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THE EVOLUTION OF 'PLURALISTIC CULTURAL ETHOS' IN INDUS ENCLAVE AND PUNJAB UP TO THE COLONIAL TIMES

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ABSTRACT

Since the establishment of Arab and Turkish rule in India, the two opposing trends at the higher echelon of the society were noticeable. The rationalists, who were pragmatic and practical in their approach; and the orthodox who preferred to move along legalist and the textual interpretations. Thus, there developed a non-accommodative and exclusivist approach. Despite struggle between these two opposing trends, justice was considered a cornerstone for stability in society. Therefore, the concepts like *al mulk o yabqi min al kufr; wala yabqi min az zulm* (the realm can survive with heresy; not with oppression) became the talking point for the administrators, poets, and the literate sections of the society. The new 'emerging societal norms' allowed/permitted adjustments with the 'pre-existing cultural practices, norms, and the traditions of the existing society'. The orthodox considered these practices as unworthy of adjustments, while the pragmatics incorporated some of these practices and linguistic traditions into their formal observances and celebrations. These ideologues took a position on such aspects and their ideas were well received by society. The paper seeks to highlight the above issues.

KEY WORDS

Pluralism; Precolonial India; Social Norms; Rationalists; Orthodox

THE CONTEXT

Irrespective of the deep linguistic and cultural affinity among the masses and the use of Persian and Arabic, as the languages of the academic discourse by the migrant elite across the board. However, there are deep societal tensions on the sectarian lines, mutual suspicions, and other vested interests that have almost destroyed the communal harmony and composite culture of pre-colonial as well as pre-partition Panjab in a big way. During and following the independence and partition of the Indian sub-continent, some of the ugliest incidents of the communal holocaust and sectarian violence have marred the landscape of the region. One is also reminded of the bloodiest engagements between the Afghan and Sikh forces during the early eighteenth century, its impact on the civic society and communitarian relations between the principal religious communities of the area, played havoc with the earlier social fabric of harmony and co-existence. Last, but not least, the expanding boundaries of the Sikh rule in the newer areas, almost destroyed the Afghan hegemony. The Sikh rule in predominantly Afghan/Pathan areas, with the brutal display of power and a sense of 'vengeance', led to a further bloodbath. Almost regular skirmishes between the local chieftains made the situation worse and deepened the communal divide further. With the political and military opposition to the Sikh rule becoming redundant, the societal opposition led by the 'votaries of reformist Islam' directly confronted the armed forces of the Sikh kingdom under Syed Ahmad of Rae Bareli (d.AD 1831). Though the military and political power of the Wahabis was crushed under Maharaja Ranjit Singh (d.AD1839) in the north-west, at the social level, the impact of the teachings of Wahabis contributed in the making of the horizontal divide within the Sunni Muslim community on the sectarian lines in the already fragmented society.

It is a matter of separate study, whether these developments were happening at the behest of the colonial power or it was a culmination of the policies adopted by the then Sikh State. Some of the old 'cultural legacy' of Punjab was restored, at least, at the elite level as has been pointed by Dominique Lapierre & Larry Collins in their *Freedom at Midnight.* In the recent past, the scholars of Panjab history across the border have made some efforts to take a larger view of this region and have come up in the last decades with splendid studies of undivided Punjab. The cultural developments can be and should be understood taking a *longue duree* view of a history of a region; a fragmented view is liable to become fodder for the narrow chauvinistic view of the people of that particular sub-region.

Conscious of my limitations, as the field of my research, had been the agrarian history of the Mughal *suba* of Awadh it is only off late, I have explored the history of Sufi institutions and the agrarian society of the 17th century and the Great Uprising

of 1857. Similarly, in the recent past I have taken up the issues of education & dissemination of knowledge, that too in the upper Gangetic valley and that is how I have examined some textual data from another *zabti* province of the Mughal Empire. I have taken up some of the themes related to these aspects only and to share some of my researches and thoughts.

THE LEGACY OF THE 'ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS' IN THE REGION

Portions of northwestern provinces and Sind were the earliest geographical regions to have become the parts of Arab domination in the early A.D. 8th century. With the occupation of Sind, Multan and parts of the region that later on incorporated in the Mughal Punjab were the parts of the Ghaznavid Empire during the eleventh century. The city of Lahore was remembered as the one which was '*ba barkat'* [the blessed one] and a place of '*khair-i-kasir'* [giving many benefits] because it boasted of having a large number of mystics and scholars.[1] In fact, Abdul Karim Samani in his eleventh century prosopographical dictionary, *Kitab al Ansab* has considered the city of Lahore as a part of the Islamic East for cultivating the aspects of higher Islamic culture which was represented by the study of Islamic sciences. It has been pointed out that Samani has included about seventy scholars in his dictionary having the *nisbah* from the Indian subcontinent. The study of Hadith was, especially, most popular among the scholars of the region. We also come across a reference of an important work attributed to '*an Iraqi poet who visited Mansoora but had been brought up in India, and hence knew its languages'*, he produced a *tafseer* of *Qur'an* in a *Hindiya* (Indian language) at the behest of one, Mahruq bin Rayaq, the ruler of the region between upper and lower Kashmir during the ninth century. There is no trace of this versified *tafseer,* but it is worth mentioning that at least an attempt was made to render the Islamic scripture into an Indian language.[2] It was in the town of Lahore that the first-ever treatise on the principles of Sufism was compiled in Persian. This was Ali b. Uthman al-Hujwiri al-Jullabi's famous *Kashf ul Mahjub* (Unveiling of the Veiled) was composed during the mid-11th century; it was long regarded as a text for Sufi aspirants and rendered into English by Reynold Nicholson. This important work marked a particular stage in the development of Sufism and is therefore to make a few comments on it.

The political renaissance in Persia during the 10th century led to the revival of the Persian language. Hujwiri's *Kashf ul Mahjub* was the first treatise on the doctrine of Sufism. The orthodox reaction against the highly individualistic approach of some mystics is well reflected in the book when the author writing about the organisation of the mystic orders says, 'the whole body of aspirants of Sufism composed of twelve sects or schools *(garoh/mazhab)*, two of which are condemned

(mardud), while the rest ten are approved *(maqbul)*.[3] Among the former, the author has listed, the *hululis* or transmigrationists, who believed in the notion of the spirit of one preceptor passing into the body of his successor. Probably, they were influenced by the doctrines of the Ismailis who held similar beliefs about their Imams. The other condemned sect was the *hallajis,* who probably believed either in the extreme individualistic version of the self or in the validity of Husain bin Mansur al Hallaj's (executed A.D. 922) proclamation of *anal haq.*[4]

Among the sects approved by Hujwiri was that of the *Junaidis*, the followers of Shaikh Junaid Baghdadi (AD 910). They preferred the path of *sahw (sobriety)* over that of *sukr (intoxication)* and avoided externalism *(zahiriat)*. His influence on his contemporaries as well as on the succeeding generations was immense.[5] The *Kashf ul Mahjub* had a readership in the city of Lahore itself, where there were enough people to understand the issues raised in the book. The city was a part of the Ghaznavid dynasty, but in creating such an intellectual milieu, the efforts of one Saiyid Ismail of Bukhara are evident, he settled in Lahore in AD 1005. It is said that he was one of the most powerful preachers and his sermons were attended by a large number of people, and many of them were swayed by the power of his argument so much that they embraced Islam.[6]

The text of *Kashaf ul Mehjoob* was considered as a 'guide for the guideless' and a sort of hallow was created around the text as being the '*pir* personified' from which the people could derive all the spiritual benefits which could be made available to them through the person of the *pir* himself. Thus, it was said for the author that:

> *Ganj-e bakhsh-e faiz-e 'alam; mazhar-e noor-e Khuda;*
> *Naqisan ra pir-e kamil; kamilan ra rahnuma*

> [Provider of spiritual benefits and rewards to the world;
> One, who represents the heavenly qualities;

> Perfect spiritual guide for the laity;
> For the perfect ones, the real spiritual leader]

Similarly, the other important towns in Punjab had also become the major centers for the transmission of knowledge. The town of Sialkot was one of the major such centers during the 17th century. Sujan Rai Bhandari specifically mentions that it has become such a center that attracts the scholars and the learned (*m'adan-i Fazal wa maskan-i Fuzla*), ever since Maulana Kamaluddin Husain Khan, one of the chief scholars from Kashmir had migrated to the town during the reign of Emperor Akbar. Similarly, during the reign of Emperor Shahjahan, Maulavi Abdul Hakim wrote

several commentaries on important texts, his fame had reached far and wide and students keep on coming to him from far off places. Similarly, after his death, his son Maulavi Abdullah was the chief scholar of town and his *madrasa* had become a center for learning and scholarship.[7]

Another scholar who became very prominent in the cultural landscape of Punjab and around whom a cult later developed was Saiyid Ahmad (d.1181), popularly known as Sultan Sakhi Sarwar Lakhi Data. He was born in a small place in the environs of Multan. After pursuing higher education in Lahore, he moved to Waziarabad. His meditations and austerities made him very popular. Finally, he moved to Dera Ghazi Khan where he married into the family of a high official which made the people jealous of him. Consequently, he was killed, according to the legend. Although he had become a celebrity in his lifetime, after his death his popularity increased among the low castes and the peasants of the area. His many non-Muslim followers, known as Sultanis, inhabited the Jalandhar and Patiala divisions till the eve of partition in 1947.[8]

Since he lies buried at Dera Ghazi Khan, in west Punjab there have been various speculations that how he became a household name among the Jats of eastern Punjab. It has been observed that the Jat peasants had brought the tradition of the worship of this saint with them while migrating from the regions of western Punjab and Sindh 300 or 400 years ago. It has been specifically asserted that

At the time of the Guru Gobind Singh, most of the Jats held, the belief in Sultan Sakhi Sarwar and the conversion to Sikhism being from (them). The Sultanis are ordinary Hindus, worshipers of Shiv or Devi; but it is characteristic of popular…….they are……very lax Hindus' again it is has been observed that 'the Hindu Jats of the eastern part are almost all Sultanis by religion, and outside of each village there is a small *pir khana* or shrine erected in honor of Sakhi Sarwar Sultan; this (*pir khana*) is in charge of a Bharais or guardian who is a Muhammadan and is not celebrated.[9]

As far as the rituals and practices associated with the cult of the Sultanis are concerned they, were, quite similar to the one, which is observed by the Hindu followers of Saiyid Salar Masood Ghazi (the legendary warrior saint of the 11th century who lies buried at Bahraich in Uttar Pradesh). The Sultanis used to visit the *pir khana:*

Every Thursday….in the evening light a lamp and beat a drum at it, (they) make a small offering of cash and grain etc. which the Bharais take; they also receive small present at other times and accompany the pilgrims who go to visit the tomb of saint Sultan in the Dera Ghazi Khan district. There is generally a small plot of land half an acre attached to the village shrine of which the Bharais gets the produce.[10]

Apart from this weekly ritual which was generally made by the women devotees, anybody who wishes to attend some object made a vow to the shrine and this offering was also collected by Bharais. As far as yearly rituals were concerns, it was performed once a year only on Friday. The ceremony of *Rot* is performed in most Sultani families; a huge loaf[of bread is] made of one mound floor and half a mound of *gur,* the Bharais beats the drum and sings the praise of the saint…… this is the great observances of the Sultanis.

By the early 20th century the cult of the Sultanis remained intact among the Jats and other low castes till the partition of the country in 1947 and it appears that it is only after that there was a mass conversion of these people to Sikhism. It is interesting to point out that the people representing the high intellectual tradition of Islamic orthodox learning, their memory is confined to their scholarly works and their works had been committed to writing by the later generations of scholars, a sense of reverence is also attached to their memory. While the people having mystic predilections and followed some sort of eclectic traditions, their memory continued for a very long period among the masses; they became a part of the imagination in the collective memory of numerous communities, hence, whether it is Data Ganj bakhsh or Sultan Sakhi Sarwar or Lal Shahbaz *Qalandar*, their memory survives across the border. However, the various communities have evolved their own ways of 'remembrances'. The questions like whether these 'selected memories' represents 'authentic' memory or not is a paradigm with which the votaries of 'reformist Islam' have been concerned and are concerned? Perhaps, one should not comment on such sensitive issues.

Similarly, the city of Nagaur was another important township that could boost for having some of the scholars as its inhabitant who had made a mark of their scholarship and learning not only in the Indian sub-continent but also in the Islamic East. Here, Sufi Hamiduddin had established his *khanqah*, and because of his austerities and his preference for a life of poverty *(faqr),* he came to be known as *Sultan ut-tarikin* (prince of recluses).[11] The family of Qazi Hamiduddin had also migrated from Central Asia and settled here. When Maulana Raziuddin Hasan Saghani (the famous scholar who compiled *Mashariq-ul Anwar*, the collection of hadith) reached Nagaur, Qazi Hamiduddin and Qazi Kamaluddin requested him to teach *hadith*. He taught the *Misbah al-Duja* to scholars of Nagaur and also issued certificates.[12] One of his pupils requested Maulana to teach him *'ilm-i tasawwuf,* Maulana told him that he should accompany him during his journey to the countryside which he was going to undertake shortly, it is reported that during this journey when Maulana reached the countryside, he removed the dress of the scholars and put on the dress of the dervish (*peerahni*) and *n'alain-i-chubi* (wooden

sleepers) and also had a *kuza* (hanging jug) filled with water in his hand. With such apparent 'disguise' he continued his onward journey throughout concentrating on prayers and meditations, when the person accompanying Maulana reminded him of his promise of the lecture on the theme of *tasswuf*, his response was quite instructive as he told him, '*tasawwuf* cannot be taught by words (*baqal nist*)*;* it is learned in action (*bahal ast*)', you must imitate me in my actions;[13] thereby telling him that what he had been doing throughout his journey in the countryside is the essence of *tassawuf.*

The intellectual and philosophical basis of all religious studies in Islam is undoubtedly *Quran*. For this purpose, the textual study of the Book was very crucial. This branch attained a high degree of sophistication following the compilation of the basic text on classical Arabic grammar, *Al-Mufassal* by Imam Zamikhshari (d. AD 1144). He wrote the Quranic commentary from an allegedly *mu'tazalite* point of view, the famous *Tafsir-e Kashshaf*. Theologians severely criticized him for his, supposedly, heretical views. In India, these works of Zamikhshari became immensely popular among scholars of higher learning. But the orthodox *ash'arite* sentiments always led to his being denounced for his beliefs. Sheikh Nizamuddin Auliya expressed his reservations about him in the following words, 'despite the fact that he was extremely knowledgeable, he held false belief (*'aqida-e batila)*' and added, 'there is unbelief *(kufr),* there is innovation *(bid'at),* there is sin *(m'asiyat).* Innovation is worse than sin, and unbelief is still worse, innovation and unbelief are closer to each other.[14] In addition to these harsh comments, he has cited two anecdotes, which describe the hostility and extreme hatred of the Indian Sufis towards Zamikhshari for his 'heretical' views.[15] Even *al Mufassal,* the basic text of Arabic grammar also invited such harsh censors. It might look ironical that in spite of such hostility towards the works of Zamikhshari, both his works, namely *Tafsir-i Kashshaf* and the classical Arabic grammar, *al Mufassal* continued to be taught throughout the Islamic World as the most standard and authentic text in a discipline.[16]

Razi al-Din Hasan al-Saghani, the compiler of important collections of *hadith*, was born in AD 1181 in Badaun. He received his initial education and training here. By this time arrangements existed for the pursuit of higher branches of Islamic studies. An early incident in his life is a pointer in this direction, once he wanted to borrow a copy of the *Mulakhkhas* (a textbook of *hadith*) from his teacher, who refused to give it to him. Saghani rose to be an eminent scholar of *hadith* in the entire Islamic east. His compilations of the collections of *hadith*, namely *Mashariq ul Anwar* and the *Misbah ul-Duja* were used as standard texts throughout the region. He used to describe his compilation of *Mashariq ul Anwar* as 'the ultimate proof

(*hujjat*) between him and God'. He was appointed to teach the son of the ruler of Kol (Aligarh) and used to get a remuneration of 100 *tankas.* When he reached Baghdad and attended the *dars (*lectures*)* of the renowned scholar of *hadith*, 'Allama Ibn Zuhri. He impressed the audience so much with his erudite scholarship and when his fame reached the Caliph, he was invited by him and was shown great respect. It is quite likely that the region around Badaon and Kol (Aligarh) has developed the tradition of higher learning much prior to the establishment of Turkish rule. Hence, we find scholars of such stature who could invite the attention of the great scholars in the Islamic East as well as the Abbasid Caliph.[17]

The *jam'at khana* of the famous Chishti mystic Shaikh Farid ud din, known as Ganj e Shakar (d. 1265) became a nerve center of the Sufi activities and as well as the dissemination of Islamic sciences not only in Medieval Punjab but in the entire Upper Gangetic Valley and North-west provinces. The life and the milieu of this jam'at khana are known to us through the *malfuz* of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, namely *Fawaid ul Fuad*. He has visited the *jam'at khana* of the sheikh thrice and there are important indicators of how Chishtis *pirs* gave training to their disciples. The strict discipline in the *jam'at khana*, the discussion about the higher aspects of Islamic theology and law and the practical training for the life of poverty and the use of *futuh* and the special rituals and the religious practices are provided with minute details.

Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya (d.1325) had become a celebrity in the world of scholarship, while at Delhi, he was known as' *Bahath* and *mahfil shikan'* among his friends, however, when he reached the *jam'at khana* of Baba Farid at Pakpatan, he was taught by his *pir* few more texts: especially five *juzv* of holy *Quran*, *Tamhid-ul Muhtadi* of Abu Shakur Salemi (a book of *fiqh*) and *Awarif ul Ma'arif* of Shaikh Shihabuddin Suharawardi. Baba Farid issued him a certificate and permitted him to continue giving instructions of these books to his students. The relevant portion of the said certificate reads:

I now permit him to teach these books to the students, provided he avoids the mistake in teaching, writing and explaining it and utilizes his energy and knowledge in the discussion, correcting the manuscripts and purification of the language......I also permit Nizam- ul Millat wad Din to narrate things which he has learned from me and has collected and preserved.....May God be kind to them who show respect and honor to Nizam-ud din, whom I honor and for whom I have great regard.[18]

The *jam'at khana* of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya became a center for the transmission of advanced knowledge in the fields of theology, ethics, *and tasawwuf*. Ziauddin Barani, the historian pays glowing tribute to the efforts of the Shaikh in furtherance of these studies and says:

Most of the scholars and learned men, who frequented the Shaikh's company, applied themselves to books on devotion and mysticism. The books like *Qut ul Qulub*, *Ihya ul Ulum* and its translation, *'Awarif ul M'aarif*, *Kashf ul Mahjub*; *Sharh-i Ta'arruf*, *Risala-i Qoshairi*, *Mirshad ul 'Ibad*, *Maktub '*Ain ul Quzzat and the *Lawaih* and *Lawama* of Qazi Hamiduddin Naguri found many purchasers, as also did the *Fawaid ul Fuad* of Amir Hasan owing to the sayings of the Shaikh which it contains. People asked the booksellers about books of devotion...'[19]

In the *jam'at khana* of the Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya there was a great insistence on acquiring knowledge as a prerequisite for being initiated into the higher stages of mystic life. Therefore, when it was suggested to the Shaikh that a senior disciple namely, Shaikh Sirajuddin Usman (known as *Akhi Siraj*) be given *khilafat nama* by the Shaikh, he observed '*education is the first stage in the field of Sufism, and he has not received any [formal] education*' thereupon, Maulana Fakhruddin Zarradi, another senior inmate in the *jam'at khana* of the Shaikh, offered to educate him within six months in the required fields. Only after this formal session of education was complete, he was bestowed with the *khilafat Nama* of the Shaikh.[20] Hence, it is perhaps most appropriate to describe *tasawwuf* as the 'postgraduate' creed of Islam.

