or with Muslim identity arose, these religious leaders found them compelled to participate in the conflict. These conflicts became apparent during the crisis of Masjid Shahid Ganj, 1935. The political sagacity of nationalist-religious groups, like Ahrar, necessitated for staying back, and for some other, like Jamaat Ali Shah and his Sunni/Barelwi shrine -based following almost compulsively became part of the movement.

On the other hand the crisis and conflict of Masjid Shaheed Ganj (1935) also showed that the Islamized shrine-based articulations could not find an easy go along with the articulations developed and motivated through Colonial Urban settings.<sup>20</sup> The relationship that was forming within the articulated voices of Ahl-e-Sunnat Sajjada Nashins, like Pir Jamaat Ali Shah and the Deobandi religious scholars and pragmatic political agitators, Ahrar, came head to head and the fragile relationship collapsed, at-least for the time being. When Ahrar started its wage against Ahmadis / Qadianis, it was not toeing the untouched ways. Already a large

number of Sajjada Nashins directed towards criticizing, and from the very early days of the inception of Ahmadi group efforts to counter the teachings of the founder of this group and the activities of the group were under way. Jamaat Ali Shah, Pir Mehar Ali Shah, Bugwi Pirs, Maulana Ghulam Qadir Bhairwi, Ahmed Raza Khan (the founder of Brelwi movement), Mian Muhammad Sharakpuri and many others had already waged an effort against this movement. The anti-Qadiani disposition of Ahle sunnat - Barelwi Sajjada Nashins remained covered under their disposition of considering other sects as Kafir. Efforts of Ahrar on a singular agenda of Qadianis, however turned this theological debate into a significant political issue.

However, as almost all of the scholars / Sajjada Nashins of Ahl-e-Sunna group remained immersed in purifying and popularizing the symbolic Singular Islam, the Ahrar was not ready to leave political sagacity at the cost of pursuing the purified conception of Islam / Muslim. Shaheed Ganj issue though threatened the sacredness of the Muslim identity but the political sagacity and understanding of the relationship with the religious Other, Sikh community in this case, within Colonial Order remained different. Ahrar leaders were preparing to the "forthcoming provincial elections and did not wish to risk imprisonment by joining in an agitation which they rightly believed was doomed to failure."<sup>21</sup> Their political sagacity<sup>22</sup> though gave them chance to stay aloof from the crisis but it also disclosed their varying conceptions of Islamic and Muslim identity with which they remained vehemently attached with during their protest against Ahmdis and pro-Kashmiri Muslim stance. Even within Ahrar, their political sagacity found an angry response from their local leaders.<sup>23</sup> For almost one year the local leaders of Lahore found it really hard to arrange a session in Lahore.<sup>24</sup>

The political embarrassment to Ahrar came from two directions: one from Pir Jamat Ali Shah and the Sajjada Nashins and the other from an organization termed, Majlis-i-Ittehad-i-Millat, formed by Zafar Ali Khan, the editor of Zamindar. After initial advance, the Ahrar movement stepped back in advancing the protest against government for taking the control of the mosque. Their political sagacity showed them that an alliance with Sikhs in the coming elections might be a good option against Unionists. Further, this issue for the Ahrars, had all the signs of conspiracy to curb his popularity by the state authorities.<sup>25</sup> However, their reluctance to take active part in the agitation opened for them the doors of criticisms from many perspectives. Hazb ul Ahnaf, the organization of Pirs and Sajjada Nashins of Ahl e Sunna, criticized Ahrar and its theological underpinnings more strongly.<sup>26</sup> Ahrars were quick enough to counter the criticism of Pir Jamat Ali Shah who was appointed as Amir-e-Millat in 1935 in a meeting in Rawalpindi for pursuing the cause of Muslim mosque. Ahrars pointed out the pro-colonial attitude of Ahl-e-Sunna (barelwi) organizations and termed this agitation as a conspiracy against the anti-colonial politics of Ahrar. While knowing the depth of the Colonial order and the compulsion of co-opting policy bound together especially the rural Sajjada Nashins/pirs. Ahrars criticized Jamat Ali Shah as, "This Pir can't do anything. He is himself the champion of pro-British policies."

Interestingly, Zafar Ali Khan, like Allama Iqbal, was distancing himself from Ahmadis and developing enthusiastically new anti-colonial,<sup>27</sup> anti-Ahmadiya,<sup>28</sup> anti-shrine-al Muslim identity.<sup>29</sup> His early allegiance with common Muslim identity, that did not desist him keeping relations with Khwaja Kamal Ud Din, an Ahmadi leader, remained his guiding light. Interestingly, he was considered Kafir with Iqbal, in 1925 by the president of

Hazb ul Ahnaf, Maulana Deedar Ali who was also the Khateeb Imam of Masjid Wazir Khan, the organization developed by Sajjada Nashins and Ahle Sunna.<sup>30</sup> However, later in 1930s, with his increasing anti-colonial attitude,<sup>31</sup> communal politics, and pro-universal Muslim politics he found his politics of Muslim Identity back and found himself standing with the Ahar's politics.<sup>32</sup> The belonging to Ahrar continued for another five years till the issue of Masjid Shaheed Ganj made him distanced from them.<sup>33</sup> In order to make alliances with the Sikh groups, Ahrar could not take an active part in the issue. Interestingly, his political activity found itself aligned with the activism of Hizb ul Ahnaf and other Jamat Ahl e Sunna groups. His efforts gave birth to a new political organization, Majlis e Ittihad e Millat and supported in making Jamat Ali Shah as an Ameer-e-Millat for pursuing the issue of Masjd Shaheed Ganj.

The politics of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan took another interesting turn when he developed close relations with Sir Fazl i Hussain of Unionist Party and let the issue of Masjid Shaheed Ganj go into forgetfulness.<sup>34</sup> His party took part in the elections, and not only his party did good in the elections he himself became a member of the central legislative assembly in 1937. In those years, interestingly, Iqbal was criticizing Qadianis to the point of terming them non-muslim.<sup>35</sup> At that time, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan was creating close relations with Unionists and with Mirza Baashir ud din Mahmood, leader of Qadiani group. Few poems published in the daily newspaper Ahsan in the year of 1936 with the pen name of "X-Shair", allegedly by Allama Iqbal, criticized severely the politics of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan. The poems reminded his early stance of anti-Qadianism and his "turning" only for the ministries.<sup>36</sup> During the elections of 1936 and 1937 he and his party however criticized severely Ahrars and kept close relations with

Unionists, and soft stance against Qadianis. However, his party remained sympathetic with the Central Muslim League, a replica of Unionist policy. He made his party merge with Muslim League in 1940 and also won from Lahore in the elections of 1945-46 from Muslim League's platform. His book, *Armaghan e Qadian*, in which he criticized severely the Qadiani doctrines and aligned himself very closely with the thoughts of Allama Iqbal regarding Qadianis after 1933, got published after the delay of few years.<sup>37</sup>

#### **MUSAMMAT AYESHA VS. ABDUR RAZZAK: CLARIFYING SINGULARITY OF ISLAM**

The year 1935, where, brought out the differences between the politics of different strands of Muslim religious scholars, and the limitation of the politics, there, at the same time it showed the possibility of politics attached with the singular Muslim identity. A conflict in marriage, became a point of providing a detailed examination of conflicting ideas between pro-(sunni) *Shariat* and Ahmadi form of Islam. The conflict arose when a father of a minor girl refused to marry her with a boy with whom he made her "Nikah" quite early in childhood. When the boy came to his puberty, and got graduated from an institution, insisted to take the girl (Mankuha) with him. The father however delayed and, after some time, while knowing that the boy had turned Ahmadi, went to the court for the divorce on the plea that a Muslim Woman can not marry an Ahmadi as Ahmadis are Kafir. The matrimonial issue instantly turned into a ground upon which religious scholars of both sides fought with each other on the question of Ahmadis *Kufr* (infidelity). The case in the court of Bahawalpur, Musammat Ghulam Ayesha vs. Abdur Razzak (1935), in which the pleader, Musammat Ghulam

Ayesha pleaded for divorce from Abd ur Razzak, who recently became a "Qadiani", became a history itself.

The case remained in the court for more than eight years and witnessed the large number of arguments in favor of the finality of Nabuwwat or the possibility and the nature of revelation, mainly around which the whole case revolved. Although taking sympathetically many of the arguments put forward by the Ulema of Jamat Ahl e Sunnat, as a pleader, the judge however maintained that the case revolved upon the question of understanding the concepts of "finality" and/or "continuity" of "Nabuwwat". In an observation, the learned judge maintained that there was a grave need to highlight sufficiently the concept of "Nabuwwat" and define and understand it "rationally." The learned judge took the literary reading of Quran and Hadith as the basic interpretive standard and ignored all other sources, such as *fiqh* or sufistic literary and cultural history, for "pragmatic" and "expediential" reasons. Further, the judge observed that the court accepted the position of the decision of Madras court that such a decision could only be decided by the scholars of the community, and because of the large number of the pleaders belong to the non-Ahmadi Muslims, the court accepts them as the scholars of Islam and the defendants, Ahmadis, as non-Muslims.<sup>38</sup>

The lengthy interpretive exercise of the court enabled the judge to clarify the "vagueness" of the concept of "revelation" along with the importance of the "unanimous" acceptance of "Umma" because of a supreme political imperative. While citing a writing of a religious scholar, Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, with the observation that the contemporary rational and enlightened Muslim intellectuals considered the concept of Prophet-hood in a sense of a political leader and a reformer. Such a personality brings prosperity and

growth after being disturbed with the degraded situation of his nation, the judge maintained. The judge, referring to the scholar, maintained further that "Nabi" was not only a political leader, but also transcends the time as he was given his purpose and message from God, and in this sense his given direction also transcended the given time. The judge observed after reading the text of the scholar that there would be a great loss for the Muslim community if the finality of Prophet (PBUH) was considered invalid. The Muslim community would find it hard to follow a single path in the absence of the concept of the finality of the "Nabuwwat" (Prophet-hood), the judge maintained.<sup>39</sup> He therefore ignored all those interpretations creating doubts in considering the "finality" of the Prophet-hood.

The proceeding of the case, though became a landmark signpost for many religious scholars, yet it couldn't become a precedence in judicial proceedings. The state of Bahawalpur was a princely state within British India, and the decisions within the court of the State of Bahawalpur was not binding upon the general judicial working of Indian courts. The decision however brought forward a wide scale conflict between the "Ulemas", though largely comprised of Deobandi school of thought<sup>40</sup> yet few others also belonged to Ahl e Sunna, and the religious scholars of Ahmadis. The important point is that even the "Modern" Muslim intellectuals, largely engaged in "reconstructing" or reinterpreting religious thoughts in current times,<sup>41</sup> also found themselves standing with "conservative Ulemas" who were in the habit of considering others *Kafir* (infidel). Although judge of the court noticed but ignored this habit because of the gravest importance of the "Nabuwwat". The other point upon which these multi-varient strands found united was its conception regarding sufistic thought and its place within the Indian

Muslim majority state. The judge noticed that the Ahmadis, as a defendant in the case, brought forward most of their argument from the sufistic tradition. The learned judge however considered meaningless the "sufistic cultural history" and accepted the position that no sufi saint in its senses ever claimed of superseding "Shariat" and "Nabuwwat." The history of the sufistic practices could only be understood, as the judge maintained in his decision, as either following the Shariat or being in a condition of "Shatihat" (a spiritually ecstatic condition) in which the sufi must be understood as "not sane".<sup>42</sup>

#### **JINNAH'S MUSLIM LEAGUE AND THE MUSLIM IDENTITY**

The politics of Jinnah's Muslim League grew exclusive to the point of considering Muslim Identity clearly distinct from Hindu Congress in India as the 1940 approached.<sup>43</sup> In order to counter Congress, Jinnah's Muslim League gradually drifted towards universal Muslim identity. His position stretched to the point of accommodating almost all sort of Muslim groups. However, it was not without a cost and that was to lose support of Ahrar and JUI-Hind who couldn't leave their antagonism for the Ahmadis. Jinnah not only couldn't make him convinced for taking legalist position against Ahmadis, he also gradually distanced his party from the Muslim political groups aligned with the Congress.