Whether the study of the Indian scriptures and the literary works in Sanskrit were also studied at the Sufi centers, we have no direct reference to that. However, the interaction with the *yogis* and other holy men was very much there at the *jam'at khana* of famous *Chishti* Shaikh Baba Farid (d.1265). It is quite likely that the text on Indian *yogic* tradition was also consulted by the Sufis especially of the order of the *Shattaris*, established by Shaikh Ghaus of Gawalior, who has appropriated so many *yogic* practices in his teachings. As is apparent from his *Jawahir-i Khamsa,* a text which describes the *yogic* practices in Persian and the manner in which the Sufis were supposed to practice them. Similarly, Shaikh Abdul Quddus of Gangoh's (d.1537) *Rushd Nama* and Mir Abdul Wahid Bilgrami's (d.1608) *Hakayat-i Hindi* were the early attempts to present Indian classics in Sanskrit to the Persian knowing audience. Akbar must have laid the foundation for his translation project to carry on the translations of the religious and non-religious text in Sanskrit to Persian. In his scheme, *Mahabharata* was quite central; hence it is quite likely that the *vaishnavite* face of Hinduism was more prominent at Akbar's court than the *shaivaite*. Similarly, the *Upanishads* and the works of Shankracharya were not represented at all. It was left to Dara Shakoh to add the *Upanishads* to the Brahminical literature through his Persian translation, *Sirre Akbar.*[21]

It should not be assumed that the Brahmans became proficient only in the 'Hindu sciences' or they were concerned only with the transmission of the Hindu

theological studies and Sanskrit. On the other hand, they acquired the knowledge of Arabic, Persian, *tasawwuf* and became the experts in the field of *insha'*. The Muslim theologians, who were invariably the teachers of the different disciplines, never discriminated among their pupils. It is worth noticing that the Hindu pupils had shown their utmost consideration to their Muslim teachers as it is evident from a reference of the early 18th century at Lahore. Raja Khushhal Chand, who studied with one Shah Atiqullah, a Sufi scholar of his times at his mosque, offered a grant of rupees two hundred and twenty-five to his teacher out of this amount, the said mosque was repaired and a well was also dug up.[22] Balkrishan, the Brahman from Hisar-Firoza tells us about his early student days in the *maktab* of one Akhund Abdul Hamid who was an 'excellent' teacher in the township of Hisar- i Firoza, and his *maktab* was one of the best in the region. Balkrishan learned Persian language and became an expert in the art of letter writing and the usage of literary proverbs. He also acquired the expertise of writing and correcting manuscripts. He was also helping his teacher in teaching the small boys and other seekers of knowledge in the *maktab*.

After acquiring the necessary expertise in Persian literature, he undertook the company of Shaikh Jalal the *munshi* (letter writer) of Khan-I Jahan Barha, and learned all the remaining books in the field of Sufism. During his stay with Shaikh Jalal, he copied around forty volumes of the book prescribed in the curriculum. In the process, he was taught by the Shaikh the higher aspects connected with *insha'*. Due to his strong commitment, the Shaikh had developed a special liking for him, so much so that he used to treat him like his own son. This affection was quite reciprocal; Balkrishan also served the Shaikh with at most humility, to the extent of carrying his shoes and walking stick. These personal services to the Shaikh invited taunts and sarcastic comments by his community members. In spite of such sarcasm, he was firm in his devotion to the Shaikh. As a result, he kept on acquiring higher studies. He continued to be with the Shaikh till his death.

Balkrishan further tells us that it is not only he but his ancestors including his father, grandfather, and elder brothers who had acquired expertise in Persian studies and the art of accountancy, and following their footsteps he has also undertaking these studies. In spite of the death of his teacher and his joining of the service, he was often busy with the books.[23]

The township of Hisar-i Firoza was in the vicinity of the Mughal capital Delhi and Muslim learning had established a tradition in the places like Narnaul, Thanesar, and Panipat (all in the vicinity of each other). It is quite likely that large service gentry was needed to serve the various government departments and therefore, the families having a tradition of learning and scholarship shifted their

focus to the new disciplines and acquired expertise in Persian language and accountancy practices. They served in various departments with distinction.

II

THE MIGRANT ELITES, DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE *SUYURGHAL* STATISTICS

'Migration' of the individuals or the group/s of people from their places of origin to the newer regions pre- supposes extreme social constraints, political instability, or economic deprivations. It can be quite a pain as well as a traumatic experience for the migrants when it is undertaken as a result of mass massacres, totally putting the life and the honor of the people upside down. Such a 'saga' of migration always remains as a 'permanent scar' in the memory of the migrants, as quite nostalgically they would remember their horrifying experiences, their legacies of the 'bygone era' in their homes of origin. Preserving 'their past' through memories and documents was the need of the hour for them as, their familial background and/or scholarly pursuits of their ancestors, would ensure some respectability for them and their descendants in their new-found homes/settlements. For the migrants, it was the question of honorable survival to remember their past affiliations. In whatever fashion they could preserve, remember, and perpetuate this 'memory'.

However, one should not forget that time is a 'great healer of wounds', hence people tend to forget their miseries in the wake of 'newfound opportunities'. However, what they never forgot was their *nisbah* (familial/geographical affiliation) with the place/s of their ancestral origin. Therefore, we see that the migrants at every stage had a memory of their familial past as a part of their larger worldview. Even in cases of not so prominent familial past, they often invoked the geographical nomenclatural suffices derived from their hometowns such as Nishapuri, Isfahani, Kashani, Sabzawari, Yemeni, Hamadani, Herati, Safavi, Kirmani, Khwafi, and Chishti, etc. It is interesting to point out that later on, these groups were accommodated within the Mughal nobility under the broader category of Iranis and Turanis, but in reality, they represented the family groups from the places of their origin, falling within the broad geographical units of Khurasan and Central Asia. The famous river Oxus (*Amu Darya*), being a rough dividing line between these two regions. However, the region east of *Amu Darya* was mainly inhabited by the Turkish and Afghan tribes and was described as Transoxiana.[24]

The magnitude of the devastation and havoc caused by the Mongol conquest can be understood better by highlighting some data of the contemporary accounts of important towns of the Khurasan region. For example, the famous city of Nishapur, which was one of the most important cities of the area, was thoroughly

and systematically destroyed by the Mongols during their second campaign. It is vividly described by Minhaj us Siraj Juzjani in the following manner:

> Nishapur, which after much fighting, he {Tuli, the youngest son of Changez Khan}captured and , in order to take vengeance because the son-in-law of the Changez Khan have been slain at that place, he martyred every person in Nishapur, desolated it, raised the walls of the city and having a pair of oxen , yoked (to a plough), he had them driven over{ the area on which} the city {stood} in such wise that not a wastage of buildings of remain having finished with them {the inhabitants} and the city and territory, Tuli advanced towards Herat, and pitched his camp before the gate of that city, and the attack began and catapults were placed in position in every direction.[25]

Similar was the fate of other famous towns of Khurasan and Central Asia under the command of the Mongol generals. The city of Delhi became a natural place of asylum for the refugees, fleeing from the cities devastated by the Mongols, during the reign of Sultan Shams ud-din Iltutamish (1210-36). The same historian, Minhaj-us-Siraj Juzjani, who also served as the chief Qazi during the reign of Illtutmish's son Muizuddin Bahram Shah (1240-42), very specifically says:

The kingdom of Hindustan, by the grace of Almighty God, and the favor of fortune under the shadow of the guardianship of the Shamsi race, and the shade of the protection of Illtutmishs' dynasty became the focus of the people of Islam, and the orbit of the possessors of religion[26]

While Isami, writing in the mid-14th century, in his *Futuh us Salatin* says, that the Delhi Sultanate has become a 'miniature' of the Islamic east, a place of refuge for the scholars, theologians, craft persons and everybody who was anybody in the region, prior to the Mongol devastation. He says:

Many genuine Saiyids have arrived from Arabia, the traders of Khurasan, many learned men from Bukhara and numbers of Sufis and ascetics from every town and every race have gathered here. Scholars well versed in the Unani system (of medicine) have also arrived from Rum. These people have gathered in the city of Delhi like the moths gather around the candle.[27]

These people arriving from the various Central Asian cities and towns have brought the elements of 'Islamic Culture' with them. Due to their presence in the city of Delhi and various parts of the Indian sub-continent, a number of *maktab* and *madrasa* were established in these towns and other centers to cater to the need of

the emerging Muslim population. Shaikh Rizqullah Mushtaqi, while writing about the reign of Sultan Sikandar Lodi, very specifically says that:

> … in each town and region, where the forces of Islam have gained an upper hand and have become popular, *masajid, jam'at khana* and *khanqah* were established and the capable people were appointed in the *maktabs* and the *madrasa* as the *mu'allim* and *muddarris*. In these institutions, the *umra'* and their sons and the sons of the soldiers acquired knowledge and busied themselves in the prayer and meditations. Those who could afford discharged their duties in the way of God. The institution so established trained the inmates for the emerging needs of the administration and the bureaucracy, the *Qazis* (judicial officers), the expert accountants, scribes and other state functionaries were the products of these institutions[28]

Abul Fazl in his account of the twelve *subas* has provided (in tabular form) the vital statistics of most of the *pargana* of the empire. Apart from providing the *arazi* statistics, it has also supplied the data related to *jama,* the dominant caste, and the armed strength of the *zamindas* in each *pargana.* It has also provided the *suyurghal* figures which were given to the class of people thought fit to deserve the imperial favors. The people who were busy in the propagation of knowledge, in the spiritual pursuits or the people who could not provide for themselves, however, the office of the *sadr* were entrusted with the task of distributing these favors to the deserving scholars. Although, the grantees have been provided with a very small percentage of the total *jama* of the empire/*suba*, they represented a most articulate class of the people whose obedience mattered a lot in the making of the imperial policies. It is worthwhile to point out that their conditions are illuminated by massive documentation in the form of archival records, family histories, and the settlement papers/gazetteers of the colonial period. Similarly, some of the families associated with these grants/the institutions for which these grants were meant, were later on embroiled in the long-drawn process of civil litigation among the various branches of the family during the British period; this has also created a lot of documentation in the records of law courts. A study of these details offers an opportunity to examine the fortunes of the grantees over the period of time and also to connect some of the state policies with their fluctuating fortunes.[29]

A perusal of the Ain's *Suyurghal* statistic relating to the *suba* Lahore and *sarkar* Sirhind (the regions which formed the parts of 18th century Punjab) offers us an

interesting window for the analysis of the later developments in the agrarian life and society of the region.

A cursory look of the above table (Appendix 1, table A &B) suggests a heavy concentration of the revenue grantees in the region, at the close of the 16th century. Most of these grantees were the men of learning and people having mystic predilections. And some of these grants were for the maintenance of the institutions engaged in the propagation of the mystic ideology and higher aspects of Islamic religious traditions. Some splendid studies have come up analyzing the *madad e maash* documents from the *jogis of Jakbar* and the township of Batala[30]. Most of these documents are from the 17th and 18th centuries. One looks for similar studies for the major townships having the maximum concentration of revenue grantees. These townships had some of the famous Sufi shrines and were very important politically and administratively. The towns like Sirhind, Samana, and Kalanaur boasts some of the major Sufi centers including a *dargah* of Imam Ali Wali, believed to be a grandson of Imam Ali Reza, the eighth Imam of the *Ithna ashari shias*, about whom it is also believed that his tomb was built by no lesser person than Sultan Shihabuddin Ghori (d.1193) himself.[31] Similarly, the town of Sirhind having one of the major centers of *naqshbandi-majududi* order of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, (d. 1624) we know for certain that this family and this center was patronized by all the Mughal emperors in a big way, one wonders as to what happened to the public records and archival documents related to his *khanqah?*

At the time when the *Ain e Akbari* was compiled, the *Suyurghal* holders in the thirty-three *pargana* of the *suba* of Lahore had 2.38% of the total *jama* as their share, some of the *pargana* like Jalandhar had as high as 52.41%; and Phulwari as 31.79%; while in other four *parganas* between 11-16 % of the total *jama* as the share of *suyurghal*.(see, Appedix 1, Table A)

While in the fourteen *pargana* of *sarkar* Sirhind at *suba* Delhi controlled 12.71% of the *jama*. Some of this *sarkar* like Macchiwara recorded astonishingly a very high percentage (100% *jama* of the *pargana* was in the *suyurghal).* Likewise, the *pargana* like Banaur (8.66%), Bhader (45.31%), Thara (30.18%), Thanesar(26.36%), Gohram (17.11%), Mustafabad (76.16%), Shahabad (11.28%) and Mansoorpur (17.85%) had the highest concentration of these revenue grantees (see Appendix 1, table B).

We know for certain that as a rule half of the grant was given out of the cultivable waste *(zamin layaq-e zirat kharij az jama)* hence, the quantum of the land assigned as a *Suyurghal* was at least just double of what it is represented in the Ain's table. The table represents only the loss of *jama* to the state. Elsewhere, we have noticed the tendencies of the revenue grantees to expand their grants

enormously during the 17th and early 18th century; there is no reason to believe that this region was free from this tendency. Hence, in all likelihood, the revenue grantees must have improved their possession/position similarly.

During the 17th and early 18th centuries, these grants must have increased enormously owing to the policy of later Mughal emperors. Unfortunately, we don't possess the exact data. The big question is what happened to these grantees of the late 18th and early 19[th]centuries. Was there a massive resumption of these grants by the regional states in their attempt to maximize the land revenue and hence, to resume the grants of the *aimma* holders as well as the Mughal officials?[32]Or whether some other factors forced the families associated with the *Suyurghal* to migrate and/or to join other professions and to leave the tradition of learning and dissemination of knowledge? These are some of the conjectures and one needs to undertake this problem for a detailed analysis.

LINGUISTIC ADOPTIONS BY THE CHISHTI SUFIS

After the establishment of the Turkish rule in the parts of the Indian subcontinent, certain vital changes took place in the cultural life of the people. There were certain dialects, which were spoken and understood from Multan in the Northern extreme to Gujarat in the Western extreme down to the Deccan. These dialects were spoken, they were the major vehicle for the transmission of ideas but they were yet to become full-fledged literary languages, as there was no recognized system of script/s. The Sufi intervention somehow made it possible, especially during the 13th century, when Baba Farid (d. 1265), the famous Chishti Sufi, started writing poetry in Multani/Saraiki (which was later incorporated in the Adi Granth compiled by the fifth Sikh Guru namely Guru Arjan Dev). Similarly, Hazrat Amir Khusrau (d. 1325), is also said to have composed some poetry in the Awadhi dialect as well. A number of Chishti-Nizami Sufi centers were established in the various parts of the Indian Subcontinent; the Sufi masters at these centers were adopting local dialects, but they were using Persian scripts to compile the works and write their poetry.

A major exercise was undertaken by the Chishti Sufis in the area where the Awadhi dialect was predominant. The *genre* of *Premakhyan* in line with the Persian *Mathnavi* tradition was practiced by these Sufi poets in Awadhi dialect, who were mainly associated with the Chishti-Nizami tradition of *Sufis* in Awadh. The characters they have used in their poetic narrations are mainly those who were popular in the countryside and were the heroes of certain caste groups. This new *genre* was used to propagate the Islamic-Sufic ideology in the local dialects. Perhaps, it is too obvious to argue that such tradition became extremely popular in the localities like Dalmau, where Mulla Daud (d.1370?) composed *Chandayan,* using

Lorik and Chanda as the main characters of the story, while Malik Mohammad (d.1540) wrote *Padmavat* at Jais using Padmawati and Ratansen as the main characters of his narration. Similarly, Shah Qasim (d.1731) composed *Hans Jwahir* at Dariyabad following the earlier traditions.

The uses of local dialects for the propagation of the Sufi ideas, as well as the singing of these compositions at the *sam'a* gatherings, were often disapproved by non-Chishti Sufis and the Orthodoxy. An incident, attributed by Mulla Nizamuddin (d.1748), the founder of the house of Firangi Mahal to Shaikh Muhammadi (d.1696), confirms this stance in the case of a *Chishti Sufi* institution of Awadh. Shaikh Muhammadi was a well-known *wujudi* scholar of his time and was ideologically associated with the famous Shaikh Muhibullah Allahabadi[33](d.1648). Mulla Nizamuddin reports the matter as it was reported to Saiyid Abdul Razzaq of Bansa (d. 1724), the famous Qadiri Shaikh: Once in the *khanqah* of Shaikh Pir Muhammad of Salon (d.1687), *Sama* was in progress, and compositions in *Hindvi* [Awadhi?] were being sung. Those present were in the state of ecstasy [*hal*]. Sheikh Muhammadi also reached there. When the *raqs* and the *wajd* of the Sufis were over, he stood up and recited a few Quranic verses in the best of accent, but it had no impact on any of those present; neither *raqs* nor *wajd* overcame them. [Observing this] Shaikh Muhammadi said, 'It is strange that on listening to the Quran none became excited while the compositions in Hindvi, which contradict Quranic themes, get you excited'. Upon hearing this, Saiyid Abdul Razzaq expressed his pleasure and approval of the conduct of Shaikh Muhammadi.[34]

While the original narrator of the story remains unnamed, it is highly unlikely for Shaikh Muhammadi, himself a *wujudi*, to have made this comparison between the recitation of Quranic verses and Sufi Awadhi poetry when sung with instruments, for both has a different impact on the audience. Hence, the reported incident *per se* becomes secondary. What is more relevant is how it is used by Mulla Nizamuddin, the biographer of Saiyid Abdul Razzaq, and later commentators on this aspect, namely Mulla Qiyamuddin Abdul Bari (d.1926) and Mufti Raza Ansari (d.1990). Irrespective of the fact that they were initiated into the principle of *Qadiri* and *Naqshbandi* orders respectively, they have compared the *wajd* and *raqs* of Sufis to *tazwir* (simple lies) and *makr wa hila* (hypocrisy). The house of Firangi Mahal, though otherwise known for its catholicity, was unable to let an innocuous incident (which in all likelihood never happened the way it was retold) pass without an adverse comment on the Chishti-Nizami *Sufi* centre of Awadh.[35]

Whatever might have happened at the political level and in the heat of the moment, especially during the Sikh domination of the region/or during the independence and partition and the country, the fact remains that the people of

Punjab still display the elements of composite culture and display various aspects of the shared past. It is not for nothing that academic Chairs are established in the name of Baba Farid and a number of centers are established in many universities of Indian Punjab, including Panjabi University Patiala which, not only boosts for having one of the earliest Departments of Comparative Religions and also has a major department for the Sufic studies.

The purpose of this presentation is to highlight the contribution of the region in medieval times to represent the high elements of Islamic culture, literature, Sufism, and the 'shared past'. The region had a concentration of the numerous migrant families to serve the medieval bureaucracy for which they were given the land grants, in the form of S*uyurghal* and *madad-e-maash*. There were ups and downs in their fortunes as a result of the State policies as well as other factors. Hence, they had a fluctuating fortune. Some of the institutions having Sufic predilections still survive in our midst in this very region, which still receives the homage of the people, irrespective of the community affiliations. Perhaps, this is a reminder of the real ethos of the people of this region during the medieval times, irrespective of the immense social upheaval, communal holocaust, sectarian strife, and political turmoil in the last two centuries. By retelling, and recalling the pre-colonial past of the region, let's assure our new generation that unlike our present, we have lived together (separately!) for longer durations, and perhaps, it is still possible.

TABLE A

SUYURGHAL STATISTICS OF THE VARIOUS PARGANA IN SARKARS OF SUBA LAHORE

SARKAR	NAME OF PARGANA	JAMA (DAMS)	SUYURGHAL (DAMS)	OF SUYURGH	TE OF THE ZAMINI
Bet	Talwan	6,780,337	804,889	11.87	...
Jalandhar Doab	Jalandhar	14,751,626	773,167	52.41	Afghan
	Chaurasi	5,463,913	255,516	4.67	Afghan
	Sultanpur	4020,232	495,830	12.33	Bhatti
	Shaikhpur	4,722,604	52,639	1.11	Bhatti
	Harhana with Akbarabad	6,032,032	49,650	0.82	Naru
Bari Doab	Phulwari	452,694	143,955	31.79	...
	Bharli	4,060,507	209,789	5.16	..
	Bhilwal	3181699	225,408	7.08	Jat
	Pati Haibatpur	28395380	284,647	1	Jat
	Batala	16820998	256,853	1.52	Bhatti, Jat
	Panial	4266000	276,091	6.47	Jat Khatian
	Chamiari	8813140	309,090	3.50	Khokhar
	Lahore suburbs	674053	202,300	30	..
	Kalanur	8,329,111	447,639	5.37	Jat, Bakkal
	Kunhewan	3,511,499	127,665	3.63	Khokhar, Bakhas
	Malik Shah	1,475,562	52,283	3.54	Bhandal
Rechnau Doab	Eminabad	24,853,006	498,480	2	Khokhar, Chimah
	Parsaror	27,978,583	486,551	1.73	Jat, Bajoh Tela
	Pati Zafarwal	3,697,338	150,865	4.08	Jat, Bholron
	Chiniwot	2,806,369	190,052	6.77	Jat Jabuar
	Daud Bhandal Bharhi	1,725,089	273,082	15.83	...
	Rechna	8,680,742	442,082	5.09	...
	Sialkot	22,090,792	184,305	0.83	Jat, Ghaman and Chima
	Gobindwal	1,253,957	194,622	15.52	Orak and Jat
	Mangtanwala	3,819,690	57,788	1.51	Jat
	Haminagar	8,391,082	59,541	.70	Jat

Chenhat	Bhera	19,910,333	53,560	0.26	...
(jech)	Khokhar	2,320,594	58,410	2.51	Khokhar
Doab	Hareo	9,150,828	76,321	0.83	Tat, Barwanji?
	Hazara	4,689,136	219,536	4.68	? Khokhar Bara
Sindh	Rohtas	60,403,140	67,052	0.11	Gakkhar
Sagar					
Doab					

_____

TABLE B

SUYURGHAL STATISTICS OF THE VARIOUS PARGANA IN SARKAR SIRHIND, SUBA DELHI

SARKAR	NAME OF PARGANA	JAMA (DAMS)	SUYURGHAL (DAMS)	% OF SUYURGHAL	CASTE OF THE ZAMINDAR
Sirhind	Banor	12,549,953	1,087,209	8.66	Ranghar, Afghan
	Bhader	3,103,269	1,406,106	45.31	Jat, _Dahsurati?_
	Thara	7,850,809	2,369,841	30.18	Munj (or Sheikh, Jat)
	Thanesar	7,850,803	2,069,841	26.36	Ranghar, Jat
	Khizrabad	12,059,918	528,170	4.37	Bhatti, Jat
	Sirhind	12,082,630	603,536	4.99	Rajput, Barha
	Samana	12,822,270	78,200	0.60	Barha, Jat
	Sadhuna	4,298,064	273,265	6.35	Chauhan, Ranghar
	Shahbad	6,751,468	761,587	11.28	Chayhan, Rajput
	Gohram	6,188,630	1,058,982	17.11	Ranghar, Jats
	Mustafabad	749,691	570,976	76.16	Chauhan, Ranghar
	Masengan	7,053,259	626,690	8.88	Jat
	Mansurpur	1,830,025	326,690	17.85	Ranghar
	Machhiwara	250,556	250,552	100	Khori, Wah

(The figures of _jama_ and _Suyurghal_ are from Col. H. S. Jarret's translation of _Ain-i-Akbari._ I have not been able to collate these figures with Add. 6586 or from the printed Persian text, edited by Block man or Syed Ahmad Khan)

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[1] Shaikh Muhammad Ikram, *Aab-i Kausar* (Lahore: Taj Company, n.d), 75-6.

[2] Derryl N. Maclean, *Religion and Society in Arab Sindh* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), 122.

[3] Ali b. Uthman Al Hujwiri, *The Kashf ul-Mahjub*, trans. Reynold A. Nicholson (Delhi: Taj Company, 1991),176. (hereafter Al Hujwiri); It appears that he was the most revered personality in the annals of undivided Punjab hence his tomb was always revered as *data ka darbar* and he was remembered by the common people as *data ganj-e bakhsh.* It is interesting to recall the observation of poet-philosopher Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal who says,

> saiyid-e Hujwer Makhdum-e umam;
>
> marqad-e ou pir-e Sanjar ra haram,

(Saiyid Ali Hujweri is the most revered figure, at whose tomb Pir from Sanjar (Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti) had performed spiritual exercises)

[4] It is quite interesting to point out that the Persian literature produced by the sufis Mansur Al Hallaj is always remembered with respect. He has never been denounced as a heretic. Similarly, in the tradition of Urdu and Persian *ghazal,* he has been immortalized as the epitome of dissent. In fact, one couplet which has been attributed to Mansur is worth quoting:

> ba jurm-e 'ishq tu kushand 'ajab ghau ghaiyeeast;
>
> tu neez bar sare baam aa, che khush tamashayeest,

(Having been killed for the sin of Love, the tumults are raised [in support of the victim]; rather one should ride the gallows to enjoy the real pleasure)

[5] See, Hujwir, *The Kashf*, 176-266; see also, *Politics and Society during the Early Medieval Period,* ed. *K.A. Nizami* (Delhi: n.p, 1974), 52-3 and 283-7; The credit of consolidating the philosophy of Shaikh Junaid goes to Shaikh Shihabuddin Suharawardi (d.1234) in his famous *'Awarif ul Ma'arif*, which is a measured, balanced and scholarly text. It was accepted by a majority of the mystics all over the world of Islam. Within a decade or two of its author's death, it was being taught at Delhi, ibid., 288.

[6] Ikram, *Aab,*74-5.

[7] Sujan Rai Bhandari, *Khulasat-ut Twarikh,* ed. Zafar Hasan Dehalvi (Dehli: J. and Sons Press, 1918), 73.

[8] Ikram, *Aab,* 74-5.

[9] Punjab Government, *Gazetteer of the Ludhiana District,* 1888-89 (Calcutta: Calcutta Central Press Company,1989), 66.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Maksud Ahmad Khan, "Surur-us Sudur wa Nur ul-Budur," *PIHC,* (1993): 231-40.

[12] *A Comprehensive History of Indian Vol.5,* ed. Muhammad Habib and K.A. Nizami (Dehli: People's Publishing House, 1970), 140.

[13] Khan*,* "Suru s Sudur," 61-62.

[14] Amir-ullah-Sanjari, *Fawaid ul Fuwad* vol. 3, trans. Khawaja Hassan Sani (Dehli: Manzoor Book Depot, n.d), 186-8.

[15]Ibid.

[16] The works of Zamakhshari continued to be the part theological curriculum throughout the subcontinent in the subsequent centuries, and it was believed that nobody can master the Arabic grammar (*nahw wa sarf*) without acquiring an

expertise of his work, *al Mufassal.* Ali Mohammad Khan writing for the *suba* of Gujrat tells about the Imperial order that all the teachers who teach the students, the books beginning from *'al Mizan* to *Kashashf* were entitled to *wajh-e' ulufa* grants from the state treasury, for details, Ali Muhammad Khan, *Syed Nawab Ali, Mirat-i Ahmadi Vol.1* (Baroda: Oriental institute, 1927), 258.

[17] Sanjari, *Fawaid*, 178-181; See Muhammad Habib, *Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya: Hayat aur Ta'alimat* (Dehli: University of Delhi Press, 1970), 24-8. The early Sufi text are replete with the themes that 'if one is able to arrange the papers the scribe (to copy the manuscript) is scare; when the scribe is available the paper is scarce or the honorarium cannot be arranged (for the copyist). The borrowing of the books, for the time being, was another option for the transmission of knowledge. The well-known incident recorded by *fawaid ul fuwad* when once the teacher of famous *muhaddis* Raziuddin Saghani refused to lend him his copy of *Mulakhkhas* at Badaon, that is how the knowledge was transmitted in an age when the volumes could be made available only in the handwritten form and, only the people with some means could afford the books. It is quite likely that the scarcity of the books led to the memorizing of the textbooks as well as the oral transmission of the knowledge.

[18] Ibid., 187-88.

[19] Ziauddin Barani, *Tarikh-i-Firuz shahi*, ed. Shaikh Abdul Rashid Vol.2 (Aligarh: n.p, n.d), 346-347.

[20] *Siyar-ul-Auliya,* 288-9; Amir Khurd mentions that Maulana Sirajuddin was able to acquire the required knowledge within six months in spite of his advanced age, his teacher Fakhruddin Zarradi specially prepared a text for him and named it as '*Usmani.* After the conferment of the *khilafat nama,* while going back to Lukhnauti, Maulana Siraj took some books from the *kutub khana* of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya for study and teaching.

[21] M. Athar Ali, "Translations of Sanskrit Works at Akbar's Court," in *Akbar and His Age,* ed. Iqtidar Alam Khan (New Dehli: ICHR Monograph Series, 1999), 78.

[22] M. Qasim, *Ibaratnama,* ed. Zahuruddin Ahmad (Lahore: n.p, 1977), 11-12.

[23] Balkrishan Brahman, *Insha'-i Brahman*, MS, Add 16859, ff 97a-99b.

[24] Perhaps it is relevant to point out that this divide was not merely a geographical one, but it also represented some sort of cultural and sectarian divide also. As late as in the mid-nineteenth century, the famous Urdu/ Persian poet Mirza Asad Ullah Khan Ghalib (d. 1869) boosts his Sunni affiliations by asserting this identity. For he says:

Shi'i kyun kar Howun; Jabki hun maen Mawra-un Nahari

(How can I be a *Shi'a*, when I hail from the region of Mawra-un Nahar?)

[25] Minhaj-us-Siraj, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* Vol.2, trans. H.G. Raverty (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1991).

> "In three months, the world-seizing Tuli
> Captured these all to the gate of Sistan
> He razed and he slew, and he swept, and he clutched;
> Not a person remained, neither great nor small."

It is necessary to remember that the second attack on Nishapur was led by the daughter of Chengiz Khan, who was the wife of the deceased general killed during the first attack, a year earlier. This attack was to take the revenge of the first

attack, when the Mongol forces under the command of Chengiz's own son-in-law, Nuh-yan/ Nurka were killed as a result of the massive resistance offered by the people of Nishapur under the leadership of Majir-ul Mulk, the Kafi, 'Umr-i-Raji, and Ziya-ul-Mulk, and the Zauzani. Therefore, one can very well imagine the ferocity and savagery which was now unleashed on the people and city of Nishapur. In this context, the traditional accounts say that 'no living being including cats and dogs were left alive in the city'. Therefore, whoever could flee from the site of the massacre, tried to find asylum, wherever they could reach with safety.

[26] Mihaj-us Siraj Juzjani *Tabaqat-i- Nasiri*, ed. Abdul Haiy Habibi (Lahore: n.p, 1954), 642.

[27] Abdul Malik Isami, *Futuh us Salatin,* ed*.* M. Usha (Agra: Educational Press, 1938), 114-115.

[28] *Waq'iat Mushtaqi,* Add.11633, 18.

[29] For the classic treatment of the issue see, Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India 1556-1707* (Delhi: n.p, 1999); especially, the chapter on Revenue Grants, pp. 342-363. However, numerous studies based on series of the documents in the archival records, private collections and the official documents of the Mughal period.

[30] See, J.S Grewal and B.N. Goswani, *The Mughals and Jogis of Jakhbar* (Simla: IIAS, 1967); J.S. Grewal, *In the By-lanes of History: Some Persian Documents from a Punjab town* (Simla: IIAS, 1975).

[31] *Punjab States Gazeetters, Vol. XVII A Phukian States* (Patiala, Jind and Nabha: n.p, 1904), 81.

[32] See Ghulam Ali Azad Bilgrami, *Mathirul Kiram Vol-I* (Kanpur: n.p, 1913), 221-2; see also, Jafri, *Studies in Anatomy of Transformation: Awadh from Colonial Rule* (Delhi: n.p, 1998), 89-90; here I have pointed out the cases of the resumption of the *aimma* grants of a *sufi khanqah*by the nawabs of Awadh.

[33] Shaikh Mohammadi's fame is attributed to his courage in defending, in front of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (d.1701), the allegedly controversial points from the famous book *Al-Taswiya,* authored by his pir Shaikh Muhibullah of Allahabad.

[34] Mulla Nizamuddin Ansari, *Manaqib-I Razzaqia,* Lucknow, AH 1313, 14-15 see also Muhammad Raza Ansari, *Tazkira Hazrat Saiyid Saheb Banswi* (Lucknow: n.p, 1986), 70-71.

[35] Jafri, "Religious Plurality in the Chishti Tradition," 219-244, for the specific reference see, 233-234.

PUNJABI LANGUAGE AND STATE POLICY IN PAKISTAN: PUNJAB ADABI BOARD, 1970-2010

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ABSTRACT

Language has been one of the most contested issues in Pakistan since its independence in 1947. Language is an ethnic identity marker which makes it a politically sensitive subject when a country has a multilingual population. This article will help understand the ethno-nationalist point of view regarding the politicisation of language in post-partition Pakistan through critical observation of the Punjabi Adabi Board which was founded in 1975. Through its journal, we can analyse the events in their entirety as how the events were affecting the language movement and resistance faced by Board. As an organisation that has been established and funded by the government, and which, at the same time engages in a struggle to challenge and reform the center's policies, the Punjabi Adabi Board provides a site of study that can help to understand the state's contradictory and complex attitude towards Punjabi.

The major languages in Pakistan according to the 1981 census are Punjabi (48:17 percent); Pashto (13.14 percent); Sindhi (11.77 percent); Siraiki (9.83 percent); Urdu (7.60 percent); Balochi (3.02 percent); Hindko (2.43 percent) and Brahvi (1.21 percent)'.[1] The initial leadership of Jinnah was short-lived; it was continued by Khawaja Nazimudin, Ghulam Mohammad, Iskandar Mirza. They remained in the struggle to formulate a constitution, and when it was presented in the year 1956, it was inadequate to even provide the basic rights to everyone i.e. paucity of

education, and political training, and the role of the army and other bureaucratic institutions was not defined. No attention was paid to the Language policy issue. Regrettably, Pakistan's rulers have not given serious attention to the repercussions of language policy for the spread of ethnic conflict. Instead of evolving practical policies for language in East and West Pakistan, successive governments have in nearly all cases decided in favour of reactive measures. For instance, the case of the fall of East Pakistan is a clear example of how the state restrained a single unit from getting their basic right of speaking their indigenous language as national language i.e. Bengali language. This, combined with other factors, erupted into the disintegration in the form of Bangladesh. As a result, Pakistan has experienced repeated turmoil and chaos among groups demanding greater ethnic and political accommodation, for instance, Sindhi Nationalism led by G M Syed and Bashir Khan Qureshi, In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pashtun nationalism, In Punjab, Saraiki nationalism. These all groups have resisted for a long time, and the demands for the recognition and promotion of their respective languages has been a major part of their struggle.

However, after partition, despite this cultural and linguistic heterogeneity and the fact that no more than 7.6 percent of the Pakistani population claimed Urdu as its first language, the founders of Pakistan insisted that the new state should have one official language, and that language would be Urdu. Since then, ironically Pakistan has not become more homogeneous than the leaders thought it would be. A major part of Pakistan's language problems developed out of regional linguistic groups' offensive position at the Pakistani state's persistence on making Urdu the national language. The predominant problem in this regard was the government's unaccommodating and disobliging language policies. "Language has for long been associated with power and ideology in Pakistan".[2] The state held the view that Urdu was the symbol of Pakistani identity and the means to achieve national integration and cohesion. Most people considered this as the State's hegemonic design and a new version of internal colonialism. The ethnic elites sitting in the core considered their language as a symbol of national integration and assumed that it will organise and muster people throughout the country. The nationalists, led by the Punjabis, uphold that this is against the ideology of Pakistan. The problem arose when State not only accommodated indigenous languages but also defined the socio-economic divide along lingual lines and considered them to be the language of peasants and unskilled workers. While English was associated with the upper and upper-middle classes, Urdu with the middle and lower-middle classes, and the local, indigenous languages like Punjabi with the peasantry, un-skilled laborers, and the working classes. In Sindh and parts of the Pashto-speaking belt, local pride has been strong

enough to counter Urdu. In Pakistan, English is seen as the carrier of western, liberal values, and Urdu is an Islamic and Pakistani-nationalist language. By contrast, indigenous languages are associated with ethnic nationalism and an identity question that has been interpreted as a threat by the state.

Not only the linguistic groups from Punjab had resentment but other provincial ethnic groups were also infuriated on the State's unsound policy towards ethnic languages. Like Sindhi ethnic-nationalist, Pashtun nationalism also emerged during the early phase of Pakistan's history. History is evident in the suppression and removal of the NWFP government in 1947 with the same movements in Bengal in 1952 and then in 1971. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto deployed armed forces in Baluchistan from 1973 to 1977 after terminating a government that although agitating primarily on a language-policy issue, sought remedies from the center. In 1998 the National Assembly dismissed the NWFP's Awami Party resolution for the province to be renamed "Pakhtunistan". Time and again, Pakistan's political leadership had rejected, suppressed, and sidelined ethnic accommodation and extended problems that will not go away on their own. A viable solution and pragmatic approach are needed to resolve the lingual cum ethnic problems in Pakistan. It was in this context that in the year 1975 the Pakistan Punjabi Adabi Board was established by the government of Pakistan under Bhutto to protect and project the rights of Punjabi people in Pakistan in general and Punjab in particular. Their main focus remained to uplift *Maa Boli* in Punjab as a medium of instruction in primary, secondary, and higher education which for long was sidelined by the center.