On the other hand, he was happy when Maulana Zafar Ali Khan's Millat I Islamia and Ahl e Sunna drifted closer to his Muslim League. After 1940, with the proclamation of resolution for the Muslim independent states of India, the drift became visible. Despite Jinnah's futile efforts in the Masjid Shaheed Ganj issue, and his Muslim League's unpromising results in the 1937 elections, his reputation as a Muslim leader having

sensitivity to Muslim's religious cause had increased to the point to make him stand out for the Muslim cause of India.

A large number of *sajjada nashins* changed their affiliation from Unionists to Muslim League, as David Gilmartin showed in his thesis. As the struggle of Pakistan emerged and prevailed, the *sajjada nashin* who were standing with the Unionist party's politics and policies till then and providing support to the ruling system devised by the British authorities, started shifting to the cause of Muslim League.<sup>44</sup> A large number of reformist Sufi-Pirs started favoring the struggle of Pakistan, thus taking the cause of a Muslim independent state to the village.<sup>45</sup> The merging of urban religious ideologue with the rural shrine-based sufistic practices consolidated the position of Muslim League and provided that very political weight to Jinnah needed to win the politics of center.

### Conclusion

The late colonial Politics of Punjab engendered an overlapping consensus around a structure of Muslim identity. The varied Muslim groups and scholars, even of different political orientations, gradually showed a consensual structure of Muslim identity. The structure came out as: believing in the greatness of Islamic history, owning Khatam e Nabuwwat or Finality of Prophethood and standing against the over-lapping pluralistic traditions. Jinnah's Muslim League opened itself to give space to the maximum number of varied religious groups and gradually found a support of a large number of groups. The structure, however, remained hidden within the Muslim League's emphasis on the universal religious identity for the Muslims of India. Muslim League emphasized on the distinctness of Muslim from the

Hindus. Politically it meant to have a distance from the Congress and stayed distanced from the Muslim groups aligned by Congress. His politics compromised his policy of universal religious identity and kept the exclusive structure of the (Sunni) Muslim identity intact.

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<sup>2</sup> Katherine Ewing, *Arguing Sainthood: Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and Islam*, (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1997), p.67.

<sup>3</sup> Tahir Kamran. *Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam: Religion, Socialism and Agitation in Action*. South Asian History and Culture 4 (2013): 465-482.

<sup>4</sup> The electoral alliance between Muslim League and Ahrar in 1936 was for a brief period. However, it shows the overlapping consensual features between Muslim League and Ahrar. It was the nationalist framework that did not allow Ahrar move closely with the Muslim League for the longer period.

<sup>5</sup> Allama Iqbal was part of Kashmir cause from as early as 1909 when he became a general secretary of the already existent Kashmir Anjuman, renamed as "Muslim Conference" was formed to show the solidarity with kahmiris, and Muhammad Fauq, the famous Kashmiri Historian, was part of that committee too. See, Dr. Rattan Lal Hanglo, Mohammad ud Din Fauq: Remembering first journalist of Kashmir, 05 July, 2012, <<http://www.kashmirdispatch.com/others/05078557-mohammad-ud-din-fauq-remembering-the-first-journalist-of-kashmir.htm>>

<sup>6</sup> Janbaz Mirza, *Karwan e Ahrar* (Lahore: Idara Maktaba Tabsara)p.347

<sup>7</sup> In a speech of Sheikh Abdullah published in 1933 in *Inqilab*, he said, " I dont have the right to stop them because of their religious views. *Because this is the age of Ahmadism (Italics mine).*" Mirza Janbaz, vol.I p.368

<sup>8</sup> Iqbal's articles attracted the attention of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru who wrote three articles in which he criticized the orthodoxy and non-liberal views pitched against an Ahmadi sect within Muslim society in India. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, "Qadianism and Orthodox Muslims" in Latif Ahmad Sherwani, ed. *Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal*, (Iqbal Academy Pakistan: Lahore, 1995), pp.197-202.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pp.201-202.

<sup>10</sup> Iqbal writes these essays in 1934 when the new constitution of 1935 was about to come. The constitution had already accepted the issue of separate electorate and hoped to be

incorporating the Communal Award already came in 1932.

Ibid. pp201-202.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp.201-202.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp.203. It is interesting that the publisher of this essay and the rejoinder to this essay, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf of Ashraf Printing Press considered it necessary to publish the decision of the Legislative assembly of Pakistan of 1974 that turned Qadianis into non-Muslims while republishing these writings of Iqbal.

<sup>13</sup> In Allama Iqbal's philosophical writings in prose, published as, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought In Islam*, already published in 1930 clearly positioned his sufistic thoughts and his sympathies with the specific spiritual tradition, especially those of Mujaddad Alif Sani.

<sup>14</sup> Allama Iqbal severely criticized on the form of Tasawwuf that dwells and promotes the idea of Wahdat al Wajud (Unity of Being). For him this form, as an Ajami (Persian) idea, crept into the otherwise Arabic *Islamic* teachings. His efforts remained to disentangle Ajami influences on the original Arabic Teachings in order to revive and liberate the true spirit of Islamic teachings. See, Preface, Ijaz ul Haq Qaddusi, Iqbal Kai Mahboob Soofia (Iqbal Academy Pakistan: Lahore, 1976), And also Dr. Abul Lais Siddiqi, Iqbal Aur maslak e Tasawwaf (Iqbal Academy Pakistan: Lahore, 1977).

<sup>15</sup> In a letter to Akbar Ala Abadi, Iqbal says, *yaha Lahore mai Zaruriat e Islami sai Aik Mutnaffas Bhe Agah Nahi... Sufia Ke Dukanai Hai Magar Waha Seerat e Islami Ke Mata nahi Bikti* (Here in Lahore, not a single person is acquainted with the necessities of Islam. There are shops of Sufis but there the manners of Islamic Life were not sold out.) Ijaz ul Haq Qaddusi, Iqbal Kai Mahboob Soofia (Iqbal Academy Pakistan: Lahore, 1976), p.Yai.

<sup>16</sup> For his praises one can find verses as written in Ijaz ul Haq Quddusi's *Iqbal Kai Mahboob Sufia*. See, Ijaz ul Haq Quddusi, *Iqbal Kai Mahboob Sufia* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1976), pp. 242-245, p.119, p.52,

<sup>17</sup> Allama Iqbal seemed to communicate sufis more intimately than can be suggested through many of his published works. Once his brother got suffered with a severe problem, Allama Iqbal sent a written poem to the shrine of Nizam ud Din Aulya. Some of the verses are: Hind ka Data hai tu Taira Bara Darbar

hai - Kuch Milai Mujh ko bhe is Darbar e Gauhar sai, Ik Nazar mai Khusro Malik Sukhan Khusro hua - mai Kahi Khali na Phir Jau tairi Sarkar Sai, Sakht hai museebat Sakht Ghabraya Hu Mai - Ban Kai Faryadi Tairi Sarkar mai Aaya hu Mai, Tu Hai Mahboob - ilahi Kar Dua Mairai Lyai - Yai Museebat hai Misal e Fitna i Mahshar Mujhai. See, Ijaz ul Haq Quddusi, *Iqbal Kai Mahboob Sufia*, p.245.

<sup>18</sup> Not only his poem, *Punjab kai Pirzado sai*, but also his essays published with the title, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* displayed his interest in Mujaddad Alif Sani and in an essay, *The Spirit of Muslim Culture* in Allama Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Stanford University Press, 2013).

<sup>19</sup> A clash between Sikhs and Muslims took place on the ownership of a mosque situated near Railway station in 1935. Both Muslims and Sikhs claimed to have historical ownership of the mosque. For Muslims, the mosque was developed by a Muslim Nawab adjacent to the shrine of Kaku Shah. For Sikhs it was the site of martyrdom of Sikh spiritual figures in the late eighteenth century. The conflict however revived in the early part of

<sup>20</sup> Jamal Malik discusses this concept of Colonial Urban Sector while stressing his point that the enhancement of this sector has corroded the autochthonous and autonomous traditional institutions. He includes within this concept, "representatives of the (Colonial) state, especially of large trade associations, representatives of Government, the higher grades of bureaucracy, the police and the army, professionals and the self-employed intelligentsia and the higher formal sector of formal education." See, Jamal Malik, *Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), p. 19. However, here the concept is not employed in this strictest sense. Rather, its usage here assumes the general theme of this thesis that the emerging Colonial Urban sector allowed at multiple levels to intermingle and inter-share traditional or modern life streams.

<sup>21</sup> Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj (1849-1947)* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1988), p.94.

<sup>22</sup> The Ahrar party was attempting to maneuver into an alliance with the Sikhs, with hopes of gaining representation the ministry after the upcoming elections. National Archives of

India, Home Political, file 18/7/35, as quoted in The Shahid Ganj Mosque Incident: A Prelude to Pakistan, in Edmund Burke and Ira M. Lapidus (ed.), *Islam, Politics and Social Movements* (London: The University of California Press, 1988), p.167.

<sup>23</sup> Punjab FR for the first half of July 1936. 18/7/1936-Poll., NAI.

<sup>24</sup> Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj (1849-1947)*, p.95.

<sup>25</sup> Ahrar leadership remained adamant that the whole issue fo Masjid Shahid Ganj was designed to damage the popularity of Ahrar. See the speeches of Ahrar leaders, especially Maulana habib Ludhyanwi as it is mentioned in Janbaz Mirza, *Karwan e Ahrar*, Vol.II (1977), pp.274-275.

<sup>26</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Maulana Zafar Ali Khan remained part of Congress till the dissolution of Nehru Report when British government refused to accept this document. Even after that, at-least till 1940, he remained supporter of Congress policies and its anti-colonial agenda. See,

<sup>28</sup> The alliance of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan with Ahrars developed earlier in 1930s and carried forward through the activities of Kashmir Committee in 1932-33, remained anti-Qadiani.

<sup>29</sup> Maulana Zafar Ali Khan quite early, that is during the Khilafat movement started criticizing the policies of British Government and a certain form of Tasawwuf expressed through the writings of Ibn e Arabi. Interestngly see, Jafar Baloch, *Iqbal aur Zafar Ali Khan* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1995), p.26.

<sup>30</sup> Jafar Baloch, *Iqbal aur Zafar Ali Khan* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1995), pp. 35-36. Among many of his verses, one verse in 1920 attracted the wrath of Hazb ul Ahnaf more than anything else: Jo Maulvi na milai ga to Malvi he Sahi --- Khuda Khuda Na Sahi Ram Ram Kar lai gai (If we could not find the maulvi then Malvi would do, Instead of saying Khuda Khuda , we would do Ram Ram). p.38

<sup>31</sup> Maulana Zafar Ali Khan kept close relations with Congress at-least till the dissolution of Nehru Report till Dec. 1929. He was among those Muslim leaders from Punjab who accepted the Nehru report, though with some proposed amendments. His rivals in Punjab, including Sir Muhammad Shafi and Allama

Iqbal, kept a strong stance against the Nehru Report. This created a violent rift within Muslim politics of Punjab. The "Inqilab" of Abd ul Majid Salik condemned severely the position of those accepted the Nehru Report. However, with the dissolution of Nehru report, Congress took a route for a complete independence and the changes in the politics of Punjab compelled Maulana Zafar Ali Khan to opt for Communal politics and separate electorates. pp.120-121.

<sup>32</sup> He was part of Ahrar's main body. "Zafar Ali Khan (editor of The Zamindar newspaper), Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, Syed Ata Ullah Bokhari, Chaudhri Afzal Haq, Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar, Khawja Abdul Rehman Ghazi Sheikh Hassam ud Din and Maulana Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi constituted the core leadership of the Ahrar." Tahir Kamran, *Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam: religion, socialism and agitation*, p.467.

<sup>33</sup> Ahrar's perspective claimed that since the denial of the presidency of Qadian Ahrar Conference in 1934, to Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, and instead making of Ata ullah Shah Bukhari as a president made Maulana Zafar Ali Khan Ahrar's enemy. Janbaz Mirza, *Karwan e Ahrar*, Vol.II (1977), p. 253.