It offers a critical evaluation of the Urdu language and its projection as the language of the elite and will examine different views of how the Urdu language will bring national integration across Pakistan at the expense of regional languages. For this, the case study of the Punjabi Adabi Board provides critical insight to the historians of ethnonationalism. While it opens new ventures to socio-economic divide along lingual lines, simultaneously, it also focuses on the question of why Pakistan's cultural identity i.e. languages remained a source of conflict and internal competition.

THEMES AND TRENDS OF PUNJABI LANGUAGE AND STATE POLICY OF PUNJABI ADABI BOARD

Pakistan Punjabi Adabi Board was established in 1975 by the government of Pakistan, more popularly under the Bhutto era. Its headquarter is in Lahore near the club road. The boards founding members include M Masood, Mian Mohammad Shafiq, Syeda Abida Hussain, Ashfaq Ahmed Khan, Wali M Wajid, Najam Hussain Syed, and others. M Masood was the first President of the Punjab Adabi Board. As a democratic institution, its members including President, Vice president, and

General Secretary are elected after two years. It pledged to work for the promotion of Punjabi language, literature both prose and poetry of all significant Punjabi writers and scholars, and for the promotion of Punjab's rich culture. This organisation falls under the domain of Education, and Cultural and Heritage department. For the last forty-five years, the Board has been trying to preserve the traditional and conventional heritage of Punjab. The Board has remained determined to publish classical folk literature or translate them into different languages. Moreover, it has also translated important literature masterpieces of other languages into the Punjabi language. In the ambit of the Board's remarkable services, it also requests dignified scholars to translate books. It also arranges seminars, important lectures, and festivals of famous Punjabi deceased poets in their honor. Till now the Board has published more than 150 books that include *Kuliyat e Ali Haider, Heer Waris Shah, Kuliyat e Bhully Shah,* and *Addab Rahian Punjab di Tareekh*. Categorically in "Tasawwuf" (Sufism) the books include '*Punjab de Sufiyana Rivayaat (*the tradition of Sufism in Punjab), *Wahda tul wujood te Punjabi shairi (*wahdatul wujood and Punjabi poetry)'.* On history, we find books on '*district Muzafargarh, Vihari, Gujrat, Bahawalpur, Khushab, Punjabi Adab de kahani (*the story of Punjabi literature), Sindhi Adab, Gojri Adab, Pashto Adab, Balochi Adab, Panj tare'.* On Politics, there are again ample of books like *'Quaid e azam soch te siasat, 'Tehrek Azadi wich Punjabi da Hisa* (role of Punjabi language in freedom movement)'.* Classic and modern poetry books include '*Akhya Baba Farid ne, Akhya Sacal Sar Mast ne, Shah jo Risalo, Heer Waris Shah, Qisah Shah Mansoor, Punjabi Rani, Akhya Mubarak shah ne. On Novel, we find 'Suraj Hirhan, Chitar Bagh, Paki Sarak, Qisa e Aashiqa'.* The books on stories *'Charkhe de Mout, Kook, Kiya Janan me Kon, Main te Main, Noori, Sheeshe de Kandh, Bari dair hue, Nike Nike Dukh, Akbar khaniyan, Ek oopri Kuri'. Drama books include 'Dooja Batwara, Jazera, Qisa do Bhirawan da, Suraj Mukhi, Lahu Suhag'.* On Folk literature, *'Sham range Kuri, Khana Abadi, Tange jhang Jande, Bar de Dhole, Punjab de lajpal Putar, Bujh lo mere baat, Taxila, Farid Wichar, Laikhe jokhe, Punjabi Naat'.*

Since the inception of the Board, it has strived to implement article 251 of the constitution i.e. Punjabi as the medium of instruction at the primary level. At every stage, the Board has done whatever it could for the promotion of mother tongue or what the Government ought to do. The Board has also the credit of publishing 'Punjab Nama' which encompassed Punjab's geographical, topological, cultural, and political history of Punjab. Indeed, the Journal titled 'Punjabi Adabi Board' is exceptional in highlighting current discourse and debate on the Punjabi language be it political or cultural. It is published thrice a year.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND STRUGGLE FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE PUNJABI LANGUAGE

Pakistan Punjabi Adabi Board had been a vigilant actor and stakeholder in the struggle for the promotion of the Punjabi language. It has left no stone unturned in pursuit of their love for their mother tongue. They believe in the maxim that 'if you love your mother how come that you don't love your mother tongue? They have been trying and struggling both literary and constitutionally to promote their mother tongue. The petition no 56/2003 and 112/2012 both entitled 'promotion of Punjabi language and other local languages and also national language Urdu' is evident of the fact that these are the people who will move mountains or die trying them. The case was referred initially to Supreme court Islamabad, and then to Lahore High court. In the year 2015, the supreme court decided the petition by endorsing the fact that previous governments failed to be conclusive in implementing article 251 of the constitution of Pakistan. Further, he ordered its 'implementation with full force and unnecessary delay'.

The federal government and Punjab government both have to coordinate for uniformity in '*rasmulkhat*'. Even the judgment was published in Urdu in correspondence with article 189, and 251. Unfortunately, the respondents did not even conform themselves with the above decision either, or there were other issues. But their inactive attitude made the petitioner stronger and they moved to Lahore high court for its implementation with the hope that it will be implemented and presented in Punjab Assembly before cabinet members. In addition to the above, a public hearing by the Senate standing committee on law and justice was called on in which an amendment was proposed in article 251. It included the word 'languages' for language, 'are' for is, and insertion of new words Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi, Brahvi, Hindko, and Saraiki after "Urdu".

ROLE OF PUNJABI LANGUAGE AND PUNJABI WRITERS IN INDEPENDENCE

Time and again, the Pakistani Punjabi Adabi Board has shown its determination to get the right of their mother tongue 'Punjabi Language'. According to Muhammad Asif Khan, a few years before Partition, 'people were disinterested in the Punjabi language, the reason was not that people no longer loved Punjabi language but they didn't want it to be a bone of contention for independence as they need to show themselves united before British Raj'. [3] But after 1947, apart from Punjabi scholars and writers, people 'forgot' to reverse their attention from Urdu to Punjabi. Those writers didn't stop there and started writing in Punjabi to such an extent that they made other people a realisation that if Urdu was their national language then Punjabi Sindhi, Seraiki, and Pashto is their (*Maa boli*) mother tongue.

A few organisations were made for the promotion of the Punjabi language. In addition to this, different journals were also published.

After a few years of the partition, as it is mentioned in the journal that the interest level towards the Punjabi language was developed to this level that "*Urdu adeeb Punjabi adeeban nal mil k likhan lag pae the*".[4] (Urdu writers joined Punjabi writers and started writing in their language). When a butcher kills an animal, he first closes his mouth so that it cannot make noise, in the same way, the British Raj tried to close the mouth and tongue of people of Punjabi poets so that they couldn't write or say something. The scholars knew that concerning 'the census of pre-partition and to 1951, Urdu had limitations to be national language'[5]. Yet it was made as to the national language. But the persistent Punjabi poets and writers i.e. Nanak Singh, Vir Singh, Puran Singh, Amrita Singh, Ustad Daman who made their mother tongue their weapon and stood against the Raj and after independence against the unjust policies of the Pakistani government. They took an active part in all social and political movements relentlessly i.e. Indian National Congress, All India Muslim League, *Khilafat* Movement, Peasant's movement, *Gadar* party. These poets wrote thoughtful poems against the British Empire and also tried to arouse a sympathetic vision from all around the world for the Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER ADABI BOARDS

The Punjabi Adabi Board always had very cordial relations with other Pakistani national Boards and provincial Boards such as the Sindhi Adabi Board. As we find that in 1986, a delegation of the Sindhi Adabi Board came to Punjabi Adabi Board on a visit. The Punjabi Adabi Board's general secretary Mohammad Asif Khan warmly welcomed Abid Laghari and Dr. Qamar Wahid of the Sindhi Adabi Board. Dr. Qamar in the gathering discussed the similarity between Sindhi and Punjabi text and also about the queens of Bhittai i.e. Sassui, Marvi, Momal, Noori construed in the beautiful poetry of Sindhi poets like Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai. Hakeem Nasir says "*jehde apni koi na howe boli, o insan kahe da o insan koi nai*"[6]. It means he who does not have any language is not a human being. This is something unusual because the poet is not even considering the human existence without language. Not only this but other poets like Rahman Baba, Khushal Khan Khattak, and poets of their age had magnificently explained actresses like *Heer, Sassi, Momal, Marvi, sunhnee*, noori Jam etc. Punjabi Adabi Board's executive members Sajjad Haider, Tanveer Mirza, and Asif Khan had a visit to Shah Abdul Latif University Khairpur, Sachal Cultural Center, Sindhi Adabi Board, institute of Sindhology Jamshoro. Moreover, the essays on Sachal Sar Mast, and Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, and Khushhal Khan Khattak construes the love for other poets and Sufi saints

irrespective of any ethnic-national element. They rather symbolize national harmony and cohesion among different Adabi Boards across Pakistan.

COMPARISON OF PUNJABI LANGUAGE WITH OTHER LANGUAGES

The Board has endeavoured an effort and struggle to contextualise Punjabi language and bring it in comparison with other indigenous languages. At the institutional level, the board initially tried to maintain cordial relations with other boards. As its financial condition was not as same as of other Boards in terms of funding so it could not visit them usually. However, by acknowledging their service and its due mention in the quarterly journal as *Parchol or Sanjh Wichar* kept their bond unified and amiable. There can be other reasons as well like through their articles on Sindhi, Balochi, and Pashto literature, Board's permanent members tried to evoke a sense of cohesion and harmony among all ethno-nationalities in contrast to what the federation thought to erupt in disharmony and unrest. By critically analysing them, we also get an insight into their relations based on the mutual interest in the promotion of indigenous languages. In addition to this, we also become aware of new cultural traditions, norms and such as *Sindhi Saqafati Mello* (cultural festival)*, Adabi Mello* (Literature festival)*, and Much katcheri* (Bone fire cum Sufi cultural night)*, Malakhro* (Traditional Sindhi Wrestling).

Professor Mohsin Abbasi opined in his article, *Kuch Sindhi lafz* (Some Sindhi Words) that "Baba Farid also took some words from the Sindhi language" so before comprehend his poetry one must consult with Sindhi scholar to know exactly the meaning of those words in context. [7] Otherwise, we will not be able to comprehend the exact meaning which Baba Farid had thought of it. In this case, Punjabi's interactions with other literary and linguistic traditions are emphasized, rather than Punjabi being portrayed as a completely isolated or independent tradition. Abid Umeeq has compared the situation of the German language in Germany and the Punjabi language in Pakistan vice-versa. He explained that Hegel sorted out this problem by identifying a few themes on which such a comparison can be carried out. For instance, he notes that German and Punjabi both languages have vast meanings of single words, a single comma *zeer zabar* can change the meaning of a whole word and sentence.[8] The German language has neither a single center/city for poetry, nor for language, or its philosophy. Rather, it is widely spread across Germany. Similarly, the Punjabi language or its poets have also no single center. For instance, Baba Farid was from Pakpattan, Shah Hussain from Lahore, Bulley Shah from Kasur, Khwaja Ghulam Farid from Kot Mithan (Dera Ghazi khan), Waris Shah from Sahiwal, and Sultan Bahu from Shorkot (Jhang).

If we compare the Siraiki language with Punjabi, different scholars have different opinions regarding its link with Sindhi or Punjabi. Arab travelers consider the Saraiki language to be the Sindhi language with little or no difference. "Punjabi Adabi Board considers Saraiki language to be a dialect of Punjabi language".[9] On the other hand, few professionals cogitate this language to be an ancient language of the Indian subcontinent and are fully independent of any other influence. However, Majhi, Doabi, and Malwai are a few dialects that are considered to be Punjabi as they are being spoken by a majority population. Majhi is almost common in Pakistan, while Malawi is common in Indian Punjab. Doabi accent is called Faisalabadi Punjabi. Potohari is being spoken in the Rawalpindi division but we discuss it in detail as it is a major spoken language of Punjab. In other cities like Okara and Jhang, and Changvi is spoken more often whereas in Sargodha Shahpuri is common. But Dogri, Hindko, and Siraiki dialects are categorized as separate languages in Pakistan.

ROLE OF PUNJABI ADABI BOARD IN HIGHLIGHTING FLAWED EDUCATIONAL POLICIES AND POOR IMPLEMENTATION

Since the inception of Pakistan, different commissions have been formulated, task forces made but no concrete result was seen, i.e. educational conference 1947, Sharif commission 1959, new educational policy 1972, national educational policy 1979, president's task force on education 1985. These policies did find out the problems' pin location yet couldn't overcome and thus remain unfruitful. Punjabi Adabi Board requested the president's task force to include the Punjabi language as compulsory from primary to grade III. On March 21, 1987, a famous incident occurred "when the British government agreed to make the Punjabi language as a compulsory subject in secondary and intermediate in those areas where Punjabi speaking people were in majority"[10]. This incident is pertinent to highlight the State of affairs because, at times when the center or provincial government in Pakistan was reluctant to promote the Punjabi language in schools and colleges and that too with a massive Punjabi speaking population, the British government was keen to do so. In later years, after the Sindh government, *Sarhad* now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also allowed teaching their mother tongue in their primary education. Although the Punjabi language by its literature spreads fragrance to other local languages yet people in Punjab are reluctant to speak and write in the same language. The Board complains that the government has focused more on the promotion of philosophy, science, and technology and almost forgot to promote their own indigenous language. Similarly, if we recall the NOV 11, 1987, Zia made a speech and construed the importance of education in the mother tongue. "Zia established 5000 schools

and mosques in towns over five years with Arabic learning was compulsory in these schools"[11]. In pursuit of Islamizing Pakistan, Zia almost forgets to fulfill his promise of promoting indigenous languages. This was not something new as time and again it had failed to be in practice. From Hunter commission of 1880 to Sergeant Commission of 1947, all emphasised the same thing. As a Board's formal request or demand from the center, National educational policy 1979, and the president's task force on education 1985 made the Punjabi language compulsory from primary to grade III.

In addition to this, the Board after the promulgation of the Education policy of 1979 regrets to say the education policies did not focus on the promotion of their indigenous culture and folk literature, and heritage. As in Sindh, the government supports the Adabi conference held on the Urs Sharif of Sachal Sar Mast and Bhittai sharif, Lal Shabaz Qalandar whereas the Sarhad government also does the same at the time of Urs/anniversary of Rahman Baba and Khushal Khan Khattak. But in Punjab government lacks the interest to do the same despite building a beautiful dome of Waris Shah. Since the early 1990s, it was celebrated with full enthusiasm. The Board has contended with the populists in power in Pakistan in general and Punjab in particular. The budget had always been a bone of contention and discomfort for everyone be it writers, scholars, or even Punjabi Adabi Board. It is discontented with the fact that we live in a country "wherein one province an annual grant of 22 lacs is given to an Adabi Board for the promotion of mother tongue"[12] where on the other side financial help is a big thing but not a single note of encouragement is given. The Punjabi language is not only a language of speaking but it has its own vast literature and culture. This indigenous language when in need has always seen people who pay lip service to the cause of language promotion. People in the countryside don't realise its importance otherwise it would create havoc for the elite circle which for long is prioritizing Urdu over Punjabi. Even UNESCO has emphasized to deliver education and teach in the mother tongue as portrayed from their monograph and in Punjab, people are not ready to accept the fact.

On Sep 8, 1992, international literacy day was celebrated in Pakistan. "Punjabi Adabi Board despite being happy for Pakistan's literacy rate ranging from 26-34, pointed out to the fact that we must focus on the seventy percent illiterate ratio of Pakistan".[13] Board was brave in this regard and its morale was so high that it wanted to see Pakistan's literacy rate not less than a hundred percent. The citizen's review on educational policies noted that "many people supported Urdu medium schools and wanted to abolish English medium Schools".[14] One of the reasons could be that people were fed up with the colonial mentality of learning the English

language. People observed that even after independence, we are not independent of British norms and traditions. And it is because of this that in Pakistan, the literacy rate was even not ameliorating over the period of time because their base was weak. A child must learn in his regional/provincial language for better clarity of ideas and thoughts.

It is no doubt that the Punjabi language has been oppressed and marginalized since the inception of Pakistan. If we critically analyze, we find that there are multiple reasons for its oppression. The Board resents that "while in Sindh an annual budget of 1 crore is given to Adabi Board in general by Sindh government"[15] and handsome amount of money to other institutes like 'Institute of Sindhology', and Sachal Cultural Centre Punjabi Adabi Board is not getting a single penny. In this regard, we can analyze the visit of the Board's executive members Sajjad Haider, Sanveer Mirza, and Asif Khan to Shah Abdul Latif University Khairpur, Sachal Cultural center, Sindhi Adabi Board, and Institute of Sindhology. An annual grant of forty lacs is given to Sindhi Adabi Board, 60 lacs to the printing press, more than 100 men staff are recruited, 450 books published in the year 1993. On the other hand, the Institute of Sindhology gets 30 lac rupees grant, 125 staff people recruited, and a masterpiece compilation of *Shah-Jo-Risalo* is published with numerable copies sent in the country and abroad. Proper rooms and cabins were allotted to Adabi writers. A well-articulated museum at the institute of Sindhology.

The problem of intriguing is that once huge funds for their institutions can be released why not for Waris Shah's tomb of Baba Farid. Now Asif khan analyzed this situation in comparison with Punjabi Adabi Board and remained speechless while saying "*Punjab Sarkar soobe de adab te culture no sanbhan lae kiya kujh karende pae ha eh tusee me too wadh jaanrde ho*!" (You know better than me whatsoever Punjab government is doing to promote the literature and culture of Punjab).[16] However, it is a very encouraging sign of the Board that their committees are responsible to raise funds for the Board from their contribution. At times when the writers are supposed to be assisted by the government are themselves upset with the State of affairs? Another important setback was that the Punjab Textbook Board published a very small amount of books of Punjabi language from 6th standard to 10th standard, except Lahore, hardly any district get enough books to distribute across all schools. Their institution under the supervision of the government is not accepting the fact of promoting the Punjabi language. Punjab government granted 3 lacs rupees to Punjabi Adabi Board and Pakistan Adabiyaat Board Islamabad granted 1 lac for Board and that too given in four installments. The reason to tell you is to draw a comparison to the State of affairs with other provincial Adabi Boards. In the budget of the 1996 fiscal year chief minister Punjab Sardar

Mohammad Arif has allotted five crore budget for the promotion of schools and to modernize its infrastructure and overhaul its condition. The promised grant of 5 crores was soon forgotten by the caretaker government. For any country to progress, it is necessary to preserve its past and the provincial government in Punjab was not heeding towards it in any manner.