<sup>34</sup> A poem published in the daily newspaper Ahsan by X-Shair, allegedly by Allama Iqbal, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan was criticized for hushing up the issue of Masjid Shaheed Ganj. "Zara Sun Lo Buzargan Baham Angaiz kai Qissai, Barai Logo Kai Ashghal Adawatbaiz kai Qissai, Udher Na Guftani Afrar ke Masjid Sai Baizari, Idher Ik Aqda Mushkil hai Dastawaiz kai Qissai." p.141. Another writer mentions that a consensus was reached earlier in 1922 between the Secretary General of Khilafat Committee, Malik Laal Khan and Sikh leaders. It was agreed upon that this mosque

would remain in the control of Muslims. This was a written document and Muslims of Lahore and other parts of India were depending a lot upon this document. However, allegedly Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan, the son of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, sold the document to the Sikhs. Dr. Sabir Kalauri, *Adbiat*, vol.1, no.4 (119-120), (Islamabad: 1984), p.127.

<sup>35</sup> The criticism also had a political dimension. Allama Iqbal had to fight with Sir Zafa ullah Khan for the Central Legislative assembly. It was, however, Sir Zafar ullah Khan who got elected with the support of Unionists. See, Sheikh Abd ul Majid, 1991... Muhammad Iqbal, *Iqbal and Ahmadiat* (Lahore:

Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1980) ... and Zafar Baloch, *Iqbal Aur Zafar Ali Khan*, p.65

<sup>36</sup> During his agitation against Qadianis alongwith Ahrars, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan wrote a long poem, Armaghan e Qadian in which he maintained that it was he who stopped its flow. The verses of X-Shair, published in the daily newspaper Ahsan, on june 29, 1936, the poet says: Ho gai hai Maadian e Qadian Is Par Sawar, Ab Kaha hai wo Sawar e Madian e Qadian. Zafar Baloch, *Iqbal Aur Zafar Ali Khan*, p.140

<sup>37</sup> The book was supposed to be published in 1936. However, the political activities made the publications of the book for few more years.

<sup>38</sup> Roidad Muqaddama-i-Mirzaia Bahawalpur (1926-1935) (Lahore: Islamic Foundation, 1988), p.97.

<sup>39</sup> Roidad Muqaddama i Mirzaia Bahawalpur (1926-1935) (Lahore: Islamic Foundation, 1988), pp.54-55

<sup>40</sup> Most of such scholars have an affiliation or sympathies with Ahrar and its political agenda. Even, at some point, Ata ullah Shah Bukhari, the most significant Ahrari leader and speaker, also participated in the court proceedings.

<sup>41</sup> Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz belonged to the group of scholars later on claimed as Ahl ul Quran. The group emphasized upon taking Quran as a basic religious text for Muslims and the dependability of other religious texts, like Hadith and Fiqh, upon Quran. The group, especially the figures attached with Tolu-e Islam, the journal and a trust around which and in which Ahl ul Quran, especially, Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz propagated his teachings. Most of the time, he was criticized bit hard for his different interpretation of religious texts and even termed as Kafir, especially during Ayyub Khan's (r. 1958-1968) government which even kept a close relations with the scholar and the trust. See, Ali Usman Qasmi, God's Kingdom on Earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947–1969, *Modern Asian Studies* / Volume 44 / Issue 06 / November 2010, pp 1197 1253, Published online: 04 May 2010

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>43</sup> Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850* (London: Routledge, 2000)

<sup>44</sup> David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.505-508.

<sup>45</sup> Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, trans. Tahir Kamran, pp.214-215.

## CENTRE-BALOCHISTAN RELATIONS (1947-70)

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### ABSTRACT

The British government announced the partition plan for India and Pakistan on June 3, 1947. The British administration appointed Shahi Jirga as an electoral college to decide the future of British Baluchistan. It finally gave its verdict in favour of Pakistan. Afterwards, top Pakistani leadership seemed ambitious to make the Kalat state as its part due to its geo-strategic and geo-economic significance. It changed its mindset and expressed the intention of unconditional accession of the Kalat state to Pakistan. Given the precarious situation in and around the Khanate, the Khan finally signed an instrument of accession. The Baloch nationalists declined to accept the validity of instrument of accession and decision of Shahi Jirga. The Advisory Council was formed in June 1949 to make sure people's participation in the governance of British Baluchistan. Another step taken in this direction was the appointment of the Reform Committee in October 1958. The central government decided to integrate four states of Kalat, Mekran, Kharan and Las Bela into Balochistan States Union. One Unit Plan was made a part of 1956 Constitution. It was a fateful attack on the federal parliamentary set-up. Prince Abdul Kareem

Khan did not reconcile to the changed status of the Khanate but his insurgency was put down by the Pakistani armed forces. Iron-fisted tactics of Ayub's regime further inflamed the centrifugal forces in Baluchistan.

#### KEY WORDS

Ustama Gall, Advisory Council, Wrote Pashtun, Reform Committee, Baluchistan States Union, Muslim League.

Pakistan took control of the Khanate on 15 April, 1948 in accordance with 3<sup>rd</sup> June plan after the Khan had inked an agreement of accession with Pakistani authorities<sup>1</sup>. Tahir Amin, a well-known political analyst and writer is of the opinion that Khan of Kalat entered in the accession arrangement with Pakistan unwillingly. He was left disappointed to get help from India and Russia. Secondly, he was threatened with the use of force against his state by the government of Pakistan.<sup>2</sup>

Prince Abdul Karim, younger brother of the Khan, never reconciled to the changed position of the Khanate after its accession to Pakistan. He, along with his companions, decided to take up arms against the state of Pakistan. He entered Afghanistan with a hope of getting assistance for liberation movement. The Baloch freedom fighters tried to get help and sympathies of the Baloch Sardars for their cause. The Russian and Afghanistan governments were also approached in this regard.<sup>3</sup> They also spared no efforts in creating chaos and unrest like situation in Balochistan.<sup>4</sup> Muhammad Hussain. Anka, Malik Saeed Dehwar, Abdul Wahid Kurd, Qadir Bakhsh (Baloch Nationalists) backed the armed resistance movement. However, it was not favoured by Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Gul Khan and Abdul Aziz Kurd because they were not certain about internal and external support.<sup>5</sup> Afghanistan could not be

supportive of the cause of Baloch movement because it was in conflict with its own demand of “Pashtunistan” spreading from Chitral to Balochistan in the Arabian sea.<sup>6</sup> Thus, due to lack of internal unity and external support it failed.<sup>7</sup> Realising the failure to materialize the liberation struggle, Abdul Karim returned back on 8<sup>th</sup> July and was arrested.<sup>8</sup> His trial began on 27 November, 1948 by special Jirga in Mach Jail. He was awarded ten years rigorous imprisonment and was fined Rs 5000. His other companions were also sentenced and fined.<sup>9</sup> Upon his release, Abdul Karim Khan formed a new political party (Ustamam Gall) or the people’s party. It focused on the formation of Baloch province. The Wrore Pashtun led by Achakzai was also working on the same lines in Pashtun dominated areas of Balochistan.<sup>10</sup> The Khan’s dream of making it all embracing Baloch Political Party never materialized because it received cold response from Makran, Kharan and Lasbela.<sup>11</sup>

#### **FORMATION OF ADVISORY COUNCIL**

Jinnah had a desire to change the statues quo in Balochistan. To fulfil his pledge he established Governor General’s Advisory Council in Balochistan so as to make sure public’s participation in the governance of their province.<sup>12</sup> It was nominated body of the areas of British Balochistan. The announcement was a big step forward for the province. According to Axmann, it was established on 11 June, 1949.<sup>13</sup> However, it did not come up to the expectations of the people because it was only a recommending body. It consisted of two members with nominal powers. It was devoid of composite representative enlarged body of all areas forming British Balochistan. All hopes were dashed to pieces regarding people’s representatives’ participation in the governance of the

province. The real powers were with the AGG to whom the Advisory Council merely referred any matter in the form of proposal for consideration. Eventually, it met its death on 1<sup>st</sup> September, 1951. The council was formed as a body so that it may have check on the decision and administrative planning of the AGG but its original position and capacity was not as it envisioned.<sup>14</sup>

**REPORT OF THE REFORM COMMITTEE**

Another step taken by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to bring constitutional and administrative change in Balochistan was the appointment of a Reform Committee on 4 October, 1950. It was composed of five members. It visited each and every corner of the British Balochistan. Its report was a remarkable step in the constitutional and political history of British Balochistan. The report of the committee proposed provincial autonomy and raising it to the status of Governor's province. It also stressed upon the introduction of adult franchise and enlarged powers to the provinces. The creation of local bodies institutions were also regarded as inevitable.<sup>15</sup> The topmost central administration opposed the report of the committee and was not given practical shape in the post-colonial Balochistan. The arguments given in this regard were far from convincing like weak financial position and under population of the post-colonial Balochistan. Jinnah had earlier set aside the arguments by saying that centre would share the financial difficulties of the province for the sake of progress and welfare of people.<sup>16</sup>

**BALOCHISTAN STATES UNION (BSU)**

The government of Pakistan decided to integrate four states of Kalat, Mekran, Kharan and Lasbela into 'Balochistan States Union' (BSU). All four states agreed to the idea in March 1952.<sup>17</sup> It had common executive, legislature and its administration was to be headed by the Prime Minister. The permission of the government of Pakistan was needed in the removal or nomination of the Prime Minister. However, Council of Rulers had the powers to appoint or remove him. The Council of Rulers, comprising four rulers of the states, headed by a President was to be selected among the rulers in rotation. Accordingly, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, was chosen as the President of the council. BSU had its own cabinet to be chosen from the Assemblies. They could not be appointed or dismissed without the prior approval of the government. The agreement provided for a legislative council of 28 elected and 12 nominated members. Aga Abdul Hamid, a civil servant, was appointed as the Prime Minister of the Union<sup>22</sup>. Awan maintained that Ahmad Yar Khan took it as a chance to emerge as the future leader of the post-colonial Balochistan. He also urged the Marri and Bugti tribes to demand for their joining in BSU. He further writes that BSU was a 'a trap' to lure Khan before demolishing him.<sup>19</sup> Where as, Dehwar views that topmost central authorities did not like the institution of BSU and they had some other foolish and dubious designs like one unit at the back of their mind.<sup>20</sup> The later events also witnessed that the idea of BSU was originated with the aim of merging it with the province of Balochistan. The government finally gave this region a special status.<sup>21</sup> Special areas were to be part of the province. These areas would not have any representation in the provincial legislature. Provincial Executive, Chief Commissioner or Governor, would control these areas.

### DISSOLUTION OF FIRST CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

In the meantime, the dispute between the Constituent Assembly and the then Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad was moving towards its climax. The Constituent Assembly's two hasty enactments led to its dissolution by Governor General on 24 October, 1954. Governor General was annoyed with the Constituent Assembly when it asserted its powers. Firstly, it repealed 'PRODA' (Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act, 1949). It was made during Liaquat's period to check the mal-administration, mismanagement, and corruption in the society. The prestige of the Constituent Assembly was greatly lowered due to this step.<sup>22</sup> Secondly; it amended the Government of India Act, 1947 by divesting the powers of Governor General to remove the ministries. It was, indeed, a step forward in the growth of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan.<sup>23</sup> The Constituent Assembly kept the Governor General uniformed on this account. He reacted sharply and dissolved the Constituent Assembly. The Governor General's action could not be justified because it was about to complete its work in regard to the framing of the constitution. If the Governor General had dissolved it when it lost its credibility after the election of 1954 in East Pakistan, his action would have been defended. He did it only to protect his vested interests rather than to protect democratic principle.<sup>24</sup>

After dissolving the first Constituent Assembly, civil and military bureaucracy fully asserted and made solo flight in deciding the future of the constitution making history of Pakistan. The formal agreement regarding the integration of the BSU in to Balochistan was signed between the Khan and the Government of Pakistan on 1<sup>st</sup> January, 1955. Ahmad Yar and other rulers consented to dissolve the BSU and thereby sanctioned the abolition of the states. By raising their annual

allowances, the government of Pakistan easily succeeded in doing away with Kalat, Karan, Lasbela and Mekran as independent princely states.<sup>25</sup>

### **POLITICS OF ONE UNIT IN WEST PAKISTAN**

The most controversial step taken by the second Constituent Assembly was the formation of One Unit Plan (1955). It was basically the brain child of central state actors, who regarded welding all areas and provinces into one unit as pre-condition to bring 'the linguistic and cultural homogeneity'. They viewed it that it would eliminate the feelings of provincialism and prejudice. It would also be necessary for viable political and economic system. Defence requirements could also be met.<sup>26</sup> Ayub Khan backed one unit scheme in these words.

Strategically and economically, West Pakistan was destined to stand or fall as a whole lying as it does in the basin of the Indus River and its tributaries, its future economic development must be considered as a whole to achieve the maximum result. West Pakistan, in order to develop properly and prove a bulwark of defence from north and south must be welded in to one unit and all provincial artificial boundaries removed regardless of any prejudices to the contrary, which are more the creation of politicians than real.<sup>27</sup>

Balochistan, instead of achieving a full-fledged provincial status, was included in West Pakistan. It was actually planned by the central state elites to counter the numerical majority of East Pakistan and to foil the political alliances and cooperation between Bengal and smaller provinces.<sup>28</sup> The politics of one unit in west wing further made the smaller provinces and nationalists forces more organized and sensitive about the cultural peculiarities and identities.<sup>29</sup>

No doubt, the central state actors used all kinds of political manoeuvrings to get One Unit Plan implemented. They succeeded in obtaining Provincial Assemblies' approval for their one unit scheme. Sindh Assembly did not toe the line of civil-military elites and had to pay the price. Pirzada's ministry was dislodged because of its disapproval of one unit. "The major political parties of West Pakistan, Muslim League and the Republican Party were ambiguous, non-committal and opportunistic in their attitude towards one unit."<sup>30</sup> One unit scheme which was incorporated in the Constitution of 1956 led to the death of federal principle in west Pakistan.<sup>31</sup> Provincialism could only be lowered by a big change in outlook and policies of the civil-military establishment.

The regionalists in Balochistan were against the One Unit Plan. They wanted independent status or at least complete political and economic autonomy for their province. The ethnic actors were sceptical and developed a lot of apprehensions against central state actors' policies. They considered their policies as an invasion on their regional cultures. Baloch nationalists even laid stress on homogeneity rather than language differences between Baloch and Brahavi. They believed Baloch and Brahavi belong to the same origin,<sup>32</sup> and are the branches of the earlier Baloch.<sup>33</sup> Tariq Rehman opines that the Khans of Kalat, who were Brahavi rulers, promoted the idea of common origin between Brahavi and Baloch to get help to consolidate their rule.<sup>34</sup>

The Khanate parliament declared on 14 December, 1947 that Baloch would be its national and official language. In practice, however most of the work of Kalat was carried out in Urdu, while correspondence with outsiders was in English. Notwithstanding administrative necessities, it was significant that Balochi nationalism was expressed through Balochi during 227 days of the independence of the Kalat State.<sup>35</sup>

Whereas the Pakistan State elites believed in one nation, one language and one culture.<sup>36</sup> They wanted to make Urdu the only national language country. They emphasized a strong centre and used Islam to gain legitimacy. Ethnic identities and cultural diversities were considered as dangerous ideas to the concept of one nation. Ethnic elites were dubbed as “anti-state and anti-Islam”. The state elites showed zero tolerance towards regional languages. They believed in unity through conformity.<sup>37</sup>

A significant development occurred on 30 November, 1956 when like-minded political parties in West-Pakistan formed the political organization by the name of Pakistan-National Party (PNP). The like-minded political groups were Azad Pakistan Party headed by Mian Iftikharuddin, G.M Syed's Awami Party, Wror Pashtun of Abdus Samad Achakzai, Khodai Khidmatgar of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Ustamam Gall (Peoples Party) from Balochistan and Sindh Hari Committee of Hyder Bakhsh Khan Jatoi. All these political forces looked upon the unification plan as usurpation of regional, constitutional, economic and political rights of the small provinces.

The regionalists and separatist forces vehemently opposed the welding of the West-Pakistan in to one unit and demanded its demolition with greater provincial autonomy to the smaller provinces. Maulana Abdul Hameed Khan Bhashani joined it in 1957. It was renamed National Awami Party (NAP). Abdul Ghaffar Khan was elected its first President.<sup>38</sup> The party manifesto included the following main points. It vowed to defend the territorial integrity of the state. It laid stress upon the independent and non-aligned foreign policy. It demanded the creation of provinces on linguistic lines. Adult franchise should be introduced. It demanded the ending of usurpation and exploitation of the people belonging to different regions.<sup>39</sup> The NAP started to act as opposition front. It also provided a

platform to the leftist groups to express their viewpoint on the country politics.<sup>40</sup>

After return from abroad, The Khan found his state of Kalat being a part of one unit, West-Pakistan. He took anti one unit stand and joined hands with NAP in its opposition and abolishing one unit. He again tried to restore his state and creation of an independent homeland for the Baloch. He sought the help of the former Sardars in this regard. He vigorously demonstrated against unification plan.<sup>41</sup>

The Khan chaired the historic meeting of Baloch Sardars held at the Palace Hotel in Karachi in 1957. It was attended by Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, Nawab Ghous Bakhsh Raisani, Mir Jamal Khan Jamali and Nawab Akbar Bugti. The historic demand of the meeting was the dismantling of one-unit and creation of Balochistan province on the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historical basis.<sup>42</sup> When Khan's real determination of the creation of the Khanate of Kalat was exposed to the participants of the meeting most of them opposed it and walked out in protest.<sup>43</sup> Having lost trust of the Sardars, Khan's political future was in jeopardy.

Meanwhile, Pakistan was confronting severe political crises. It was mostly created due to weak federal parliamentary system. The political parties were not well-organized and well-established. They lacked political tradition and norms. The political culture of West-Pakistan was dominated by powerful land and tribal elites. The Muslim League had very short history of organized political struggle. The early death of Jinnah created vacuum. Moreover, the political and constitutional problems were further compounded by federal character of Pakistani society. The West-Wing had dominance in military and bureaucracy. It was also politically dominant. It created a sense of deprivation and alienation among the people of East-Pakistan. In the western wing, small provinces were raising

head against Punjabi dominance in the polity. The one unit scheme further promoted apprehensions and reservation of the small provinces, Inter-wings and intra-west-wing conflicts caused a great delay in the constitution making process.

The ambitious civil-military bureaucracy manipulated the circumstances taking advantage of the institution imbalance. It took its benefits and asserted its role in polity. After the dismissal of Nazimuddin' ministry in 1953 and dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954, the civil-military bureaucracy increased its role in politics and emerged as a key factor in determining the state's policies. President Sikandar Mirza proclaimed Martial Law in the early hours of October 8, 1958. The constitution was abrogated and central and provincial assemblies were dismissed. Political parties were banned and general elections were postponed for an indefinite period. Ayub Khan was appointed as a Supreme-Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.

As earlier discussed, the feeling of neglect and deprivation were compounded in Balochistan over the issue of one unit. The NAP and the Khan opposed and demanded its dismantling. The ruling elites were anxiously waiting to take the Khan's designs as a pretext to arrest him on the charges of high treason. He was allegedly blamed for conspiracy to merge Kalat with Iran.<sup>44</sup> He was also accused of reeling Afghanistan's support for proposed Balochistan rebellion.<sup>45</sup> The Khan, while addressing the workers of the Baloch Academy at Quetta on 26<sup>th</sup> August, asked for the breaking up of one unit and creation of new province on linguistic basis.<sup>46</sup>

On the Khan's refusal to meet the President and the Prime Minister to explain his alleged involvement in anti-state activities, the government of Pakistan finally decided to arrest him at the end of September, 1958.<sup>47</sup> Martin Axmann opined that the allegations against the Khan were levelled to pave the

way for imposing Martial Law in the country. Awan and Iqbal Ahmed differ with the Axmann's views. They did not see any link between the two-events. The Khan was detained in Kalat allegedly on the blame for starting full-scale Baloch insurgency with the help of 80,000 tribesmen. Pakistani armed forces entered on October, 6 in Kalat finding no such reported numbers of insurgents. As a result of the clashes, a number of tribesmen were killed.<sup>49</sup> The khan was deprived of all distinctions and privileges by the order of President, Sikandar Mirza. Agha Daud Jan was appointed as his successor.<sup>50</sup>

Highly centralized governmental structure gave rise to centrifugal tendencies. It was a reaction of the small provinces against a highly centralized idea of one unit in West-Pakistan. The impact of the politics of one unit was far reaching in Balochistan. The people of Balochistan realized that they were denied an equal share in the state affairs. It created discontent and dismay which was finally reflected vigorously in demand for regional autonomy. The regionalists gained strength in Balochistan. Flexible centre was necessary for ethnically and geographically fragmented society. Decentralization with democratization was the proper response to block fissiparous tendencies. Regionalism in Balochistan was also the outcome of economic discontent. Had the general election been held in time, centrifugal tendencies could have been curtailed in Balochistan. Federalism is a balancing mechanism between the centrifugal and centripetal forces. The spirit of federalism suffered a setback due to One Unit Plan and highly centralized structure in which provincial status was that of subordination rather than coordination.

#### **BALOCH ARMED INSURRECTION OF 1958**

Most Baloch considered army's attack on Khanate in 1958 as unprovoked and aggressive. There was also strong resentment among tribesmen against authorities' demand of turning in their weapons at local police station.<sup>51</sup> The arrest of the Khan also caused a wave of anger to sweep throughout Balochistan. Sardar Nauroz Khan Zarakazai, an old man of ninety, decided to challenge the authority of the state of Pakistan. He led the major Baloch armed insurrection in support of the Khan. Nauroz Khan was perceived as a notorious fire brand during British times.<sup>52</sup> The chief demand of Nauroz Khan was release of the Khan and breaking up of one unit. He also urged upon the protection of Baloch customs and traditions.<sup>53</sup> He, along with his gathered guerrilla force of 1000 men, went to the Mulla Pass. The army launched bombing on the guerrilla hideouts in mountains. Baloch nationalists opine that an agreement was reached as result of discussion between Pakistani authorities and Nauroz Khan. According to it, tribesman gave up their armed resistance movement in response to general amnesty and safe conduct. Abolishment of one unit was also promised. Sardar Doda Khan Zehri took an oath on the Koran, the Muslims' holy book, assuring the insurgents that authorities had met all their demands.<sup>54</sup>

According to nationalists' accounts, the authorities dishonoured the pledge by arresting Nauroz Khan and his sons. However, the military government officials declined to accept the authenticity of such agreement.<sup>55</sup> Nauroz Khan and seven of his followers, including Batay Khan and his sons, were given capital punishment by a special military court held at Mach Jail. Nauroz Khan's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to this old age.<sup>56</sup>

The early two military actions were taken in post-colonial Balochistan against the Khan. First, to compel him to accede to Pakistan and second, on the pretext of his 'anti-state

activities' The next conflict erupted after the military operation and the military court' punishment to the leader of second armed rebellion, Nauroz Khan and his followers. Besides repeated military actions in post-colonial Balochistan and persisted incarceration of Baloch leaders. The other factors which caused alienation and disillusionment among the people of Balochistan were the formation of one unit in 1955 and Ayub Khan's Martial Law in 1958.

The centralizers' attitude had always been that they knew the best what is good for an area and its people and what they do, had to be accepted without any questioning. The Baloch were not prepared to accept their perception, with the result that military operation were launched and their top leadership remained imprisoned for long periods.

Top most military-civilian elites' policies towards Balochistan created feelings of mistrust and deprivation among the people of Balochistan. Since Khan's arrest, the wave of violence and counter violence erupted and continued even to the present time. The Khan's political hopes of restoration of his former Khanate dashed to pieces after army's attack on the state in 1958. He served in the subsequent years as Governor of Balochistan from post 3<sup>rd</sup> insurgency.