Simultaneously, the tide of military governments was over only to rise again in the form of Musharaf's regime. "All provincial assemblies were democratic in nature, their speakers and other members took oath in English, Urdu, and their indigenous mother tongue but in Punjab provincial assembly they didn't do so"[17] even though the Punjabi language is the most spoken language in Pakistan, it is being ignored and suppressed from its own home. One can also identify a reason that it was considered to be the language of the poor, destitute, and peasants. So elite circle was reluctant to be categorised in that circle. Although it has a vast culture and diction of its own, and a regional language too like Pashto and Sindhi yet is not given its due share of importance as others are getting in their respective provinces. So it should be given what it deserves. In the year 2004, an International Punjabi conference was held in Lahore at Al-Hamra Arts Council. As a chief guest Chief Minister, Punjab Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi promised to promote and protect the rights of Punjabi *maa boli*. It is a general held belief and fact that 'rights are supposed to be protected when given' in Punjab the mother tongue indeed had never been given its right to promotion and right to be used as a medium of instruction! And It is because of this the Board is not developing to the extent it should develop. Provided the history of the journal *Punjabi Adabi Board* from 1987-2010, we have understood that time and again it has been ignored, overlooked, omitted, marginalized, and disregarded by their people in general and government in particular.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, as a student of history I find the Partition to give a blow to the history of the subcontinent, be it economic, political, social, ethical, or moral. But the heavy blow was also ethno-lingual based on language lines. For any government in either part i.e. Pakistan, or India, it was pivotal to counter the forces formed on the lingual lines in pursuit of language protection. India succeeded in countering the Ethno nationalist movements whereas Pakistan still is lingering the unsettled linguistic problems i.e. the case of the promulgation of Punjabi language as a medium of instruction in schools. My research has expounded the fact that language's politicization is not a new debate but has a colonial legacy followed in the post-partition era. During the British Empire, the English language was given prominence

whereas in the post-partition era Urdu replaced the seat of English. However, article 251 of the constitution provided its implementation within twenty years from its announcement. So it was expected to be in practice up to 1993 but remained ineffective in implementation. As an institution, the Pakistani Punjabi Adabi Board has tried to raise the voice for the protection and promotion of its provincial cum indigenous language. Every language evolves and a lot of changes are made in it so leaving language at its fate is a really cold and uncaring attitude. For instance, when people travel and come to new places, they influence their native language with their indigenous language, and also do influence by the same language they listen to there. Punjabi Adabi Board has till now published more than 150 books. In addition to this, it has been publishing its journal since 1987 and that too uninterrupted. As we discussed earlier that the Board is getting only lip service from its government, and with this journal thrice in a row in a single year is not possible. Certainly, a handsome amount of fund is required to fulfill this obligation which the Board had taken upon itself. So to meet this challenge their writers and member collect and join funds from their savings and earning. The reason is to highlight the role of the Punjabi language and Punjabi speaking people in different cities mentioned above. Secondly, it has covered the relation of the Punjabi Adabi Board with other Adabi Boards across Pakistan. At third, although it was Punjabi Adabi Board which since 1975 tried to promote the language, yet their efforts were not as steady as they needed to be, for instance, without constitutional proceedings, it could not move their stance towards legislative assembly or federation. And we find the first constitutional petition in 2003 which indeed is a strong move from Board's side but too late to address the question of Punjabi language. It could have served fruitful results if it was endorsed in the decade of 1970 or 1980. As of now, we must not weaken our resolve in the struggle for the promotion of the Punjabi language.

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NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CAUSES OF THE RISE OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE MUSLIM-MAJORITY COUNTRIES SINCE THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to examine the reason and theoretical aspects of the rise of political Islam in Muslim majority countries in the 20th century. This study briefly explains the rise and fall of Islamism and debates around its future, especially the theory of post-Islamism. This paper tries to analyse different reasons for the rise of Islamism including economic, political, authoritarianism, and anti-western trends in the light of the Marxist class conflict and the realist approach of international relations theory. It explains that the rise of modern Islamism owes most of its success to the inter-class economic conflict between the middle and lower class on one side and the elite or ruling class on the other side.

KEY WORDS

Islam; Islamism; Muslim Brotherhood; Political Islam; Marxism; Realism

Islamism has been one of the most extensively debated political ideologies in the last few decades, when observed in a historical context Islam has always been a religion with a political aspect. Islamism can be defined as the politicisation of Islam, a struggle for a political system grounded on Islamic law known as sharia and accepting complete sovereignty of God over humans. Islamists believe that Islam is a comprehensive code of life that encompasses guidelines for political, economic, social, individual, and every other aspect of human life, and throughout Islamic history, Islam inspired and constructed a complex legal system.[1] The difference between Islamists and a traditional stream of Islam is the political goals of the former, numerous traditional Islamic movements like Tablighi Jamaat have a

missionary nature and they plan to alter the system by changing individuals, but Islamists want to be the regulator of state, they want to change to trickle down from the top.[2] Even though with a mutual goal Islamism is scarcely a unified political movement,[3] its spectrum diverges extensively between democratic Islamists like Muslim Brotherhood and militant Islamists like Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Another deep division that lies between different segments of the Islamist movement is the extent to which they want to apply Islamic sharia, examples are hardliner Islamists like the Islamic state which fantasizes of a pan-Islamic caliphate governed on the fundamentalist model, and AK Partisi of Turkey whose been ruling Turkey from last two decades and has incorporated various principals of conservatism and secularism in its political ideology and governance model.[4] Although there is a massive difference between different sects and groups of Islamists about the version of Islamic laws and values, they want to implement but there is consensus about Islam being the political and social solution between all the Islamists.[5]

This article is divided into four sections, first part will briefly discuss the rise and decline of Islamism as a potent political power, the second part of this article will discuss the theoretical aspects of its rise, the third section gives different reasons which played an important part in its rise and the fourth part will discuss its future. The causes comprise various social, economic, political and religious factors that came together in the early decades of the 20th century and gave rise to what is known as Islamism.

Francois Burgat divides the history of Islamism into three different phases; the first phase is comprised of the earlier Islamist scholars like Jamal-udin-Afghani, Rashid Rida, Muhammad Abduhu, and purist preachers like Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab. The second phase entailed Islamists who resisted political and cultural colonization of Muslim countries by western powers or post-independence leaders who adhered to western ideologies and world view, this includes scholars like Imam Hasan ul Bana, Qutb, and Maududi, this phase was different from the earlier phase due to its stark political nature. The third phase which began in the early 1990s consisted of radical figures who wanted to militarily resist and topple the puppet government of the middle east and counter this re-colonization in which the west was reigning over the Islamic world through its puppets and appointed dictators, most of these groups including AL-Qaeda adhered to extremist and radical interpretations of ideas put forward by Syed Qutb.[6] Some historians and political intellectuals credit Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab as the first modern Islamist in the Middle East, who preached a puritanical version of Islam grounded on hadith and traditions of salaf, because his teachings and the consequent state

that was originated on his teaching was focused on clearing Islam from impurities and were nationalistic and regional in approach.[7]   Hasan ul Bana is deemed the founder of the modern Islamist stream of thinking; he worked on educating people about the all-encompassing nature of Islam which includes answers for all political, social, cultural, and economic questions.

The formation of the scholarly and ideological foundation of modern Islamism is credited to Syed Qutb of Egypt, Syed Maududi of Pakistan, and Iman Khomeini of Iran.[8] Syed Maududi and Syed Qutb forwarded kind of similar idea of Jahiliya, which meant that modern Muslim societies are like the pagan, Jahiliya stricken society of Mecca of the pre-Islam period. Socialism, nationalism, and secularism were labeled as modern gods, but they equally differed on the mode to dismantle this system. The message of Syed Qutb was more of revolutionary nature, while Maududi advocated the path of slow and gradual change, and strictly warned his followers in South Asia of any violent way of Islamic revolution and counseled them to work in the legal boundaries and bring about the gradual change, while Syed Qutb gave a different opinion about this matter and was hanged on the charges of a murder attempt by Jamal Abdul Nasser before he could further elaborate his thinking and in result his name is used by both democratic Islamists and violent terrorist as well.[9] Islamist Muslim brotherhood confronted strict clampdown in the decades of '50s and '70s by Military dictators of Egypt, as nationalism was on the rise, during this crackdown various offshoots of MB emerged who decided to confront the situation with terrorism or militant resistance. In 1967 Arab Israel war broke the chasm of nationalism and gave some breathing and maneuvering space to Islamists in Egypt.[10]The decades of the 70's also witnessed the rise of Imam Khomeini in Iran who eventually led the popular revolution in Iran against American supported Shah and deposed him to take over as a strict Islamists leader and turned Iran into an Islamic republic, the first example of Islamists triumph in the Middle East.[11] 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union unbolted a whole new chapter of achievement and propaganda for Islamists globally. Financial and militaristic aid by the USA and Saudi Arabia and logistical and tactical support by Pakistan which was also ruled by an Islamic leaning military dictator at that time made Islamic rebels called mujahideen to overthrow the Soviet-backed government. This was the high noon of Islamism and everyone was expecting a succession of Islamic revolutions, but this tide failed due to numerous different reasons. Democratic Islamists were overshadowed by armed Islamists who were in a sense of false confidence after defeating Russia and the 90's decade saw Islamist terrorism escalation throughout the world with military conflicts in Chechnya and Bosnia giving a feeling of besiegement to

Muslims and pushing Islamists towards more radical and militant ways. Post 9/11 world was challenging for Islamists and suddenly every Islamist, even if he was a democratic Islamist was seen with skepticism. The Arab spring in the second decade of the 21st century was probably the closest Islamists got to taking power in middle eastern countries, but this spring promptly became Arab winter with blood civil war in Syria and a military coup against the Islamist government of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The upsurge of Islamism has been one of the most momentous events in the political arena of the world in the 20th century, there are multiple theoretical explanations given for the rise of Islamism. Most dominant of which is the traditional view in which scholars tend to relate modern Islamism with the traditional political structures and history of Islam. This article will discuss the rise of Islamism was an amalgamation of multiple different reasons including different political, cultural, and historical factors which all can be described and explained in the context of realism and postcolonial theory but the most important and dominant part of the rise of Islamism was "class struggle". It is ironic to say that in coming years one of the biggest nemeses of Marxism/socialism was itself the product of class struggle, the struggle of the urban middle class and poor class against the ruling elite which in most of the cases were either military dictators or the post-independence political leaders with western education and world view. This cannot be said that class conflict was the only rationale liable for the rise of Islamists, but it can without any doubt be called one of the leading reasons and this is most evident in the phenomenally successful of the Islamists revolutions – Iran. The Islamic world has one specific trait, the majority of the population whether they have a belief in political Islam or not they consider Islam as a vital part of their individual and social lives and this is the reason that even socialist and nationalist leaders and movements are forced to employ Islamic rhetoric or symbolism. This is the reason that even the deprived classes – the lower class, the recently urbanized class with scarce economic options and educated students, although their problems and issues were economic were pushed towards the folds of Islamism which was at the time in conflict with the economic and ruling elite. Though the reason for the clash of Islamism with the ruling and economic elite was cultural and ideological rather than economic because the ruling elite was secular and nationalist and was trying to impose the western model of enlightened values in the society but the motives of both economically deprived groups and Islamists aligned and ended up becoming a strong political power. In many other aspects of the rise of Islamism, especially its violent and militaristic torrents pragmatic policies of certain Muslim countries and global powers can be partial if not fully

charged. Those using Islamism as a political tool on a global or domestic level were either not fully aware of the consequences of their actions or, they just simply ignored it for the most immediate goals, but Islamism later became a staunch opponent of the very same powers who once gave it financial, ideological, and logistical support for the reasons rooted in Islamist ideology itself, examples of such powers are Israel, USA, and Gulf countries.

The rise of Islamism as a potent political power in domestic theaters of various middle-eastern countries was seen in the period between the '60s and '80s, which period was also coupled with demographic changes in most of the middle-eastern countries, this period saw unprecedented population growth.[12] This transformed countries from complete rural societies with agrarian base into countries with a continually increasing urban population, which was exposed to modern lifestyle, political ideas, and approaches towards life, but governments were not successful in providing adequate economic opportunities or political space for these impoverished new urban youth which considered religion an important part of their lives and hence they were attracted towards the budding Islamist movements. During the post-independence decades of many Muslim Arab countries, neo-liberal policies were fervently applied by the ruling elite to create a robust economy but due to a number of factors like corruption, lack of strong state institutions, and problems in regional trade, these policies failed to produce expected results. Before the start of the first intifada in Palestine and the sudden and abrupt rise of Hamas, Palestinian territories were going through such demographic and economic crisis with population growth one of the highest in the whole world and after graduation, only 20% of students used to find employment, this economic catastrophe along with their skepticism of PLO quickly drove them towards Hamas which was running different social, education and political projects.[13] Another glaring example of this phenomenon was Iran, where class conflict was an essential part of the revolution against the Pahlavi monarchy, Firstly Ali Shariati and later Imam Khomeini used the terms "mostakbirene" for the upper ruling class and "mostadafine" for the lower oppressed class, these two terms from Quran gave religious connotation to the economic woes of people. Iran started to face economic problems in the 1970s, the drop of oil prices in 1975 put a lot of pressure on the Iranian monarchy, which retorted by strictness on dissenters and opposition which in turn made the resolve of opposition stronger. This economic crisis became one of the main reasons for the ultimate rise of Islamists, their taking over of the anti-shah movement and founding the first Islamic republic in the Middle East revolution in 1979.[14]

The First World War saw the disintegration of the ottoman empire and ottoman sultan: also, the caliph of Islam was deposed by the Turk assembly led by Mustafa Kamal Pasha in 1924.[15] The office of caliphate held an important and esteemed position in the eyes of the Sunni population of the world and its importance and sanctity were seen in the fervor was seen in the caliphate movement of Indian Muslims during the first world war against the British colonial government of India to pressure them into not taking punitive steps against the ottoman empire.[16] Although in the 20th century the Ottoman caliph was not as powerful as the caliph Umar of Rashidun caliphate or Harun ur Rasheed of Abbasid caliphate but still his persona gave all Sunnis of the world moral support and a feeling of belonging to a wider Muslim ummah. When the caliph was removed and the office was abolished by the secular nationalist government of Mustafa Kamal, a feeling of gloom fell over the whole Muslim world. This political leadership vacuum in the wider Muslim ummah created space for an ideology, a movement that called for a reinstatement of Islam as the rule of the land, as the ruler of Islamic countries. Egypt from where the modern political Islamism, in the form of Muslim Brotherhood rose had remained a part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries and was one of the most important countries of the Muslim world and before the discovery of oil, Egypt was without any doubt the most populous and important region of Arab lands. It represented the feelings and emotions of a wider Muslim Arab population stretching from the Euphrates to the Sahara and in this politically and culturally important land Muslim brotherhood was born, and it quickly spread into surrounding Arab countries in coming years. At a similar time, western powers were also supporting Jewish migration to the land of Palestine, this Jewish plan of repopulating levant has always been rejected by the Ottoman sultan but in the absence of the Ottoman sultan or another central figure in the Muslims, this Zionist plan went on unimpeded, Muslim brotherhood of Hasan ul Bana also took part in military actions against Jewish settlers in Palestine during this time. This overall feeling of being defenseless and vulnerable pushed Muslim towards Islamism

Authoritarianism no matter what its ideological driving force becomes an elitist and class-based composition in time, this argument is especially valid in the case of the Middle East where most of the authoritarian rulers were either military dictators or kings from kin-based dynasties. In both cases, the ruling elite was composed of close family and friends circle of the king or ruler which in turn created an elite class both in political and economic meanings. And it was observed that in a few years of rule the close circle of the ruling autocrat became immensely rich due to unabated control of that small group of people on

resources of a whole country. Islamism rose in many of those countries which were ruled by dictators with a secular and nationalistic ideological inclination with little to no involvement of Islam in governance structures examples are Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Algeria. In these countries, there were not sufficient democratic institutions to help the population vent out their dissent and with secularism as the state ideology, Islamism became the only wide acceptable political platform of dissent, which vehemently opposed the un-Islamic dictators. Iran was ruled by the western, secular Pahlavi dynasty which ruled as an American backed monarch, Iranian king was often called the policeman of the east and when he was ousted by the population, the protesting population along with ideological and economic motives also had anti monarchic feelings in which they ought to have more representative government in Iran.[17] The same example can be seen in the context of 1977 antigovernment protests in Pakistan, which were originally against the authoritarian, undemocratic way of ruling and suspected rigging in elections, by socialist-leaning Bhutto government, but they swiftly became a religious movement, named "Tehreek e Nizam e Mustafa" the movement for the system of Prophet (PBUH).[18]

In the mid-20th century, most of the Middle Eastern countries were either newly independent or still struggling to get independence from western colonial powers. Economic plunder, exploitation of weaker, backward nations of the Islamic world created a reactionary sentiment in the general Muslim population, here class conflict can be seen in two ways. Firstly the occupation and later economic and social exploitation of underdeveloped countries by the first world powers like France, Great Britain, and Italy and on second level class conflict was seen within the occupied countries where elite class often accepted foreign cultural and economic suzerainty and quicky adopted western ideologies and world views the second class was the lower class, workers, farmers who in a reaction more strongly clanged to their traditions, which pre-dominantly were Islamic and when Islamism started to rise these classes were enticed by the Islamic and anti-colonial aspect of Islamism. The western occupation brought with it, secularism, and modernism, secularism called for complete separation of state and religion while modernism preached values like liberalism, pluralism, and individualism. These values were widely acknowledged and condoned by general European societies, but they were alien and irreconcilable for most of the population of the Muslim world because Islam is a religion with multi-dimensional and multi-layered identity, where it is a cultural, religious, and political identity all at the same time. The colonial rule was able to inoculate these values in the small ruling minority which was being taught and trained in educational institutes

developed on European lines, but the majority remained incapable or unattracted to adapting to these foreign ideas' and values. So as a reaction to this program of western ideals outright rejection of these wester/modern ideas became a core tenant of Islamism, which rejected it along with its political, economic, and social aspects and tried to find a parallel system from the Islamic scholarly tradition and political history. The movement of FIS in Algeria had a strong anti-French notion in it, and it called for banning of French language and cultural symbols from the public sphere of Algeria and replace it with Arabic, a language with a strong religious notion attached to it.[19] Economic exploitation of India British crown has been a well-recorded fact in the history now that how a country with 27% GDP of the world in 1700 was reduced to economic wretchedness and famines in upcoming years which took lives of millions in Bengal famine.[20]