#### **DISTURBANCES IN MENGAL AND MARRI-BUGTI AREAS**

The adopted policies of Ayub's regime, in political, cultural and economic spheres were totally unitary in characteristics. He sustained One Unit Plan and introduced. "Controlled democracy" based on "Basic democracy".<sup>57</sup> The civil military

elites during Ayub's period believed in using force to suppress the opposition. The government intensified the military operation in Balochistan to crush the insurgency sparked off after the life imprisonment of Nauroz Khan and his companions' execution. In July, 1960 Army's action caused a wave of indignation among the political activists. Ayub Khan paid visit to Quetta in August 1962. Baloch leaders organized a political meeting on his arrival. They condemned military operation as solution of the Balochistan problem.<sup>58</sup>

The dictator was angry with their warning and threatened them with "extinction" if they persisted with their resistance.<sup>59</sup> The regionalists in Balochistan strongly opposed the state elites' policies. The Bugtis, the Marris and the Mengal tribes continued their resistance under the leadership of respective tribal chievs like Khair Bakhsh Marri, Akbar Bugti and Atta Ullah Mengal.<sup>60</sup>

It must be noted that the Baloch were greatly underrepresented in state power structure during Ayub' period.<sup>61</sup> The next wave of uprising was launched by the Mengals and it spread to the Marri-Bugti areas. It carried on till the declaration of amnesty in 1967. The Mengals were annoyed with government's demand of surrendering of weapons. Tribesmen were greatly perturbed over the government's decision to replace the traditional Sardar's with that of the government's nominees.<sup>62</sup>

The guerrilla warfare continued in Jhalawan and Marri areas during Ayub's regime. Skirmishes between the hostiles and the government forces took place during 1956-66. The government in order to control the rebellious activities decided to replace hostile Sardars like Attaullah Mengal, Nawab Akbar Bugti and Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri with that of government supporters. The government's

initiative in this regard was totally failed. All of the government's nominees were killed by their tribesmen.<sup>63</sup>

Ali Muhammad Mengal started armed resistance after the arrest of Atta Ullah Mengal and made the following demands: First, to release Atta Ullah Mengal, second, to stop the campaign to collect weapons, third, closure of police stations. The clashes broke out between tribesmen and security forces that lasted till the end of 1966. The government arrested Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Mari on charges of supporting armed uprising.<sup>64</sup> They were time and again detained and set free on different charges.<sup>65</sup> They were blamed for backing and extending assistance to the Baloch resistance against the government of Pakistan. Sher Muhammad Marri stood distinguished in raising the flag of guerrilla rebellion.<sup>67</sup> He was also famous as General Sherof. He had joined politics in 1945 and established "Mazlum Party" in the tribal areas of the Sulaiman Mountains.<sup>68</sup> He also founded the Parari movement. Both commands were under his control. He himself led the northern command of the Marri-Bugti area.<sup>69</sup> The southern command of Jhalawan district was under the supervision of Ali Muhammad Mengal.<sup>70</sup> It was believed that Sher Muhammad had organized 22 base campus in Marri-Bugti and Mengal areas by July 1963.<sup>71</sup> The army headed by Major General Tikka Khan took on the "Pararis". They put up stiff resistance as discussed earlier; the government authority was greatly undermined by the killing of all the new Sardars replacing the traditional ones. The Baloch became more united and die-hard due to the military operation.<sup>72</sup> Amazingly, even the British avoided to replace the Sardars in such a manner as Pakistan government did under Ayub.<sup>73</sup> Sher Muhammad expressed the objectives of this rebellious struggle with the *News International*. According to him, the key goal of the

armed struggle was to break up the one unit.<sup>74</sup> The rebels had close political affiliation with the NAP, which was struggling for provincial autonomy.<sup>75</sup>

The government failed to control the situation and it deteriorated with the passage of time. The government felt the failure and futility of its strategies towards the Balochistan crisis. There was a shift in government's attitude towards the problem after the appointment of General Muhammad Musa Khan as a Governor. Amnesty was announced and the Baloch leaders were released as a gesture of goodwill. The authorities also reinstated the deposed tribal chiefs. They were further assured that their political demands would also be met. The area returned to normalcy after calling the rebellion off in 1967.<sup>76</sup> After brief interval, the situation again became tense due to lack of trust between the central state actors and ethnic lords. Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti, Gul Khan Naseer, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai were re-arrested.<sup>77</sup> Trouble again sparked off in Easter Balochistan and Pat-Feeder area.<sup>78</sup> Meanwhile, the political condition of the country worsened. There was wide spread agitation against the government.

Ayub Khan's experiment of "Controlled Democracy" based on Basic Democracy ended on a note of disillusionment and failure. Highly authoritarian and centralized political system promised little to the Baloch grievances. They were excluded from a share in the political authority within Western-Pakistan. It contributed to the rise of the movement for regional autonomy and Baloch nationalism.

Ayub Khan's rule stopped the growth of democracy in Pakistan. There was no space for the growth of genuine political system. The whole system was circling around Ayub Khan's authoritative personality and his created political party. It crumbled to dust after his departure from Presidency. Sheikh

Mujib-ur-Rehman, passionate supporter of provincial autonomy, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, advocate of populist program, moved in to the political vaccum.<sup>79</sup> Baloch nationalists stopped their hostilities against the regime because their major demands were fulfilled. However, they sustained their "Command Headquarter" and guerrilla formation.<sup>80</sup>

The Constitution of 1962 was more centralized and the central grip over the units increased manifold. Ayub Khan considered a strong centre inevitable for achieving unity and economic progress of the country. He ruled like an autocrat and concentrated all powers in his own office. The regionalists were totally opposed to his views. Regionalism reached its peak during Ayub Khan's rule because of the extensive powers of the President, centralized so called federal structure and the subdued position of the indirectly elected National Assembly.

The situation had gone beyond his control and he realized his grip losing over the country's affairs. Ayub Khan resigned his office on 25<sup>th</sup> March, 1969 and handed over the reign of the government to General Yahya Khan, Commander in chief of the army. Yahya Khan imposed Martial Law and abrogated the Constitution of 1962. The political parties were banned. Yahya Khan introduced two-major changes in the future political structure. One unit was dissolved and the former provinces were restored.

Second, Balochistan was made a full-fledged Governor's province. Yahya's regime also released Baloch nationalists.<sup>80</sup> It was the undemocratic rule of the Ayub's regime which deprived Balochistan of an effective voice in the nation and state-building task.

The movement of maximum provincial autonomy gained currency in the Eastern-wing. The situation also worsened in Western-wing. The ethnic elites in Balochistan

resented the one unit. Instead of following the strategies of pacification, the ruling elites tried to suppress the Baloch regionalists. Troops were deployed in the province to put down the insurgencies. A number of Baloch regional leaders were arrested. The strategy of suppression further inflamed the centrifugal forces in the provinces. The Ayub government under-estimated the forces working for restoration of democracy and provincial autonomy. Eventually, the regionalists and supporters of democracy started movement against the authoritarian regime, which brought about the downfall of his rule in March 1969.

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## CHISHTI SUFI SILSILAH IN INDIA: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

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### ABSTRACT

Soon after the inception of Chishti *Silsilah* (initiatic or spiritual genealogy) in India, it strengthened its root in this region. In this regard, it is pertinent to analyze the rise of Chishti *Silsilah*. After passing the early period in eighth and ninth centuries, the tenth century is regarded as the period of the systematization of Chishti *Silsilah*. During the next centuries, the Chishti *Silsilah* flourished and further developed itself in South Asia. The fourteenth century was marked by its consolidation in Delhi, the political centre of the Sultanate. The close of fourteenth century and the start of the fifteenth century were marked by a process of decentralization of Chishti *Silsilah*, whereby regional Chishti centres emerged. The present article is focused on the origin and development of Chishti *Silsilah* from its pre-Indian phase till fifteenth century. In this article an attempt is made to discuss the important features of

Chishti *Silsilah* which emerged in these centuries. Along with this an elaboration is being provided for the major sufi personalities of Chishti *Silsilah* before sixteenth century.

#### KEY WORDS

Genealogy, Chishti Centers, Consolidation, Sufism, India

Chisht was a village of Khurasan near Herut now part of modern Afghanistan. There were two places with the same name, one was in Khurasan, whereas the other was a famous town situated between Uch and Multan in South Asia. Chishti *Silsilah* rose from the town of Chisht in Khurasan.<sup>1</sup> After the gradual Islamization, this particular area became the centre of Islamic world. The foundation of this *Silsilah* was laid down by Shaykh Abu Ishaq Shami (d. 940). No detailed historical accounts are available about the inception of *Silsilah* except some accounts like *Shajrah al-abrar* and *Mirat al-israr*. He belonged to Syria from where he migrated to Baghdad and then to Chisht. After his migration to Chisht, the city emerged as a prominent place of Sufism. Abu Ishaq left Chisht in the first decade of tenth century while declaring Khawaja Abu Ahmad Abdal as his spiritual successor. Khawaja Abu Ahmad died in 966, and appointed his son Abu Muhammad (d. 1020) as his successor, who in turn appointed his nephew (sister's son) as his successor whose name was Abu

Yusuf Chishti (d. 1067). After the death of Abu Yusuf his son, Khawaja Mawdud Chishti (d. 1126) succeeded him. Because of Khawaja Mawdud and his disciples, a spiritual peak in Sufism was attained in Chisht.<sup>2</sup> His successor was Haji Sharif Zandani (d.1215), who was spiritually succeeded by Khawaja Uthman Harwani (d.1211), whose disciple and *khalifa* (spiritual successor), Khawaja Muin al-Din of Ajmer popularized the Chishti *Silsilah* in South Asia. The spiritual lineage of sufi shaykhs of Chishti *Silsilah* is as follows:

1. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) (d.632)
2. Ali ibn Abi Talib (d.661)
3. Hasan al-Basri (d.728)
4. Abd al-Wahid ibn Zayd (d.793)
5. Abu Ali al-Fuzayl ibn Iyaz (d.802)
6. Ibrahim ibn Adham (d.779)
7. Sadid al-Din Hudhayfah al-Mar'ashi (d.822)
8. Amin al-Din Abu Hubayrah al-Basri (d.900)
9. Mumshad Alu Dinawari (d.941)
10. Abu Ishaq Chishti (d.940)
11. Abu Ahmad ibn Farasnafah Chishti (d.966)
12. Abu Muhammad ibn Ahmad Chishti (d.1020)
13. Abu Yusuf Chishti (d. 1067)
14. Mawdud Chishti (d.1126)
15. Haji Sharif Zandani (d.1215)
16. Uthman Harwani (d.1211)
17. Mu'in al-Din Chishti of Ajmer (d.1236)<sup>3</sup>

The rise of Ghurid Turks in the tenth century brought disturbance to the peaceful atmosphere of

Chisht as the very region became an arena of tussle between the Ghurid Turks and their opponents. Tranquility returned only after the rise of Ghiyas al-Din Muhammad as the Sultan of Ghur in 1168, however the policy of annexation of South Asia remained topmost priority.<sup>4</sup> The region no longer remained favorable for the sufi movement and most of sufis migrated to nearby areas. Khawaja Muin al-Din Chishti, who was one of greatest sufis of all times, migrated to Ajmer in north India.