Islam as a religion has historically been used to impart legitimacy to rulers and governments alike. Even the most tyrant rulers used to get some sort of Islamic justification for their tyranny because as It has been said the earlier majority of the population to this date consider Islam as a most important part of their social and political lives, this pragmatic way of using Islam as a tool to influence the internal and external politics has been used to this date. There are glaring examples of countries promoting Islamism domestically to give legitimacy to their actions or counter other political ideologies which in most of the cases were either nationalism or socialism. In many cases, this support and maneuvering space to Islamism was curtailed as soon as the necessity ended.[21] This pragmatic use of Islamism as a political tool on the global level was also observed in the last century, where Islamism was deliberately allowed to develop or supported to achieve a certain foreign policy motive. The rise of Arab nationalism after the military coup in Egypt and eventual revolutions and takeover of Syria and Iraq by nationalist leaders created a tide of Arabism in the Middle East which was led by the charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser who led the united Arab cause against Israel and tried his level best to solve the conflict. To counter this rising tide of nationalism and influence of Egypt in Middle-East Saudi Arabia was forced to make this pragmatic choice of adopting Islamism as a political ideology, they invested newly acquired oil money into promoting their brand of Salafi Islam and branding itself as representative of Islam. During the Muslim Brotherhood purge of Egypt by Jamal Abdul Naser, many leaders and scholars of the Muslim Brotherhood were also given refuge in Saudi Arabia, most prominent of them Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sed Qutb.[22] The use of Islam as a tool to impart legitimacy to an illegitimate rule and its use as a tool to crush the dissent was also observed in Pakistan, wherein the 1977 socialist-leaning government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was

ousted in a coup by rightist Army Chief, Zia ul Haqq. His tenure saw brutal use of Islam as a tool to malign the socialist opposition, he enacted many superficially Islamic laws which had good propaganda value but practically they were of minimal impact, in practical life he was a military general who had a controversial past, especially his role in Black September purge against Palestinian resistance had been a controversial issue. The same realist and pragmatic approach of certain global powers can be attributed to the rise of radical Islamism. During the last few decades of the 20th century, Islam was used as a weapon against communism by the west. Islamism was supported and financed by the USA and its allies, primarily Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to counter the soviet army and it was in post-soviet Afghanistan that the concept of global jihad was crystallized in its current form.[23] A lot of literature has been written on the American support to Afghan rebels, called mujahideen. Throughout the war, Billions of dollars, modern weaponry, and space on global forums were given to rebel leaders. All this was done keeping in mind that these rebels were Islamist, because their conflict with the communist Afghan government, was religious and cultural, Communist government of Afghanistan was vigorously implementing modern socialist ideals in the society, something which was not acceptable for the traditional Islamic people of Afghanistan. A similarly pragmatic approach can also be applied as a secondary aspect behind the rise of Hamas in Palestine, Hamas was initially supported financially and politically by the Israeli government itself to counter the secular and nationalist PLO, it was a realist and pragmatic choice by Israeli policymakers to divide the Palestinian resistance into two different factions.[24]

Islamism as a political and cultural force has played an important role in the history of many major Muslim countries, but what about its future? Scholars like Asef bayat argue that Islamism in its true sense is already over and what we are witnessing right now is the Post Islamist world.[25] The rise of Islamism, with its multitude of different reasons and ramifications, has proved one thing that Islamism as a political ideology is resilient, and Islamists are opportunists of a sort, this is what makes them different from the traditional ulemas and leaders. They have the capacity to transform, change themselves, we have seen throughout the 20th century that Islamists have used different methods to get political power in different countries. Another argument that Islamism is making compromises with its core values due to internal or external pressures is also skipping the example of Turkey where we have seen the gradual return of the AK party towards its traditional position after slowly defeating traditional foes of Islamism in the form of Turkish army and judiciary, some may try to explain this in the form of neo-ottomanism and rise of Turk conservative power, but again Islam in Muslim

countries is an essential part of their culture and history and in most of the case they supplement each other. Another example of this phenomenon can be seen in the new charter of Hamas where they have completely omitted any mention of the word Islam but their actions and tactics after the release of the new manifesto have proved that it was just another political tactic and nothing regarding their governance of Gaza and their attitude towards Israel and PLO have changed.

The rise of Islamism cannot be explained as a linear development, a multitude of different historical, cultural, and political reasons was responsible for its rise. Economic woes of lower classes have always been the reason for great upheavals in world history, two greatest revolutions of the last centuries, the Russian and the French revolution can be attributed to the prevailing economic conditions at that time. Similarly, economic and class conflict can also be ascribed as one of the main reasons behind the success and failure of Islamists. Countries, where Islamists were successful in creating a tactic alliance between different segments of the middle class and lower class, were successful to some extent but countries, where they failed in this regard, did not saw any considerable achievement. Jamaat e Islami of Pakistan failed to extend its clout beyond the educated urban middle class and failed to achieve anything but Imam Khomeini in Iran was able to create a tactic alliance between middle-class bazar merchants and the lower class, hence he successfully carried out a revolution. Islamism has one definite trait, its non-commitment to any certain way of acquiring power, Islamists are always open to opportunities, Islamists used crude military power in Afghanistan, a military coup in Sudan, a popular revolution in Iran, and democratic elections in turkey but this trait also made Islamism prone to it being exploited as a political tool by both global and Muslim powers to tap certain grievances for their own domestic or global policy motives.

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THE TRADITION OF *ATTAN* IN PAKISTAN, C. 1947-2020

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ABSTRACT

The ethnographic encounter examines how *Attan* a form of Pashtun traditional dance has been understood in Pakistani history. The paper at first generally analyses the cultural history of the Pashtun traditional dance in the Pashto literature. It inspects the explanations upon which the historians have built-in their narrative of *Attan* as a 'practice' or 'ritual' in past and then categorised it as an integral part of today's Pashtun 'culture'. Secondly, it discusses how *Attan* culture can provide an avenue of socialising space when Pashtuns living in far-flung regions of Pakistan get together at one place focusing to promote a single ethnic 'identity'. This study aims to offer insight based on qualitative research methods, including, participant observation, in-depth telephonic interviews, personal communications, retrieving online videos, and informal visits to archival sites i.e. Lok Virsa Islamabad and Pashto academy in Peshawar. Thirdly, it asks that if it does unite Pashtuns as it did in the past, how has the meaning of the performance has changed (and continues to change) in Pakistan over time and in different socio-political contexts. It is today asserting "social control" or "social order" facing contemporary challenges in Pakistan. The study passes to the conclusion that *Milli Attan* is indispensable in influencing Pashtun sentiments of national brotherhood in the socio-political context of Pakistan.

Key Words

Practice; Ritual; *Attan*; Ethnicity; Social control; Identity

The colourful practice of *Attan* has not reached all along to the Pashtun's society in its ready-made form, what we spectate today in Pakistan, but it has a long past contingent to ancient religious rituals and conventions linked to historic military warfare. *Attan* has originated from ancient religious rituals of Aryans (it is of no surprise that in ancient people danced to their gods to attain purification or expiate any misdeeds) or from martial exercises of Greeks when the soldiers used to drill before going to confront the enemies. Such moves when we study in Greek's wars are in resemblance to the body movement of Pashtun dance, practiced in the regions of tribal areas of Pakistan and also in close vicinity to the mountains of Afghanistan.

When we try to understand dance history from written shreds of evidence then Dost M. Khan had also appealed for the origin of dance that is traced from the religious books of Tawrah and the Bible. He says the examples of dance could be found whether we take old civilizations of Bani Israel, Babylon, Gupta, or from Egypt, all they either danced for religious purposes or entertainment. Hence, this activity resided in societies of non-religious and religious both. The holy book of Tawrah has preserved the story of worshippers in the period of Hazrat Daud, who used to dance to praise their god.[1] In turn, Sadiq Rashteen, had also made his views and interpreted the story of Aryans and their religious rituals he thought such muffled story could be discerning to extract the first reference of dance.[2] From these explanations, one can reckon that historians have yet seldom traced the factual history of *Attan.* Nonetheless, these assertions could not be over rightly called as 'deviation' from genuine history because historians have alluded that even if they have failed to discover the history of *Attan*, it is patently true that there has hardly ever existed written history to them in this regard. Despite the fact, we find no national testimonies to the history of *Attan* but we are assured from other historical sources (that accounts for the socio-political past of tribal areas) that Pashtun people had been very religious and were too often engaged in wars, then based on this history we can assume that *Attan* may have derived from religious rituals or martial exercises. Today, we can decide that *Attan* reveals these approaches in terms of its symbolical means when few regions in the south-west of the country are still interested in dancing (In trance like-state) around the bonfire, not with the intentions being tied to that particular religion but to reinstate *Attan* as a very old ancient practice. Secondly, as far as *Attan* is concerned as a warlike dance, this general understanding becomes reality because exercises remained in correspondence to warriors before they were inducted in battlefields to achieve high morale for them.

However, we could find historical references to *Attan* and several historians who have devoted their work as such unveiling the antiquity of *Attan* but its application of cultural realm is rarely debated especially in the colonial and post-colonial period under the grand studies of psychoanalysis, sociology, anthropology, ethnography, and science. Hence, to grasp new developments to *the Attan* tradition, I have connected modern-day theoretical studies appertaining to various cultural dances that mainly prevailed in the western world.

Can *Attan* or any other dance be regarded as the unique cultural identity of any ethnic group? To concern, such questions of dance cultures, newly established discipline of the twentieth century, the so-called "Dance anthropology" came to being with frequently initiated dance studies. Susan A Reed viewed these advancements in anthropology and dance studies as significantly contributing to making us understand the culture in-depth and to analyze the body movements as a form of expression, making identities of aesthetic practices and politicising cultural norms.[3] Dancing bodies are so often related to 'power' 'ethnicity', 'identity', and 'resistance', upon which any particular group integrates and classifies their selves from 'other'. These perceptions were contemporarily adopted by writers such as AP. Royce, JL. Hanna, Stanley Brandes, Pallabi Chakravorty, and Sofia Kalogeropoulou. Socially dancing for the sake to articulate exclusive identity is very much helpful because identity and history are relatable and have been connected in much extensive way, as people produce it and then subsequently embody/carry it all through their lives.

To what extent, can *Attan* possibly offer an avenue to the concerned Pashtun community so could they articulate their particular identity within a country like Pakistan? is another theme of the discussion. Before I bring you the mentioned discussion, it is of utmost importance to survey the cultural policy of Pakistan and how exactly the newly independent country had ensured accommodation of dissimilar ethnic groups within the larger group, the so-called 'nation'. Sibte Hassan (1916-1986), a political activist and socialist scholar has explicated the elite culture and its essence in Pakistani society that is widely promoted. Even though, Pakistan was a pluralistic society but has restricted the ethnocultural voice at the state level and consolidated unitary policies via religious bonds and concerns.

Hassan himself witnessed and participated in cultural seminars convened in various governments, he argues they were engineered religious principles and no place was left for music, dance, etc. because these enjoyments were not aligned to two-nation theory and these arts had a glimpse of Hindustani culture too.[4] Hence, to achieve the support of every ethnicity and to exterminate the regional differences or previously attached 'Hindustani' characteristics from the land of Muslims,

implying religious role certainly seemed helpful in the initial stages of Pakistan but unleashed religion had effectively suffocated the freedom for observing cultural practices in later years. There are varieties of cultures constituted of distinctive modes of living standards in Pakistan and these regions are spiritually bound to each other. Although, on a national level there is no satisfying culture that might have been achieved after blending the multifarious cultures.[5] Unfortunately, in the case of Pakistan, one can't even ponder what culture the citizens are supposed to represent when they are out of the country.

The question of how far the culture of *Attan* can reflect the nationalist spirit and invoke identity to its practitioners and the extent *Attan* might express symbolical nationalism and strong sentiments of national brotherhood are chiefly addressed. Performing *Milli Attan* (Pashtun national dance) in Pakistan, as primarily a part of a valuable Pashtun culture is concurrently playing role in harmonizing or propagating national brotherhood in socio-political context and necessarily be held as a center over which Pashtuns dispersed in distant are amalgamated. It is today stressing "social control" or "social order" facing contemporary challenges in Pakistan. While considering the phenomenon of "social order" and "social control" in connection with *Attan*, it seems the performance is reflecting both aspects, on the one hand, creating 'solidarity' within the participants and on the other hand raising voice against the opponent violent groups. Moreover, in Pakistan, we would find that Attan has subsisted in many forms and variations to different tribes and is still preserved in particular (these specific variations are usually distributed based on geography instead of tribal identities) but these differences are in general reduced to a single narrative when all they are exposed to each other at the national level.

METHODOLOGY: ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY

I situate my research as an ethnographic study fixed on studying specific dance of *Attan* belonging to a particular community of Pashtuns. To examine the Pashtun's dance tradition or *Attan* I have engaged extant written sources and especially the oral information I got from the local informants. Many of the works I have used have been written by amateur historians and scholars studying Pashtun culture. This study aims to offer an insight based on qualitative research methods, including in-depth telephonic interviews, personal communications, retrieving videos and newspaper articles from online websites, and informal visits to archival sites i.e. Lok Virsa Islamabad and Pashto academy in Peshawar. Furthermore, to see how gradually the meanings are crystalized to *Attan* in different historical periods of Pakistan, I have applied a descriptive and chronological approach to my research

study that spans dissimilar regimes in Pakistan, that includes General Ayub Khan (1958-1969), Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1973-1977), General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988), General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). Furthermore, to comprehend contemporary developments in *Attan* tradition I have engaged recent events where *Attan* has encountered religious pressure groups but despite being attempted by these groups to target Pashtun culture, it has shown adverse results when we see *Attan* has been asserting ways to unite and raising Pashtun nationalism.

DEBATING *ATTAN* AS A TRADITIONAL PERFORMANCE OF PAST

A theologian writer, Ibn al-Hajj claims that the beginning of dance is merely from the time of *Samiri* people who had led astray from Moses. Samiri, a magician created a golden calf where people had roamed around and danced. From this calf, a strange sound echoed and people trusted his fake religion. The next day Moses accompanying his followers to visit the camp were traumatised, seeing people gathered before the calf and offer worships in the form of dancing[6]. Niaz Fatehpuri had notified useful reference to religious dance a day was specified for religious dancing when their ancestors would dance for the exaltation of deities and no other work was allowed in it.[7] However, referring to such rituals and detailing past dances where it was retained as the chief activity is likely to make suggestions that *Attan* might have existed as the religious ritual before the coming of Islam. Although, historians don't surely claim *Attan* had occurred as a religious ritual; they have also never denied that it was precisely a religious activity.

In relevance to these aforementioned positions to dance origin; it is essential here to historicize the *Attan* culture of Pashtuns. Many scholars, poets, researchers, historians, and local informants (who have received *Attan* history in traditional verbal form) have alluded that *Attan* came to the Pashtun society from ancient religious rituals or had been influenced by martial exercises of Greek. Jamal Uddin Afghani (1838-1897), Sadeiq ullah Rashteen, Khair Mohammad Arif, Wali Mohammad Khan, Siyal Kakar (recipient of the Tamgha-i-Imtaiz Pashtu literature), and others have taken these influences as more or less correct and having historical attachments to *Attan*.

Arif had forenamed Homer (who is said to have initially authored two epic poems, Iliad and the Odyssey, that later became the central works of ancient Greek literature), defining the history of *Attan* as actually materialized from Greek and traditionally considered as the most ancient form of entertainment performed in every occasion. Especially, Spartans were deeply fond of it and its learning to every

Spartan man was a common practice. Their children were admired to follow the steps of Martial or combative-like dances so they could be trained before they would crush the enemy to their hands.[8] Since many scholars like Arif have concluded that *Attan* is influenced by such instances of military practices, though, they are not sure either it could be from Greeks or Aryans but they are tended to define the history of *Attan* alike.

Amin Khan presumes that if we peruse the history of Pashtuns in regards to dance, then we might not discover any national testimonies that may clarify the exact date of its derivation or find how *Attan* had penetrated in Pashtun society. Nevertheless, we are certainly sure of Pashtuns' past that they were often engaged in warfare and had always stood unitedly against their enemies. Hence, in this particular situation, we are also sure enough that *Dhol* or beating drum was the only way through which tribal people used to get together and then would march towards the battlefield. This is what Amin incited that it was the beginning of the traditional dance or *Attan*.[9] Abdul Jamil Mandokhail, a well-informed elderly person, anticipates *Attan* as something associated with 'practice', and in historical cases, it was done before the commencing of war. Similarly, he added that today the traditional dance appears as the resurrection of preceding old customs of war, when a performer lays one of his hand to defend himself and with the change of tone of *Dhol* he turns his body immediately, allowing the other hand to strike the enemy.[10] Considering *Attan* being a 'practice' is another aspect that is widely appreciated by historians because it bears semblance to the current image of *Attan*.

As I have said that we seek a couple of historical references to *Attan* whether they are sometimes attributed to religious rituals or for the sake of entertainment. In respect to religious rituals, it is of no surprise that in ancient people danced to their gods in a position to attain purification or expiate any misdeeds. Moreover, from present-day historical sources, it seems like Aryans were also accustomed to dancing rituals, and Pashtuns might have inherited these practices but in a more advanced form.[11] In addition to these historical references for *Attan,* I feel essential here to mention my interviewee from Zhob, he alluded to one of his answers to my question, that Zoroastrians who were living in parts of ancient India, had also made orientations to dance from whom Pashtuns have taken over this tradition. According to him, these Zoroastrians have stated such moves in their holy scriptures of Avesta also what we see today in the shape of *Attan*. And he further says that they would set fire to worship their god and then move around the fire in a circle making odd voices as being part of their religious rituals. Though, we find no references to such *Attan* on large scale but surprisingly, still to this date we may

find Pashtun youth in locality experiencing these religious rituals for the sake of entertainment.[12]

In the end, we can evaluate that history aimed at *Attan* either from local informants or historians, including, Jamal Uddin Afghani (1901), Sadeiq Ullah Rashteen (1945), Dost M. Dost, Khair Mohammad Arif (2005), Khathir Ghaznavi, Syed Anwar ul Haq Jilani (1945), latif Jan (2002), Ahmed Shah (2015), and Habib ullah Rafi (2018), have sketched out from prehistoric period. For instance, historicizing *Attan* to such an extent is ultimately to inflate the significance of *Attan* performed today. Eric Hobsbawm, a famous British Historian, had made a deliberate attempt to depict how traditions are invented? And specifically, the formation of any 'national' tradition, where things are borrowed from the accumulated collection of the respective society. History of traditions and customary arts (e.g. folktales, rituals, performances, etc.) are all borrowed from historical sources to legitimize the existing tradition. According to Hobsbawm, there seldom exists any tradition that could be exactly traced to particular ancient practice rather, traditions are only the creations of new regimes.[13]

Therefore, to every society, the historical continuity of the past matters a lot, and this invention of antiquity gave them the space to live in parallel to other distinctive societies. It doesn't mean that I am questioning the originality of *Attan* tradition but the thing I am trying to inculcate if Historians have synchronized the *Attan* tradition with the Vedic period, Aryans, and Greeks is necessarily to indicate to the readers that *Attan* has a huge past and getting over it is something impossible. In the same way, religion is also always tried by historians to be connected with *Attan* so it may then give an imprint of the distant past. According to Habibullah Kakar "though, culturally secular in its nature, *Attan* is performed around the fire in Sanzarkhail tribe (sub-branch of Kakar), the *Attan* seems to be strengthening the arguments of its Zoroastrian origin."[14] Hence, by finding any performance in history that draws the spitting image of today's *Attan* then historians would write in a manner, showing clear coordination between the past event and today's *Attan*.

ANALYSING THE CONCEPT OF *MILLI ATTAN* IN CULTURAL STUDIES

After the 1980s, the anthropological advancement in this particular sub-branch of dance made things easy for historians to comprehend the relationship between politics of dance, performances, culture, and ethnicities in a historical context. For example, a renowned dancer and Anthropologist, Joann Kealiinohomoku wrote her inspiring piece, concerning "ballet as an ethnic form of dance".[15]Other such researchers, including Stanley Brandes an anthropologist who has studied the

culture of dance in Spain, and twenty-first-century Sofia Kalogeropoulou, whose research emphasizes dancing in Greece and the national identity. However, as *Attan* could also be studied in reminiscence to the foregrounded cultural studies but it is rarely discussed by the historians in this particular context.

According to Susan A. Reed, This new dance scholarship has made significant contributions to our understanding of culture, movement and the body; the expression and construction of identities; the politics of culture; reception and spectatorship; aesthetics; and ritual practice."[16] According to Kaeppler, it was in 1960 when a tremendous work of Prokosch Kurath published within the course title of "current anthropology" helped to inaugurate ethnographic studies of dance to be added as a separate branch of anthropology.[17] Even kaeppler proposed anthropologists to take serious consideration in dance because they are the created cultures and are the most important entities of any given group. Dance may provide information relating to deep structures and social relations existing within society.[18]

To this discussion, we can inculcate that Franz Boas (1858-1942) who is also known as the "father of American anthropology", subsequently initiated dance to be studied as a culture instead of using it as the data for the sake of generalization. He argued that dance is to be examined as a part of any culture and every particular culture owns its unique dance. Therefore, it should not be judged as a kind of universal language like others who attempted to understand art cross-culturally without considering any dance in its contextual (cultural) background. Boas stated that similar patterns of dance are found in widely separated and unrelated areas. Each culture, however, has a unique configuration of dance characteristics for movement patterns, styles, dynamics, value, and of dance which are distinguished when comparing dances from one culture with those of another. Moreover, it was not over rightly to reject the resemblance that may exist between dances belonging to far regions. Take an example of Pashtun *Attan* and compare it to the other traditional dances of Pakistan. The common features we will discern would be like all these dances are carried in open space, representing any kind of cultural values or exhibiting the emotions, a large group of people has adhered to the activity, music is always accompanied to it, musical drums or other instruments are used and many other similarities could be drawn but there are significant differences as well. These differences generally are more conspicuous if viewed in the close context of cultural meanings when the performances are carried out. Secondly, the meanings of *Attan* is varying depending on the environment it is performed, for example, even *Attan* contemporarily is used as a symbol of peace and a tool to fight extremism in Pakistan is another side of culture.

Early social anthropologists who have designated dance that can carry social functions, included American German- anthropologist, Franz Uri Boas (1858-1942), father of social anthropology Bronislaw Malinwoski (1884-1942), Pritchard (1902-1973), and Radcliff Brown (1881-1955) who are considered the first to confer many features to dance which influenced the coming discourse of future scholars. Evans Pritchard, an English professor of a social anthropologist, had alluded that ethnology seldom takes dance into the social realm or in the context of native's life rather, has been limited to mere functions where we only see it as the movement but not imaging it as possessing social importance too. *Attan* like other tribal dances where several people involve to participate and that can convey to the audience of its great social values. Pritchard's fieldwork based in Africa suggests that this activity had been determining unity within the community where "these people were bounded to each other based on some kind of social ties such as those created by blood-brotherhood, marriages and other associations".[19] And participants in dance felt harmony for their fellow members because they owe allegiance to the same community or tribe. When we take *Attan* as the traditional dance of Pashtuns, it does not only entail the rhythmic movements but reminds every performer of the sense of "harmony" that exists between them. This very character of *Attan* or within the traditional dances (such as Bhangra, Jumar, Hojamalo, Balochi Chap) of other ethnicities of Pakistan, differentiates and prevents the mixing of groups into one.

Attan is usually to induce harmony in the society of Pashtuns if it is performed individually then it would mark no real significance. Dance is a mean of the medium through which you can bring a lot of changes as well. Addressing any social issue via traditional folk dances is something today the Pashtun youth are interested in and if it is not unitedly supported then it obviously would have neither any cultural importance nor, perpetuate to achieve any sought of social change in the society. I am saying it would be left as a cultural tradition because culture itself is the basic mean by which any community finds possibilities rather than being stuck to face mere difficulties. Dance is even discussed by biologists saying it is certainly performed by bees, birds, fish, etc. Although, they do it individually. But as far as dance in human life is concerned, 'group' of people particularly takes participation for what it turns out to be social behaviour and this perspective of dance has been brought in the studies of anthropology to a large extent.

Attan can also play this specific role in managing to unite the Pashtun ethnic group scattered in a far-flung region of Pakistan. secondly, as I have said earlier if *Milli Attan* (national dance) is normally accommodating every Pashtun within the state boundaries of Pakistan and even surpassing other such artificial obstacles.

Concerning these developments to *Attan*, I asked my interviewee (anonymous) belonging to Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan, what be your take on this? if Pashtuns could articulate their identity in Pakistan based on other supplementary solutions instead of *Attan* practice. He responded that Pashtuns are living in minority in Pakistan hence, the practice of cultural *Attan,* is certainly the easiest way to manifest identity for Pashtuns. Secondly, it also inculcates the soft image of Pashtuns in Pakistan. Meanwhile, if Pashtuns would have been doing it by running Tehreeks and other movements to sort out their exclusive identity in the country, it might have affected the overall image of the ethnic group of Pashtuns.

EXPLORING *ATTAN* IN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PAKISTAN

The ongoing portion of the paper explicitly discusses what were the political debates that took place at first to shape cultural policy for Pakistan? secondly, concerning this policy of the state, where was *Attan* culture accommodated in the historical perspective of Pakistan or how *Attan* being the culture of the Pashtun belt in Baluchistan and the northwest regions have developed simultaneously with all other ethnic cultures and to the extent, it is promoted at the state level? Thirdly, the foregoing part will also address the hostile effects on *Attan* culture when the state's government had aided religious groups either to accomplish foreign interests or to legitimize their regimes in the name of Islamization.

Similar to all other newly independent states, Pakistan also got freedom from British colonial administration and primarily went for the creation of national culture and identity. This very act of producing a new identity for the people of Pakistan meanwhile, after 1947 was no less challenging because of the huge diversity that existed in the regions, and setting the nation free from the previous *Hindustani* or Indian identity was indispensably problem for the new government to stand against it.[20]

To socially unite the nation, performances were retained by the newly independent countries i.e. India and Pakistan, after the process of decolonization. The reason for these aesthetic performances, according to Jisha Menon "was acquired for the cognitive ideas of the imagined communities… and the centrality of performance was considered the tactic for political power"[21] (in the post-colonial world). If Benedict Anderson, a well-known political scientist, and historian, is considering "print capitalism" as the prime reason for the establishing "imagined communities",[22] then Menon is concerning the new method of performances in public spaces that forges new nationalism and helps in the construction of embodied citizenship or ideologies for those who love spectating material symbols of flags, anthems and unique uniforms for their national military.[23]

Menon explicated the 'mimetic' presentation (see the description in the book) at zero points, the Waqah border where two cities of Amritsar and Lahore are separated between the states' government of the respective countries of India and Pakistan. Besides, how there the performing soldiers of both countries from the period of 1960s to this date are constituting nationalist subjects of nationalism on an everyday basis. Hence, she had argued that "Linking action to virtue, mimesis oscillates between aesthetic practice and subject formation".[24] The focus of Menon is simply to deconstruct the performing activities that are metaphorically happening at the border and at the same time producing two different realms of "state making" and also executing the "high politics" of the partition. These ceremonies are aesthetical in a sense not just observers come in terms of enjoying the views but they feel the nationalism spectating it with others who shares the same citizenship. Secondly, these spectacular ceremonies are attended routinely by a range of people across the borders because it articulates the state power and to depict as well to what extent these two countries are adversaries to each other.[25]

But appropriating the national identity, Pakistan has not only relied upon such performances but the embedment of religious conception in citizens has got much predilection. Thus, the government of Pakistan sought for legitimizing its laws and authority based on 'Islamic principles'. Secondly, the very common question these Asiatic and African states faced was of fulfilling the lacuna existing between the people belonging to different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. In doing so, the state of Pakistan was encompassing diversity without any proper national cohesion and bonds within the different proportion of people, despite having the same religious entity that every citizen carried. Though, to provide their citizens with the national identity and define the national culture, establishment and in alliance with civil bureaucracy had dominated the government of Pakistan after the unfortunate death of quid e Azam M. Ali Jinnah (before he could plan coherent religious, cultural, social and political policies).

Islamic ideas had been employed to win the support of diversity to make Pakistani identity deeply defined on religious fundamentals instead of propagating unique cultures belonging to separate provinces. It was religious adherence of every individual in Pakistan by which a satisfying degree of national integration was achieved, not by social or cultural bonds rather, every four provinces of West Pakistan and constituted its language, values, norms, and traditions. Pakistani society is 'imagined'. It is imagined in a sense that on a structural basis it seems every particular culture is enabled to their observers to practice though, the actuality on the ground is deviating. Instead, Gulshan Majeed has instilled in his readers' minds that new states of Asia and Africa are having different dynamics to

that of European countries because their unification took place in conformity with common cultures and languages. Rupert Emerson (quoted by Majeed) has designated these Asian and African states as "are not yet nations in being but only nations in hope".[26]

Hereby, I am not insisting or opposed to why religion is appropriated to integrate regional or ethnic differences? but the matter of fact is why religion is used to replace cultures in Pakistan? Addressing this question needs to be contemplated seriously because every nation around the globe is identified by its' own culture, (see English, Francis, Chinese, Japanese, and others) then why so Pakistan is facing impediments in this regards? If Pakistani culture is all about religion, then what for regional cultures are? Do they are only resisting the state's center? or could we term these regional cultures as sociologically be "nationalities", respectively?

Dr. G. A. Allana writes "Pakistanis also desire to be identified by their culture when they are outride Pakistan. The national culture of Pakistan can have some features in common with all regional cultures so that on the national level the cultural spirit of various regions could form a bouquet in which flowers of different colours come together to present a multi-coloured unity".[27] Dr.Jamil Jalibi expedited the discussion when he glimpses that 'there is no such culture that could represent the national culture of Pakistan rather, the regional cultures are separate in their own and no deep spiritual bonds exists in between them".[28] However, if these cultures were accommodated to one unit it may have formed a multi-coloured unity and this unity would survive permanently. To further make it possible, Pakistani culture should be the name of mixed regional cultures or subcultures in the north of Pakistan because restraining anyone (these five typical cultures are namely Sindhi, Balochi, Pashtuns, Punjabi and of norther regions) out of national culture would carry threatening consequences.[29]

DEBATING THE CULTURAL POLICY OF PAKISTAN IN LIGHT OF DIFFERENT RULING PERIODS

Sibti Hassan, an eminent scholar of Pakistan, writes that he took participation when the policy of culture was debated during the three most important ruling periods of Pakistan, as mentioned, in governments of general Ayyub Khan (1958-1969), Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1973-1977), and general Zia ul Haq (1978-88). Hassan assumed that there were two opposing groups, one of which positioned that Pakistan is a "cultural unit" based on the same religious principles. This group suggested that religion has been the force of amalgamation between the diversity of Pakistan and were strong proponents of the "two-nation theory".

AYUB KHAN (1958-1969)

The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital… The concentration of the different species of capital leads indeed to the emergence of a specific, properly statist capital which enables the state to exercise power over the different fields and the different particular species of capital.[30]

In the words of Pierre Bourdieu, state elites control every kind of capital to counterbalance the other resisting powers within the country of Pakistan. This dominant position of the state in Pakistan was to impose a single culture with a single language of Urdu.

The implementation of the 'one-unit policy' was a conspicuous act that perpetuated in the period of Ayub khan. By this very policy, it emerged all four provinces of West Pakistan into one political unit in fear that the majority of East Pakistan may get hold of the political dominion. According to Ian Talbot, consequently, by these measures of Ayub khan, the government faced strong bitterness in the shape of strong nationalist movements in Baluchistan, Sindh, and NWFP who called for separation from Pakistan.[31] Tariq Rehman added that it was the period of Ayub when different ethnic groups "were born with fixed identities and this was the reason why the Punjabis, Pathans, Sindhis, and Balochis could not become modern enough to identify with Pakistan as a whole".[32]

Nonetheless, many people still believe that the formation of cultural art academies like Lok Virsa and PNCA (Pakistan national council of arts) was the bold step initiated by Ayub under the auspices of UNESCO. Such claims are noticeable in the publications of PNCA in 2007. Moreover, Naeem Tahir, former head of the PNCA, defines the era of Ayub as a "moderate one" where he implies that the culture of Pakistan is represented in this period.[33] But he forgets that what was then the culture that was represented abroad? was it (Pakistani culture) incorporated of all the regional cultures and traditions to specify the Pakistani culture? Or if the art of dance and music was only supported at the state level for the sake of "cultural diplomacy"?

ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO (1973-1977)

It was not until the premiership of Bhutto when the national institutes for regional promotion of cultures, were initially established. Though the publications of PNCA under the authoritarian regime of Pervez Musharraf, hardly tolerates the credit for democratic governments the reality speaks louder. Sadia Toor proposes pieces of

evidence to this authenticity, saying Faiz Ahmed Faiz, a progressive poet, and journalist from the left-wing was the main actor who participated to reproduce the Pakistani culture that would include all voices from disparate provinces. Toor further judges that "in the late 1960s, Faiz accepted the invitation to chair the government Commission on Culture and the Arts. His report was unfortunately submitted at the same time as the popular agitation against Ayub Khan reached its climax, and was thus temporarily shelved; however, it formed the blueprint for Pakistan cultural policy under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s".[34]

Faiz was of the view that Islamic culture must prevail in the society of Pakistan so could they make relations to other Islamic countries but he did make his point reiterating, religion is not everything but we should coach our own Pakistani culture to maintain the diversity peacefully.[35] and Pakistan, he says, "is the name for geography, not the faith".[36] Faiz remarks as "national culture" could not be bestowed from 'above' like what Bourdieu has exposed, but it needs an unwavering process of discussion where people belonging to different groups shall be seated to make the culture for Pakistan and these groups have also struggled for the making of Pakistan state.[37] Moreover, it is certainly tested that if the socio-political background of any state becomes strongly stable then cultural interdisciplinary fusion is deemed possible. But the coming years in Pakistani politics faced instability. Zia ul Haq imposed martial law and thwarted cultural institutions in the name of religion hence, he could make strong his political interests.

ZIA UL HAQ (1977-1988)

Major General Zia ul Haq attacked the democratic government of Bhutto and arose to rule Pakistan, after his successful coup d'état in 1977. He presented a conservative mind when his government decided to censor every cultural show, especially those which were expansively related to dancing and music. For example, the institutions that remained for promoting regional cultures (Lok Virsa and PNCA), were also faced with scanty funds and even too paralyzed to function.

To make his government legitimate, he aligned religious extremist groups and political parties such as Jammat e Islami (JI). Religious political parties that were led free-handed in the Zia regime had extremely swayed state institution, for instance, educational sectors have not been spared even so. However, to this date, the impact of the mentioned alliance has been sustained in universities and other social institutions, where we can see how cultural dances, specifically, *Attan* have been attacked. Today, Jamil Mandokhail anticipates these former events, saying, "I with other Pashtun friends used to do the *Attan* on every occasion and it was too common for every individual Pashtun rather, we would carry it in the holy month of

Ramzan (fasting) without any fear. But by the coming of Zia in Pakistan and subsequent *Inqilab* (Saur revolution in Afghanistan) in the 1970s and 80s, it vigorously changed the dynamic of peace in Pashtun areas and the *Jamiat* people had been so active in every street of the region, even they never hesitated from banning music shops to labeling traditional *Attan* as 'un-Islamic'".[38]

M. Qadeer, who has provided the first cultural survey of Pakistan in English, says, restricting dance as well as music in the public sphere and inducing shrines, Madrassahs, and Islamic institutions in urban areas are paradoxical because "private life was secularized and the retreat of arts, music, and dancing from public space was certainly to Islamize the country for self-interest and legitimization of government".[39] According to Qureshi, 'this historical period of Pakistan during the rule of Zia is marked by political Islamization and that had vast bearings over the traditional arts in state media via "extensive patronage of religious genres" and the Quranic recitations derived from Arab regions were mainly instilled to national T.V programs.[40] Consequently, no space left for classical dances in Pakistan compelled artists to flee the country and take exile in other parts of the world. Dancers, who were expertise in *Kathak* and *Bharatha natayum* were out-screened as they couldn't deem to the new policy of Zia. This group involved Naheed Siddique who has been to England for the period until the socio-political stability has revived in Pakistan. other famous dancers (including Sheema Kermani, Nighat Chaundary, and Tehreema Mitha) who did not desire to go to foreign countries, had been acting out only at private residences.[41]

Sheema Kermani writes that during the rule of Zia, the first PTV dance Program that was disbanded, called *Payal* and all that Zia tried to copy the Middle-East's politics as well as culture. To Islamize the society of Pakistan, he called dance an un-Islamic thing, and if performed by women at stages then it was sensed as anti-state. Thus, Kermani condemns these measures in the following words, "the state introduced legal and social forms of control over women as part of its campaign of suppression and made women's sexuality and morality the business of the state".[42]

Iftikhar Haider Malik pointed out, although, "the vocalization of religious hymns such as *Hamad* (poem praising God), *Na'at* (composition praising the Holy Prophet) and the *Qawalli* music became more pronounced under a military regime which propounded a literalist vision of Islam and frowned upon all other forms of visual and recreational art" but the traditional dances (like *Attan*) in rural areas prevailed in the wedding ceremonies and people were pleased of such entertainments.[43] From the mentioned research of Malik, we can reckon that *Attan* is an 'embodied' or 'embedded' culture where it could not be easily concealed from its practitioners by just ascribing it as an un-Islamic thing rather, it's long been integral to Pashtun

society in parallel to existing religious believes as well. Ghulam Qadir Khan Daur ascertains this perspective of Pashtun people by saying that "the tribesmen adore their religion and they love *Pukhtunwali*...They never miss a prayer and they never miss *Attan*".[44] Historically, in Pakistan, various unfortunate events have taken place where *Attan* culture of Pashtuns was consecutively targeted but could not succeed, respectively.