#### **KHAWAJA MUIN AL-DIN CHISHTI OF AJMER**

Khawaja Muin al-Din Chishti (d. 1236) originally belonged to the town of Sijz, but later travelled to many places including Samarqand, Bukhra, and Baghdad. During the second half of the twelfth century, the Khawaja reached Multan and then Lahore, afterwards he moved to Delhi. After visiting a number of places he decided to settle at Ajmer in 1165. Though the Chishti sufis had adopted the doctrine of keeping themselves at bay from the authorities, Khawaja Muin al-Din selected Ajmer as the centre of his activities, which was the capital of Prithviraj Chauhan, the ruler of the neighbouring region. Apart from political and strategic importance, Ajmer was also a center of religious activities of the Hindus. In the ending decade of thirteen century Shihab al-Din Ghori was preparing an army for war. When the Khawaja came back from his visit from Ghazni to Ajmer in 1192 he was threatened by Prithivi Raj to leave but he replied

him the words, "Wait for three days" and after these days, he was defeated in battle of train.<sup>5</sup> Before the start of the second battle of Tarain in 1192, Khawaja Muin al-Din established a vast community of Muslims in Ajmer. Soon his teachings began to spread in this charged environment of caste, race, and color and it sublimed a large number of following. He died in Ajmer at the age of ninety seven in March 1236. *Siyar al-Awliya* suggests that the Khawaja made his first visit to capital on the invitation of Shaykh al-Islam, Najm al-Din Sughra.<sup>6</sup> His migration to India brought a subtle change in Ajmer. During this period, Muizz al-Din Ghuri conquered India with the help of his Ghulaman-i Sultan, the Turkish slaves. The people of Ajmer were Hindus by faith, but embraced Islam at the hands of Khawaja Muin al-Din.<sup>7</sup> The last days of Khawaja Muin al-Din Chishti was full of peace and respite. Shaykh Qutb al-Din Bakhtiyar was with him during his farewell time. Before his death in May 1229, Khawaja Muin al-Din appointed Shaykh Qutb al-Din as his successor. The occasion has been recorded in the words of Shaykh Qutb as:

When he finished his teachings with tears in his eye, he said, 'O Dervish, I have been brought to this place for this reason that this place is my last resting place. Then he got the *khilafatnama* (certificate of succession) prepared by Khawaja Ali of Sanjar, he gave it to me (Qutb al-Din) and made me his *khalifa*

and *sajjada* (spiritual successor) at Delhi. I bowed low and he put on my head the *dastar* (turban symbolizing succession). He gave me the robe to wear and gave me the sacred stick of Khawaja Uthman.<sup>8</sup>

#### **SHAYKH QUTB AL-DIN BAKHTYAR KAKI**

Shaykh Qutb al-Din Bakhtyar Kaki was a contemporary as well as a disciple of Khawaja Muin al-Din. The consolidation of Chishti *Silsilah* in Delhi occurred due to his efforts, as he settled at Delhi where he built his *khānqāh* (sufi dwelling). Since the inception of his efforts he did not try to nurture any kind of political relations with rulers of time. Sultan Iltutmish (r. 1211-36) had great veneration towards the sufis. However he paid his visit to Delhi during the time period of Sultan Iltutmish in 1224. He greatly revered Shaykh Qutb al-Din. According to *Siyar al-Awliya*, Shaykh Qutb did not develop any close relation with court but the Sultan consistently paid homage to him. The growing affiliation of the Sultan brought abomination among other scholars. On his visit to Delhi, Khawaja Muin al-Din was saddened to know that Shaykh al-Islam, Najm al-Din Sughra had similar feelings of resentment because of Shaykh Qutb al-Din's mass following. That is why when the Khawaja decided to take Shaykh Qutb al-Din with him to Ajmer, the people of Delhi persuaded the Khawaja to change his decision.<sup>9</sup> Shaykh Qutb al-Din strictly followed the tradition of Chishti *Silsilah*. Once the Sultan offered him a land

grant of three villages but the Shaykh refused to accept it. The Sultan himself established a *khānqāh* for him in Delhi. He also took consultation from the Shaykh to build water reservoir in Delhi named *Shamsi Hawz*.<sup>10</sup> On his death, Sultan Iltutmish led the funeral prayers according to the desire of the Shaykh, as it was only the Sultan who fulfilled the condition of saying non-obligatory parts of 'asr (afternoon) prayer.<sup>11</sup>

#### **SHAYKH HAMID AL-DIN SIWALI OF NAGOURL**

One of Khawaja's very young disciples, Shaykh Hamid al-Din (d. 1274) lived in a village named Siwal near Nagaur. He was bestowed by the title of *Sultan al-Tarikin* (the King of Ascetics) by him. Though the Chishti sufis were permitted to receive gifts in cash and kind, along with *futuh* (unasked for charity), Hamid al-Din had a small plot in the village of Suwal and relied on the cultivation from the field. Not complacent with the attitude of Suharwardi *Silsilah* towards wealth, he wrote a number of letters to Baha al-Din Zakariyya of Multan (d. 1267) on the theme of *faqr* (voluntary poverty). He was a man of letters and had good command on Islamic laws. During his lifetime he declined to receive gifts from rulers and preferred a simple life.<sup>12</sup> After his death in November 1274, his descendants came into interaction with Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughlaq (r. 1324-1351), who awarded them important political positions. Nagaur as a centre of Chishti *Silsilah* re-emerged under

Khawaja Hussain Nagouri (1495), a descendent of Shaykh Hamid (d.1274). Khawaja Hassan Nagouri instead of affiliating with court followed the teachings of Chishti *Silsilah*. His source of income was farming as he had small orchard and cultivated fruits.<sup>13</sup>

#### **SHAYKH FARID AL-DIN MASUD GANJ SHAKAR**

The efforts of Shaykh Qutb were embellished by Shaykh Farid al-Din Masud Ganj-i Shakar, popularly known as Baba Farid. He himself was the disciple of Shaykh Qutb as he took *bay'at* (oath of allegiance) at the hands of Shaykh Qutb. Once, he visited Ajmer and met Khawaja Muin al-Din. Before his death Shaykh Qutb al-Din nominated him as his successor. However, he did not prefer to live in Delhi, and soon he left for Hansi where he also found even larger number of devotees from all over India.<sup>14</sup> He stayed away from politics and did not play any role in politics. He followed the traditions of Chishti *Silsilah* and did not align himself with political authorities. Common people referred to him as 'Shaykh al-Islam' out of devotion. His devotees included nobles as well. The chief officer of revenue grants, Malik Sharaf al-din Kubra was, for instance, an ardent devotee of Baba Farid, but he declined to accept him as his own disciple. Similarly, when one of his class fellows requested him to pray for his appointment as Qazi, but he declined on the basis that religious knowledge is for good practices, not to get people in trouble.<sup>15</sup>

The Chishti *Silsilah* itself spawned the doctrine of social equality, tolerance and social discipline. The masters of Chishti *Silsilah* enriched the South Asian Muslim culture with exquisite spirituality.<sup>16</sup> Baba Farid following the very doctrine led a very simple and rustic life. He, like other Chishti sufis did not accept land grants. Shaykh Baba Farid had an offer of land grant and a garden but he declined to accept it, saying that none of his preceptors had accepted these offers. In *Fawā'id al-Fu'ādīt* is stated that Sultan Nasir al-Din Mahmud (r. 1246-66) visited Ajodhan once during some expedition. Ullugh Khan Balban, who was his deputy at that time, also accompanied the Sultan. Baba Farid was offered with some cash and land grant consisting of four villages but he declined to accept the land grant, but accepted the cash which he immediately distributed among the poor.<sup>17</sup> He considered these practices extremely materialistic and regarded them as persuasions that could lead one towards profane or mundane concerns. It is recorded in *Siyar al-Awliya* that he said "If you desire to attain position of great saint do not pay attention to the princes".<sup>18</sup> Understanding the sufferings of people due to exploitation by upper class he tried to assuage their hardships on individual level but never at an institutional level.<sup>19</sup>

Baba Farid had to face rivalry from his contemporary *ulama* or scholars like Sharaf al-Din Qiyami, who tried to create trouble for him. Though

he established his *Khānqāh* locally, his *khulafa* established *khānqāhs* all over India.<sup>20</sup> Through his trained disciples he preserved a strong legacy. Some of his disciples botched out same doctrine while following the very tradition of Chishti *Silsilah*. Shaykh Jamal al-Din Hansawi was a very close friend and *khalīfā*. Because of high closeness with Baba Farid, he stayed in Hansi for twelve years. Baba Farid reposed so much trust in him that he had even permitted him to sign the *khilāfatnāmah* (certificate of succession) for anyone.<sup>21</sup> He died during the lifetime of Baba Farid, and his sons remained affiliated to Shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya. This *Silsilah* under their leadership was named as Jamalia but later on it merged into Chishti-Nizami *Silsilah*.

Shaykh Badr al-Din Ishaq was another disciple and son-in-law of Baba Farid. Shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya was very close to him. Out of respect he never took *bay'at* at the hand of any other during his lifetime. He was deeply influenced by his preceptor that his eyes were always full of tears because of divine love. Baba Farid ordered him to take Malik Sharaf al-Din Kubra under his discipleship. However, after the death of Baba Farid he could not continue his affiliation to the same level with Shaykh Badr al-Din Sulayman, the son of Baba Farid. Shaykh Najib al-Din Mutawakkil led quite a simple life. He was younger brother of Baba Farid and lived in Delhi. He was offered five

hundred *tankas*, and following the tradition of Chishti mentors he distributed it among the destitutes on the same day.<sup>22</sup>

### **SHAYKH NIZAM AL-DIN AWLIYA OF DELHI**

Shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya after whom the Chishti *Silsilah* was known as Chishti-Nizami *Silsilah* took the Chishti doctrines to its peak in South Asia. It was because of his light of guidance that Chishti *Silsilah* established all over India through *khānqāhs* and it reached to the heart of common men. He constituted an important part of the chain of Chishti *Silsilah*. Like his preceptors, he laid emphasis on simplicity and adherence to basic teachings of Chishti *Silsilah*. On the other hand, he also followed the teachings that love of God is the love for humanity. He voluntarily preferred the life of poverty and refused to accept the land grants from Sultan Ala al-Din Khalji (r. 1296-1316). Thousands of people were fed from his *langar khana* (open kitchen) but he himself abstained from eating too much, only for the reason that what if someone might leave hungry. During the early years he got education from the younger brother of Baba Farid in Delhi. However he visited Ajodhan where he was formally bestowed with the discipleship of Chishti *Silsilah*. When he visited Baba Farid third time in 1265 he was given *khilāfatnāmah* by Baba Farid to further disseminate the doctrines of Chishti *Silsilah* by enrolling disciples.<sup>23</sup>

Ghiyathpur, a small village in the suburbs of Delhi, embellished due to the presence of Shaykh Nizam. He established a *jamā'atkānā* there and people found this easiest way to get rid of their problems by visiting. During the time of Shaykh Nizam, Ghiyathpur proved to be a place where people came to eliminate their hardships. *Siyar al-Awliya* describes that it was due to the blessings of Baba Farid that he pacified a large number of people. The door of his *jamā'atkānā* remained open all the time to everyone.<sup>24</sup> Zia al-Din Barni, writer of *Tarikh-i Feroz Shahi* anda disciple of Shaykh Nizam al-Din, describes that it was persuasions of Shaykh Nizam which changed the attitude of people towards material life. Drenched in the teachings of Shaykh Nizam, they sought redemption in mysticism and prayers.<sup>25</sup> Shaykh Nizam, on the other hand provided social services to the people along with spiritual one. In this way he esteemed himself to rule on the hearts of people. As long as he stayed alive, he mitigated the sufferings of human beings. By making a place in the heart of people he strengthened the roots of this *Silsilah* at every corner in India.<sup>26</sup>

The policy of adhering to the tradition of Chishti *Silsilah* reached to the highest point of elevation during the time period of Shaykh Nizam al-Din. Embracing the very tradition he avoided to develop direct relation with the authorities. According to Riazul Islam, Shaykh Nizam was not as

strict towards the officials and *umara* as was his preceptors. State officials and *umara* (nobility) used to visit his *jamā'atkāhāna* and he listened to their resentments.<sup>27</sup> However, Amir Khurd in *Siyar al-Awliya* has accounted that the Shaykh always hesitated to visit courts of kings. He wrote letters to the official in response to complaints and advised them to address the problem. His attitude towards state officials was not very motivational. In his opinion people who played role in bureaucracy were easily swayed by politics and corruption. Judicial system in the Sultanate of Delhi was a symbol of oppression. Many sufferings of people arose because of coercion from the Qazis which was based on political motivations. Though not ordinary disciples, his *khulafa* were not allowed to join the government service. In case of violation, the *khilāfatnāmah* could be cancelled by the Shaykh. Even the sons of Sultan Ala al-Din, Khizer Khan and Shadi Khan were disciples of the Shaykh, and they used to visit the *jamā'atkāhāna*.<sup>28</sup> Though accepting the royalty under his discipleship was a deviation in the history of Chishti *Silsilah*, when it comes to relation of Shaykh Nizam with the contemporary Sultans and authorities he strictly adhered to the tradition of Chishti *Silsilah*.

Incoming years after the demise of Sultan Ulugh Khan Balban (r. 1266-86) were full of political instability and chaos. After the Khilji takeover, order was restored in politics of India. The newly king,

Sultan Jalal al-din Feroz Khilji (r. 1291-96) was benevolent despot but he desired to visit *jamā'atkāhā* of Shaykh Nizam. The Shaykh strategically avoided meeting as he wanted to remain at bay from the royal influence. As far as the cash grants are concerned, the Shaykh accepted some and distributed immediately among the poor and needy. During this time period grants came in a large quantity but Shaykh Nizam ensured the complete distribution among the poor. It is accounted that he made sure that nothing was left in stores.<sup>29</sup> During the reign of Ala al-Din Khilji (r. 1296-1316), who was the successor of Jalal al-Din Khilji, Ghiyathpur became a hub for his disciples and devotees, who visited it in large numbers. As the political situation passed through a turmoil with the succession of Ala al-Din Khilji as Sultan, Shaykh Nizam tried to maintain maximum distance from authorities. Since the Shaykh commanded immense popularity, Sultan Ala al-Din considered it as a direct threat to his large sphere of influence. His doubt towards the growing spiritual influence of Shaykh Nizam was also developed due to conspiracies of people. Shrewdly, he confirmed through a letter if Shaykh Nizam was interested in politics but got satisfied after finding a negative answer.<sup>30</sup>

During this period, an atmosphere of spirituality existed in and around Delhi. Platforms with thatched roofs were built all the way from

Delhi to Ghiyathpur. Sultan Ala al-Din, his family, and his heir Khizer Khan were effable towards Shaykh Nizam. Khizer Khan was already under the discipleship of the Shaykh. In the last year of his reign, Malik Na'ib instigated a conflict and amid this turmoil he executed the crown prince, Khizer Khan. The Shaykh did not take interest in turbulent politics but he could not keep himself aloof from the political impacts. Sultan Mubarik Shah (r. 1316-20) who ascended the throne knew well about the popularity and influence of Shaykh Nizam. As Khizer Khan was a disciple of the Shaykh, the new Sultan started conspiracies against the Shaykh, who remained calm against the wrath of the new king. His successor, Sultan Nasir al-Din Khusrau (r. 1320) sent large sums of money to many sufi shaykhs, most of them declined to accept and some accepted them including Shaykh Nizam. He distributed money as usual among the needy. When Sultan Ghiyas al-Din Tughluq (r. 1321-1325) ascended the throne, he asked the Shaykh to pay back the received money. Shaykh Nizam refused to do so saying money of treasury belonged to the Muslims but Sultan was unable to take any action against him.<sup>31</sup>

The relation of the Sultan and Shaykh Nizam remained smooth until some *ulama* raised the question of the validity of *samā'* (devotional sufi music) practiced in Chishti circles, and tried to use it as a tool against Shaykh Nizam. Therefore, the

Shaykh was asked to appear in the court for a public debate, where Qazi Rukn al-Din Walwalji directly questioned the Shaykh. Alam al-Din Ahmad, a grandson of Baha al-Din Zakariyya of Multan, acted as arbitrator and presented evidences in the support of *samā'*. On hearing the logic in favor of *samā'*, the Sultan refused to give any decision to ban it. The Sultan did not take any strong and direct step against the Shaykh. Shaykh Nizam al-Din did not appoint any one as his successor for the leadership of Chishti *Silsilah*, though he had given *khilāfatnāmahs* to a number of *khulāfa'* who carried on the task in coming years. Once his *khulāfa'* inquired him that every Preceptor authored books as his memories but the shaykh replied my *khulāfa'* are my books.<sup>32</sup> Some of his *khulāfa'* remained attached to the central system of *khānqāh* in Delhi while some established *khanqāhs* in other areas of India.<sup>33</sup>

#### **SHAYKH ALA AL-DIN AHMAD ALI SABIR**

In fifteenth century, most of the *khulāfa'* of Shakh Nizam al-Din migrated to other provinces of India and established *khānqāhs* there. Shaykh Ahmad Ali Sabir was a nephew (sister's son) of Baba Farid. Baba Farid gave him the title of 'Sabir' (literally means having patience) which reserves an incident. When Shaykh Ahmad Ali Sabir was serving Baba Farid, the former's mother came to see him after seven years. She was astonished to see him being extremely underweight but Baba Farid told her that

Shaykh Ahmad was made the in-charge of *langarkhana* since the day he came. When Shaykh Ahmad Ali was questioned, he told that he had the duty to distribute food among the people, not to serve himself. Baba Farid hugged him out of joy for being a dutiful disciple and bestowed him with the title of Sabir. Shaykh Ahmad spent thirty six years of his life with Baba Farid. As religious and moral condition of the town of Kaliyar (in district Haridwar, in present day Uttarkhand, India) was declining day by day, Baba Farid advised Shaykh Ali Sabir to migrate to Kaliyar in 1254. When he reached Kaliyar, he was not welcomed by the people, especially Qazi Tabarak, who refused to accept his spiritual authority. When Shaykh Ahmad Ali showed him the letter from Baba Farid, Qazi Tabarak tore it apart. Despite the hostilities, Shaykh Ahmad Ali Sabir continued to propagate Chishti *Silsilah* in Kaliyar. He granted *khilāfatnāmah* to the people whom he found spiritually able. Most of his accounts are available in his own work, titled *Sirr al-Abhidiyat*. *Siyar al-Awliya* does not provide the accounts of this prominent *khalifa* of Baba Farid in details.<sup>34</sup>

His most prominent *khulafā* were Shaykh Panipati Turk (d. 1306) and Shaykh Abd al-Haqq Radowlavi (d.1433). The Chishti-Sabari *Silsilah* spread in the regions of Deccan, Malwah and Bengal. Shaykh Ali Sabir in his life time did not establish any *khānqāh*, instead he lived in a simple

hut where food was served if available. However, the propagation of Chishti *Silsilah* and granting *khilāfatnāmah* was carried on by him. When Chishti-Nizami *Silsilah* was facing decentralization, the Chishti-Sabari sufis rigorously propagated the *Silsilah*. His *khalīfā* Shaykh Ahmad Abd al-Haqq Radowlavi did not adopt isolation like his master, instead he localized the *Silsilah* in Radowli (presently known as Shahjahanpur, a small town in district Muzaffargarh, UP). He established his *khānqāh* on the pattern of *khānqāhs* developed by Baba Farid and Shaykh Nizam al-Din. He also wrote letters to the nobility and royalty, but they did not respond him owing to the fear that the *Sisilah* preaches austerity from worldly temptations.<sup>35</sup>

Shaykh Ali Sabir died in 1281 in Kaliyar. After his death, the leadership of Chishti-Sabari *Silsilah* in Kaliyar was carried out by Shaykh Panipati and then by Shaykh Jalal al-Din. His mausoleum was built by Shaykh Turk Panipati and it was renovated with the efforts of Shaykh Abd al-Quddus Gangohi in fourteenth century and later by Emperor Akbar. Local authorities also played their role in constructing and expanding the shrine and the *khānqāh*. In nineteenth century *Khānqāh* was also renovated by Begum of Bhopal.<sup>36</sup>

#### **CHISHTI-NIZAMI AND CHISHTI-SABARI SUB-LINEAGES OF CHISHTI *SILSILAH***

According to *Siyar al-Awliya* after Baba Farid, his two disciples Shaykh Ala al-Din Ahmad Ali Sabir and

Nizam al-Din Awliya perpetuated the Chishti *Silsilah* on the lines preserved by Baba Farid. Ali Ahmad Sabir, after whom the *Silsilah* was named as Chishti-Sabari *Silsilah* did not try to establish Chishti *Silsilah* at a vast level but his disciples played very important role in propagating it. Historical accounts provide meager details about him but he led a life of austerity and remained strictly affiliated to Chishti sufi traditions.<sup>37</sup> During his lifetime he did not play any role in politics. Most prominent shaykhs of the Chishti-Sabari *Silsilah* are found in fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.<sup>38</sup>

Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq (r. 1325-51) used to frequently visit the assemblies of Shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya in his youth. But later on, he got influenced by rationalist philosophers who led stress on orthodox part of religion and explicitly questioned the ideology of Ibn-i Arabi. Under their influence, he came to the conclusion that the sufis must play an important role in state and politics, as well as in propagation of Islam among the infidel.<sup>39</sup> The reign of the Sultan staged an arena for the philosophical rational and religious forces. The Sultan himself was under the influence of a student of Imam Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328), a Hanabali theologian from Syria. Ibn-i Taymiyyah impeached the sufi ideology of *Wahdat al-Wajud* (Doctrine of Oneness or Unity of Being) propounded by Ibn-i Arabi, and criticized many sufi practices. Under this orthodox ideology tension between official body

and Sufism grew in 1327. The policies of the Sultan adversely affected the Chishti sufis, many of whom were forced to don silken official dresses instead of patched robes.

After Shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya, Shaykh Nasir al-Din titled 'Chiragh-i Dehli' (the Lamp of Delhi) had taken over the responsibility to persevere the teachings of Chishti *Silsilah*. As a leader of Chishti *Silsilah* he stood firm for the traditions and policies of his preceptor.<sup>40</sup> Shaykh Nasir al-Din was one of them who stayed in Delhi during the reign of Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq to bear the enormity of state's policies. The Shaykh was saddened by the circumstances created by the policies of state but he resolved not to leave Delhi. Before his death in 1356, he did not appoint anyone as his successor. He also ordered to bury the sacraments of Chishti preceptors along with him in the grave. With his death the centralized Chishti *Silsilah* in Delhi began to crumble.<sup>41</sup> The *khulafa* of Shaykh Nizam al-Din migrated to different parts of India and established local *Khānqāhs* in many regions. With this decentralization a new phase started in the history of the Chishti *Silsilah* in India.<sup>42</sup>

When Daultabad was made the second capital of the Sultanate of Delhi, Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq ordered the sufis to move to newly formed capital. It particularly affected the Chishtis whose main *Khānqāh* was in Delhi. Many disciples

of Shaykh Nizam migrated to Deccan. After twenty years in 1347, Sultan Ala al-Din Hassan (r. 1347-58) laid the foundation of Bahmani kingdom with its capital at Gulbarga. To consolidate his rule he had to enlist the support of the sufis.<sup>43</sup> Khawaja Banda Nawaz Gesudiraz (d. 1422) was a *khalifa* of Shaykh Nasir al-Din. He reached Gulbargah (a city in presentday Karnataka State in south India) in 1380. Taj al-Din Feroz Shah (r. 1397-1422) was ruler of Deccan at that time he granted him several villages which Khawaja Banda Nawaz accepted. During this time period he did not only accept the offers but also remained attached to the court. The Sultan's brother, Ahmad used to attend the assemblies of Gesudiraz regularly. Later, Sultan Ahmad (r. 1422-1436) after ascending the throne started supporting the family of Gesudiraz.<sup>44</sup> By aligning himself with court, Bandanawaz diverged from the traditions of earlier Chishti sufis. The earlier masters of Chishti *Silsilah* had strictly adhered to the policy of non-alignment with ruling authorities but Gesudiraz changed the policy by aligning himself with the ruling house.<sup>45</sup> However, he did not directly shape the religious or political policies of state. Bahmani Sultans sought the help of sufis in gaining the support of local people and consolidation of their power.<sup>46</sup> A prominent disciple of Khawaja Banda Nawaz Gesudiraz was Shaykh Ala al-Din, but unlike his spiritual leader he preferred the life of austerity. He led a life of simplicity and avoided contacts with

the rulers. Story has it that once he asked his servant to throw garbage on the door steps so that no one could visit him, and so he might not get disturbed.<sup>47</sup>

The *khulāfa'* of Shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya like, Shaykh Saiyyid Hussain, Shaykh Hissam al-Din Multani, Shah Barik Allah, introduced Chishti *Silsilah* in Gujarat. However, the propagation of the *Silsilah* in an organized form was done by Shaykh Kamal al-Din in Gujarat. He was the *khālifā* and nephew of Shaykh Nasir al-Din. In Bengal, the Chishti *Silsilah* was introduced by Shaykh Akhi Siraj (d. 1357). He came to visit Shaykh Nizam al-Din as a devotee but got knowledge through great hard work and was bestowed with *khilafatnamah*. His *khālifa'* Ala al-Din established his *khānqāh* in Pandwah (a town in Palmu district in Jharkandh State). His other prominent *khulāfa'* were Nur Qutb-i Alam (d. 1410) and Mir Saiyyid Ashraf Jahangir (d. 1405). In Malwa the propagation of Chishti *Silsilah* was done by Shaykh Wajih al-Din Yousuf, Shaykh Kamal al-Din, and Maulana Mughis al-Din (d. 1320), the *khulāfa'* of Shaykh Nizam al-Din Awliya.

The Chishti *Silsilah* bore the brunt of the strong policies of Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq. Though it was decentralized in Delhi, the emergence of regional Chishti centres was an important development. Though the consequences did not reflect that his intentions were not of destruction, the demand of the Sultan rendered the

*Silsilah* in a position in which the *khulafa* of prominent Shaykhs of the *Silsilah* had to dispense with the very core values of order and most remarkable of them was not to align with the ruling house. The incoming fifteenth century was marked by the consolidation of the Chishti *Silsilah* in regional centers.

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**CONCEPT NOTE**

**MERITOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA**

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**ABSTRACT**

Democracy is associated with the process of holding, free, fair and people-oriented elections and meritocracy is the result of this very kind of mature and institutionalized democracy. In this context, Whole of the region of south - Asia, specifically the case of states like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh is quite relevant. Regarding India, being largest democracy, there is to some extent hopeful possibility of this very co-existence between democracy and meritocracy; because she is on the paths of political organization, political system and finally toward the achievement of political (mature) culture. But, other cases, especially of the state of Pakistan, which is relatively more influenced and gripped by colonial-oriented and institutionally over developed institutions and non-professionalism of true parliamentary practices, is still facing serious issues. Presently, these sorts of countries along with other internally and externally weak and dependent states (particularly of third world) are facing more obstacles and issues in this respect. True, vibrant and institutionalized process of democracy can lead concerned states and societies toward institutionalized and impartial

meritocracy. Almost all Members of SAARC, particularly India (being an independent democratic state) and Pakistan (being dependent and controlled democratic state) can achieve this very goal through democratically institutionalized strength and responses, especially from three basic pillars of any state.

### **Keywords**

Democracy, meritocracy, institutional development, fair elections, pillars of state

Democracy gets momentum and strength, when it is given space for growth. Regular holding of general elections, as it is the case in India<sup>1</sup>, is one of the main reasons of strengthening democratic system and finally the democratic culture. It is the democratic culture, which actually leads the concerned state and society, towards the emergence and growth of principles and practices of meritocracy. Democracy and meritocracy can co-exist in this context. Basically, democracy works for institutional development both at state and societal levels. This institutional functioning and strength guide all other minor and macro pillars and departments towards meritocracy and fair play.

The situation of South – Asia is to some-extent different than that of developed world. In developed world, the democratic system and culture have actually developed those lines and paths, by which meritocracy has been practiced as the real base of democratic process and its further development. But, in the context of South – Asia there are certain obstacles and problems, which often create such circumstances that

cannot give space to meritocracy and democracy to co-exist.

Regarding India and Pakistan, it is generally perceived that the colonial “legacies” have influenced both the concerned states and societies in different ways.<sup>2</sup> India, on the basis of democratic institutional developments has been able successfully to get the right track. The politics of India, which is based on adoption of universal adult- suffrage, holding of continuous general elections, smooth and peaceful changes of governments,<sup>3</sup> and constitutionally independent Election Commission both in spirit and practice, has been able to lead Indian Society and state towards a true and real meritocracy. Although, it has not been fully accomplished, but the Indian democratic system has led India towards the destination of achieving meritocracy.<sup>4</sup> In the context of obstacles, the dynastic politics, emergence of linguistic, ethnic, regional or caste groups and their visible role in national politics, radicalized paradigms and practices of BJP in the context of destruction of Babri Mosque etc.... are very relevant and important. The emergence of slogans of purely Hindutva government is also another problem in this context. But, the India's political arithmetic has not supported these concept and practice.<sup>5</sup> It has again given a chance to congress to lead India towards a culture which would not only compatible to Indian democracy but to meritocracy in general and specific contexts.

Luckily, in India, there was party politics and structural authoritarianism, which actually further strengthens the legacy of all India National Congress and under the able leadership of Jawahir-lal-Nehru, the country went towards parliamentary practices in true sense. Later on the rule of All India National Congress regarding Indra Ghandi's government and growing

Indian Populism also significantly influence the whole of the scenario in the context of democracy.<sup>6</sup>

The situation of India is somehow better than the other states and societies of South – Asian region. India is on the track and going towards the achievement of goal of co-existence of meritocracy and democracy. But, other states of South – Asia, especially Pakistan and Bangladesh have many internal and external problems in this regard.<sup>7</sup>

From 1947 to 1971, the lack of political and professional skills and seriousness, especially in parliamentarian's context, and the civil – military and feudal oligarchies were the two major causes, by which the socio – political fabric of United Pakistan could not develop on democratic lines. At societal level, Pakistan could not be led even towards a political system and political organization and the vision of Jinnah about Pakistan was also remained unfulfilled. There was no preparation for the journey and way, which could lead Pakistan towards a politico- Pluralistic Society.<sup>8</sup>

According to Mohammad Wasim that from 1947 to 1958, civil bureaucracy ruled the country on behalf of military bureaucracy and, from 1958 to 1971 military bureaucracy ruled the country on behalf of civil bureaucracy. The political process, especially the guidelines of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (his speech, presidential address on August 11, 1947), were being sidelined. And the whole of the society and state came in the grip of exploiters, like landlord of this peripheral area of India, generals of this region (having colonial legacy and land along with chieftains of this whole of the region), civil bureaucrats, and religious "elite" (*mullahs-ulemas*).

Similarly, the short-comings and obstacles regarding democracy and co-existence of meritocracy

with democracy are also directly linked with the effects of British imperial rule in the Punjab and the adjacent areas. The “importance” of Punjab as a military recruiting camp for the colonizers has undoubtedly the relevance as the future – factor of designing the socio-politico and economic aspects of this region. In this context, the defense of British Empire by the soldiers of this region, regarding the great uprising of 1857, is also very important aspect for understanding the present – scenario of this region. These soldiers also served during World War I and World War II, and in lieu of their “military services”, the British granted land and built a very large and systematic irrigation/canal system. Similarly, the role of Unionist Party, unification of different agriculturalists and religious communities were only possible, due the factor of military – patronage, especially by this regional aristocracy on behalf of the colonizers.<sup>9</sup>

The question of co-existence of democracy and meritocracy would be answered in negative and non-constructive contexts. Even, the democracy was not being allowed to flourish. There were the concepts and practices of controlled democracies under the cover of different dictatorial rules. Military, both in Pakistan and Bangladesh repeatedly intervened the politics of these countries, even after 1971. In these circumstances, democratic process derailed repeatedly and institutional development was being halted again and again. The emergence of civil – society, truly independence of judiciary (without DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY), vibrant media and journey towards the mature form of democracy were remained unfulfilled dreams. Rather, these dreams were being shattered by the internal and external anti-democratic and anti-meritocracy forces.<sup>10</sup>

These forces are still working directly and indirectly to maintain their “influence” regarding democracy, rule of law, meritocracy and constitutionalism. On the other hand, the phenomenon of uni-polar world, particularly the role of United States of America, to establish and maintain neo-imperialism, especially in third world countries and other daughter states, is very relevant. In this context, the South – Asian States, including India can not deny the American influence. The countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh, the international players of great- game influence these kinds of weak states in all aspects. These players have actually penetrated in all walks of such country's foreign and domestic life. On the one hand, they (Pakistanis and other countries of third world, like Pakistan) have very weak systems of governance and societal progress, and they are being directly and indirectly interfered and influenced. Therefore, it is very difficult to maintain democracy and meritocracy jointly.

Basically, the mature stage of democracy, which passes through the phases like, general politics, political system, political organization and political culture, is really the solution. In South – Asia, the colonizers have actually left very powerful, effective and “long-lasting” legacies”, especially in respect of Pakistan. These “legacies” not only give room to the existing ruling class to maintain and secure hegemonic system, which is prevailing from the times of the British, for instance, the feudal class and later on the military and civil bureaucracy . Similarly, the feudal lords and religious men (“ulemas”) were also directly and indirectly linked with the colonizers and the Raj. In such kind of situation, democracy and meritocracy would not be able to co-exist, rather the political system could not be given the space to grow and start journey towards the

achievement of goal of establishing and maintaining the mature and result-oriented democracy and meritocracy at institutional level.

It is true democratic process both in spirit and practice, which ultimately leads towards institutional development. When the sound and vibrant socio-political (democratic) system works, it automatically goes towards the institutionalizing meritocracy. In this respect, individuals are becoming irrelevant and as a whole, the concerned department takes responsibility in general context and goes for the merit, non-favoritism, non-nepotism and equality.

If democracy would be the strengthened force, along with education (quality education) and the holding of general and fair elections regularly, the complete situation of politics would be in favour of the ways and paths of meritocracy as well. These kinds of situations ultimately lead towards the mature culture of meritocracy. When it would become the necessity of the individual and collective life consciously and unconsciously; it would be the stage where meritocracy and democracy co-exist in any region or society of the world.

Generally, the countries and societies of SAARC are discussed in the context of People's Participation in Politics through democracy, and people's fundamental right with regard to meritocracy. The history and culture of this region has actually great importance regarding the theme and practicability of co-existence of democracy and meritocracy. Whole of region has abundance of sources of all kinds, so the people of this region are under the deep influence of their respective geography, environment, growing seasons and of course their respective history. All these factors shape the individual and collective life of the people of this region.

The matter of co-existence of democracy and meritocracy has also been directly interlinked with all these factors. The South – Asian region has the most important example of India in this context, as she has successfully started her journey towards the attainment of maturity of democracy and meritocracy.

India, as the “largest democracy” of the world and also having the remarkable stability of its democratic institutions, has developed the political and constitutional ways to remain firm on democratic and meritocratic lines. And, through this way, as it has been described earlier, India is on the right track to go towards the establishment of institutionalized meritocracy. In this regard, democracy and meritocracy would co-exist in India. Although in the context of the present days, India is not responding fully as a state of merit and non-favoritism; but India has started journey towards the achievement of this goal.

On the other hand, Pakistan has spent almost half the time since Independence under different forms of military rules. From Ayub Khan, the first dictator, to General Pervez Musharraf, the last military ruler, the Pakistan military played a high – profile role in national politics. Even, today, it has “great” indirect and direct influence in the socio-political scenario of Pakistan.

Due to this factor, the first step of democracy and its strengthening could not be accomplished. Hence, the meritocracy, democracy and their institutionalization are also still a dream. There were controlled and engineered democracies, which paved the way for the strengthening of anti-democratic and anti- meritocratic forces. Undoubtedly, there are flaws in character and relevant functioning of politicians also, but these are due to the weaknesses and deterioration of institutions especially of democratic ones. In Pakistan, there is hope

for the establishment, maintaining and continuity of democracy, which would lead towards political system and organization. The political culture would be the final stage, due to the maturity of this stage the factor of meritocracy and institutional strengthening would be possible. The case of Bangladesh is also seemed as more relevant to Pakistan, rather India. Bangladeshi armed forces have also “great influence” in their political arena. The democratic process of this country is also to somehow engineered and controlled, both from inside and also from outer world. It has also the need of true democratic, constitutional and general political reforms for co-existence of the democracy and meritocracy. All the other states can only achieve this goal through politico cum democratic institutional strength and responses. And, it would only be possible through the functioning of a true, real and constitutional democratic process.

Actually, the role and importance of three pillars (executive, legislation, and judiciary) of state, to give space for co-existence of democracy and meritocracy can not be denied. These are equally important and having real result – orientation. Under the cover and absolute guiding principles of political culture and mature democracy, these pillars would institutionally work and create permanent space for co-existence of democracy and meritocracy, particularly in South Asia and generally in any concerned part of the world.

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