ATTAN OVERRULED BY TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN

When in the 1970s Russians invaded Afghanistan and Pakistan established a "patron-client" relationship with the US to pushback communists from afghan lands, then inter-services intelligence agency of Pakistan (ISI) with the foreign support from Central intelligence Agency (CIA), recruited and trained tribal people for this cause. And religion was used as a bargaining chip to motivate these Islam-loving people and the soviets were labeled as *Sor Kafir* (red infidels) and on the contrary US ally was referred by compliments calling them 'good infidels'. Nonetheless, to make this war the war of tribal people alongside these *Sor kafirs*, the state used other techniques of indoctrinating extremist ideas into the region or even glorified the martyrdom of Taliban during the Afghan War via T.V channels to propagate. Henceforth, performing *Attan*, and observing other cultural arts became irreligious things in the region.[45]

After evacuating the Red army out of Afghanistan "then a vacuum was produced which was occupied by the Taliban and many Taliban from the Pakistani tribal areas joined them. These events orchestrated a very fertile breeding ground for a violent conflict in the region". Subsequently, the Attack of 9/11 further made the land of Pashtuns in Pakistan a haven for the Taliban who would cross the border with ease. However, for this time Pakistan state government once again became a forward ally of the US in the "war against terror" but with new plans targeting the same Taliban who was previously used against the Russians. And equally, the Taliban who had been previously fighting for the US, now roared on Americans to leave the lands of Afghanistan, and slogans such as "go America go from Muslim land of Afghanistan" usurped the socio-political landscape among the local communities of Pakistan.

Beside these consequences caused by the state policy and complaints of the Pashtun community over the usage of these particular areas for strategic depth, Surat khan, a Pakistani research scholar, opined that seeing the recent surveys in regards to present militants in tribal areas, it seems like religious extremists are hereafter leading the Pashtun nationalism. Despite these misleading perceptions, Pakistani media and a few scholars who are themselves unaware of historical

events, have been publicizing false history and that is degrading the image of overall Pashtuns in terms of stereotyping and suspecting them with the discourse of terrorism is ultimately condemnable.[46]

As I have aforesaid, After the tragedy of 9/11, when religious militants took over the tribal regions of then FATA (federally administered tribal areas) and especially, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, they had left considerable impacts over the traditions of Pashtuns and continued with the extremist plan attacking native socio-cultural institutions. The *Jihadist* movement that swayed over the Pak-Afghan Pashtun regions, Shaheen Buneri writes, they attempted to indoctrinate "hatred over love, censorship overexpression and death over life, and thus tried to destroy cultural spaces in the Pashtun society. To enforce Islam in its puritan form, the centuries-old cultural heritage and the values attached to it were considered a heretic and opposed to the injunctions of Islam".[47] In 2008, in Swat only, during this tense scenario, a great number of musicians and dancers were badly murdered and even impelled to migrate from their home towns because the leadership of Taliban openly named them as *Satan*, who is accountable and having hands in the moral degradation of the Pashtun society.[48]

Particularly, in South Waziristan, a traditional dance that was known for both genders (male and female participators), "*Baragai Attan"* had been stereotyped by emerging Talibanization. The *Attan,* once upon a time, being part of the *Waziri* (Pashtun who lives in Waziristan) culture was presented by both men and women who would sing songs or "*tapas"* in rhythm to the beaten *Dhol.*[49] But this beautiful image of Pashtun society started vanishing with the dominating Taliban who gradually took the region under their thumb. However, *Barangai Attan* has been revived after the decline of the Taliban in the region but it has lost the features once it had been accompanying. Saima Wazir, an old woman from the Wazir tribe, recalls the Attan in the following words "It was considered an honour to participate in such a gathering" (consisting both male and female).[50] But today, Saima says, "only the men can participate, though, it is still publicly existing".[51]

According to Shaheen Buneri, "the Pashtun culture of peace having being exposed to militancy, drugs, and nikov are the consequences we bear because of Afghan Jihad movement".[52] Although, the government of Pakistan exclusively supported it the impression it had over the image of Pashtuns, was even more dangerous in the result, if compared to what British discriminatory policies were aimed in the colonial period. To know the local perceptions of how these past events have infected the tribal areas, I asked one of my fellows in this respect from Waziristan. I am quoting him as it is, "After 9/11, The concentration of extremist thoughts and terrorist institutions on the name of madrassas had been a giant issue

that indirectly exploited the culture of tribal regions, where *Attan* and *Dhol* were like in the top of the priority list to be eroded so and what they got in the end by doing it? nothing as such" (male, 24, pers. comm.). Moreover, from this mentioned discussion we can reckon out how badly these peace-loving people were pulled in foreign wars and now the result is like religious institutions are named suspiciously by the newer generation because the so-called Madrassah's had been previously used for state activities.[53]

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO *ATTAN* IN PAKISTAN

As I have pointed at the start of the chapter, the culture of Pashtun was not only unprotected to the Jihadi movement but it has been hitherto facing other such difficulties from religious pressure groups also. During the reckless regime of Zia, the intruded jihadi culture nonetheless, had excessively dwindled the growth of diverse cultures and especially, that of Pashtuns' regions. In addition to the coming short-lived democratic governments in the 1990s and the politically convoluted situation, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto did not provide proper attention to their cultural policies or seldom they could do so because cultural arrangement had lost momentum and the yearly old built-in image couldn't be fixed at once.

However, it was during the period of General Musharraf, when he determined to reshape the diverse culture of Pakistan. On 24th January 2005, he was recorded saying, that he had sensed the immediate need of promoting diverse Pakistani culture and art to planning a softer image of the country.[54] Hence, he aligned with the US-led government to fight the "war against terror" and the national cultural heritage institutions like PNCA were revitalized with the funds he received from foreign countries (Lok Virsa had been run through UNESCO's capital). According to Rathnam Indurthy, 'General Musharraf wanted to transform the dark sided image of Pakistan into a moderate, tolerant, and progressive Islamic state, (in resemblance to the policies of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey) and liberate Pakistan of its jihadi culture but the reality on the ground seemed otherwise to the results what he had promised in his presidential addresses.[55]Despite General Musharraf 's efforts for the promotion of regional cultures but he had failed to rid Pakistan from extremism. Because ever since from the time of Zia, the religious groups have taken hold of public sectors (including educational institutions) and are targeting the traditional activities but none of the government to date, including that of Musharraf, have prevented such religious organizations from criminal activities.

On 21 March 2017, an organisation of Pashtun students (that proclaims itself a non-political organization) known as Pashtun Education Development Movement (PEDM), hosted a program at Punjab University in Lahore. This event was arranged

for the student's invitees to perform *Attan* in the ancient old festival called *Jashan e Nauruz* (The festival is exclusively attached to a Pashtun culture where the season of spring is celebrated). But the Islami Jamiat e Talba (IJT), the student organisation of the mother party, Jammat e Islami, aggressively attacked the festival attenders. Few of the *Attan* performers were brutally stabbed and other seriously carried injuries. The stalls that had been prepared for the exhibition of few Pashtun traditional items were also vandalized and the lovely episode of dance and flowers turned into bloodshed.[56] One unknown leader of the religiopolitical group albeit claimed that "whenever there would be a dance on the campus, there would be tussle".[57] From that day it also resulted in the closure of the institution and even affected the course schedule of the students too.

However, this criminal attack from IJT was widely condemned across the country and literally "began to be seen as an effort by fundamentalists and extremists to stamp out folk traditions amongst Pashtuns".[58] Further, the menace attitudes of IJT as it got immensely viral via social media where the Pashtun youth has been attached to, there the Pashtun party leaderships also erupted in anger and arranged protests in several cities around the country. And the protests took another shape when mega *Attans* were also performed in.

It is being said that whenever any culture is tried to be suppressed then the more it reacts. Therefore, different universities and political or social organisations initiated huge *Attan* programs in resistance to any future attacks on the Pashtun cultural shows. The best example of these shows may be prescribed here, when on the 7th of April, Peshawar held a grand *Attan* of peace in *Bagh* e *Naran* where Pashtun students reached from far cities and unitedly shown how to fight back belligerency with non-violent means. To encourage the practice of *Attan*, old aged tribal elders and women were also present and they too participated to disseminate the message of peace.[59]

CONCLUSION

The Pashtun traditional dance from historical sources has several assertions of how *Attan* did reach the community of Pashtuns. Although, the social outlook of it might have been changed in due course and may receive slight other intrusions in the future as well. However, after briefly plotting the origin of *Attan*, we can figure out that there are two explanatory models upon which the historians have traced history for this particular traditional dance: One explanation assumes *Attan* is derived from ancient religious rituals and the communities who had been dancing on account to pursue repentance or praise their deities; while, the second

explanation is immensely presenting *Attan* as the 'practice' that creates the spitting image of fighting soldiers in past who used to exercise before launching the war on their enemies. Besides, the study exemplifies *Attan* cultural dance in the post-colonial period that has provided the practitioners with socializing space so could that particular group can exhibit their sign of nationalism unitedly and in stark contrast to the 'other'. It is today stressing "social control" or "social order" facing contemporary challenges in Pakistan. While considering the phenomenon of "social order" and "social control" in connection with *Attan*, it seems the performance is reflecting both aspects, on the one hand, creating 'solidarity' within the participants and on the other hand raising voice against the opponent violent groups. Moreover, in Pakistan, we would find that Attan has subsisted in many forms and variations to different tribes and is still preserved in particular (these specific variations are usually distributed based on geography instead of tribal identities) but these differences are in general reduced to a single narrative when all they are exposed to each other at the national level. *Milli Attan* as primarily a part of the valuable Pashtun culture is playing a role to aggregate the views of brotherhood in socio-political context and necessarily offering the centre over which Pashtuns dispersed in distant are assimilated.

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BALANCED NATIONALISM AS A MECHANISM FOR PEACE-BUILDING, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA: THE NIGERIA INSTANCE

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ABSTRACT

This article identifies peace-building, sustainable development, and effective international engagements as critical tripods of the national aspiration of many African countries in their march to independence in the 20th century. While the nationalist leaders had evolved plaintive nationalism to agitate for inclusion in the colonial structure, they later grew it to radical nationalism which served as their platform of the struggle for outright freedom to guarantee self-determination. They had, in many cases, not injected cultural nationalism into their platforms of the struggle for independence. Thus, the skewed (imbalanced) nationalism consequently led to a loss of identity and the strong feeling of collectivism in many African countries with ethnicity emerging as a dangerously divisive force, such that they were ushered into independence as thoroughly disjointed entities. This study takes the Nigerian instance as a working example to historicize the African experience of failure to meet national aspiration in their postcolonial history. The study relies on primary and secondary source materials and adopts the historical interpretive method to achieve its two objectives and establish its central thesis. One, the study aims at presenting a cursory but comprehensive account of plaintive and radical nationalism in Nigeria. Two, it aims at examining and highlighting the nature and impending impact of imbalanced nationalism on the afore-noted tripods of national aspiration. The study further presents an analytical argument that beyond the hoopla of independence, a more balanced nationalism with a quantum of radicalism and cultural ethos of the people is an imperative mechanism for meeting the national aspiration. It concludes that African countries, in each case, need to urgently

cultivate the involvement of critical stakeholders in the national project (civil society, youth, and political leadership) to develop a strong architecture of balanced nationalism to build enduring municipal peace, sustainable development, and emplace themselves at a vantage position in the global system for more competitive engagements in international relations business.

KEY WORDS

Nationalism; Peace; Development; International Engagements; Identity; Culture.

It is a truism that the process of nation-building in postcolonial Africa has been bedeviled with many challenges. Some of the challenges are inter-ethnic tensions and disharmony among the ethnic components of the artificially created modern African states, the attendant consequence of enthroning sectarian interests over and above national interest; the politicization of religions, which have severally culminated in inter-religious intolerance and wars; palpable insecurity; gross and seemingly intractable underdevelopment; corruption; overbearing elitism influence; poor organization of public life; sit-tight leadership; over-reliance on foreign aids; and many negative manifestations of neo-imperialism, among others. These challenges have combined to put Africa on a choking space in the global political economy such that, recently the continent was tagged 'headquarters of world poverty'. Without being unnecessarily sentimental and pissed off by a statement that may appear racist and indecorous, Africa, it must be conceded, is more easily known and remembered for the crushing poverty and inhuman living conditions of the greater majority of its citizens in the postcolonial age. This sad reality is naturally opposed to a functional African society to which African leaders and people had looked forward with hope, a sense of pride and aspiration for good governance, a more orderly society, and a better life for the greater majority. The immediate implication of this despicable state is that the national aspiration of African countries as encoded in peace and stability, sustainable development, and effective international engagements, remains largely a statement of hope in well over seven or six decades after independence. This is an obvious, even uniform, pattern across many African states.

Against the above backdrop, this paper attempts anatomy of the Nigerian State since 1960 as a typical African example of failure to meet set goals of a peaceful society and true development as encapsulated at independence. It argues that, while the Nigerian nationalists evolved what could be termed radical nationalism in the decolonization years, from the earlier plaintive nationalism, by

harmonizing their resources and agitation strategies for the immediate purpose of attaining independence, their nationalist drive faded away with the colonial rule as they did not grow it to the level of ideologically driven pan-Nigerian culture-centric nationalism, which would have made their nationalism a balanced one capable of fast-tracking the process of post-colonial nation-building and effective international engagements. The study argues further that the nation-building process and the character and content of international relations of post-colonial Nigeria can be better enhanced by evolving a balanced postcolonial nationalism, which incorporates cultural nationalism, as a national ideology that can stimulate a pan-Nigerian drive in those regards. This initiative, it posits conclusively, can be better galvanized by a deliberate synergy between the coalition of civil society organizations and the youth on the one hand and the political leadership on the other, to indoctrinate the average Nigerian with a national identity and ideology as a connecting tool with the national drive for development.

The discussion is organised into four sections. Some terms like nationalism, radical nationalism, cultural nationalism, state, nation, nation-state, national ideology, and nation-building are conceptualized in the first section, while section two provides a historical overview of colonial rule, as well as plaintive and radical nationalism in Nigeria. The third section examines imbalanced nationalism, with some illustrations, as an impediment to nation-building, while section four concludes by underscoring the compelling need for emplacing balanced nationalism as a national ideology towards genuinely building a pan-Nigerian national architecture for attaining the national aspiration tripods.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Nationalism: Nationalism defines the bond between a citizen and his/her nation. From the dateless past, people have been attached to their native land, to the traditions of their parents, and established territorial authorities; all combined as elements of heritage and identity. This attachment has, in turn, produced citizenship imbued with strong sentiment and philosophy clad with the principle that the individual's loyalty and devotion to the nation or state surpass other individual or group interests. This underscores the dynamic vitality and pervasive character of nationalism. With this modest, dateless beginning, nationalism grew in the closing years of the 18th century to be generally accepted as arguably the most powerful single determining factor, capable of molding the public and private life of individuals. The American and French revolutions of 1776-83 and 1789 respectively were clear indicators of the power of nationalism, thus making the succeeding 19th

century an age of European nationalism. On the other hand, the imposition of colonial rule made the 20th century the age of nationalism in Asia and Africa.

Nationalism, in the wider context of politics, emphasizes the identification of the state or nation with the people or at least the desirability of determining the extent of the state according to ethnographic principles. In the age of nationalism whether in Europe, Asia, Africa, or elsewhere, the principle was generally recognized (or so it ought to be) that each nationality should form its state and that the state should include all members of that nationality. This was however not the case with Nigerians whose state (or nation if the 1914 entity could be so-called) was created and imposed by an external force – Britain. This scenario eventually triggered off a nationalistic tendency among Nigerians in a manner found in tandem with a scholarly view that;

Nationalism is certainly one of the most powerful forces in the world today, especially in non-Western countries and areas. It helps to explain the almost paranoic (sic) sensitivity of leaders and peoples of former colonies to any infringements, real or imagined, on their newly won independence.

Yet, it is contested in this paper that the Nigerian nationalism was not the type that established a bond between the Nigerian citizen and the Nigerian state because the latter did not emerge from the preference and choice of the former.

Radical Nationalism: Ordinarily, radical nationalism is driven by the passionate belief that the State should be a culturally homogenous entity that reflects the cultural values, norms and peculiarities of its people. As such, radical nationalism is against international law or global universal law, and promoters of radical nationalism hold that the legitimacy of the State comes from its Sacred Duty to uphold and protect the culture and institutions of its own people. Thus, it emphasizes both the individual and the group dynamics. But, in the Nigerian instance, the context of radical nationalism is a bit different. It means the vibrant nationalism pursued by the articulate educated elite, who by their education and enlightenment injected some modicum of radicalism into the process of nationalist struggle, particularly in the decolonization years.

Cultural Nationalism: Cultural nationalism, as against radical nationalism, presupposes the existence of an identifiable national culture, which defines the total character of a people within a given geopolitical entity who share a common feeling about their existence in relation to other people. Over time this culture grows to be a springboard of national ideology, which encompasses the values, norms, and aspirations shared by the people. More than anything else, this ideology helps in strongly connecting the people's actions with transcendental principles, whereas the individual's or sub-group's feelings, aspirations, and actions are

subsumed under the larger framework of the national interest. It also defines their stature and promotes their interests in their relationship with other peoples. This study is not unmindful of Appiah's position that there is no such thing as a pristine culture or identity completely unaffected by another in today's world.[1] Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere, every culture is a composite stock made of layers of other cultures. This underscores the elementary feature of cultural dynamism. Yet, the study aligns with Hutchinson's view about modern Ireland that "Cultural nationalism should be seen as an integrative force that sought to unite warring groups by reviving within them a love and knowledge of their common (Irish) history and culture". In other words, groups (countries) in the modern world can deploy the extant diversity and close compactness to strengthen their own cultural identity through a well-lubricated structure of cultural nationalism as a means to survive and develop within the over-arching global system.

Nation: A nation simply implies a geo-polity of a people who share a common history, heritage, language, customs, or at least similar lifestyles. This commonality of the nationality of the people uniting together for a purpose would lay the foundation for their nationalism, which strengthens their resolve to owe their allegiance to the nation, and its legal representative globally known as government. But beyond this elementary characterization, some distinctions need to be noted. While language poses a natural limitation that everyone is reluctant to subdue, Ogundowole argues that the nation is not a natural but historical phenomenon. In the same vein, it has been observed that the formation of a nation required much more.[2] There is usually a dominant social force…, which acts as the protagonist of social progress together with which the whole society should feel the need for national linkage as their common economic and social interests, as an irresistible demand for economic development.[3] He noted further that, "The phenomenon of the nation is a specific manifestation of social life on the basis and within the framework of a certain cultural-linguistic community: in other words, it is a historically determined synthesis of certain socio-economic factors and ethnic structures".[4] Therefore, a nation cannot be an arbitrary or artificial creation out of the whimsical fancy or impulsive preference of an external force as it was in the Nigerian experience. It can only evolve and develop into maturity whenever and wherever its characteristic essential elements are present.[5]

STATE: Rosenau expressed the fear that a state appears too nebulous to be conceptualised when he claimed that;

All too many studies posit the state as a symbol without content, as an actor whose nature, motives and conduct are so self-evident as to obviate any need for precise

conceptualizing. Often, in fact, the concept seems to be used as a residual category to explain that which is otherwise inexplicable in macro politics.[6]

However, there are some fundamental features that a geo-political unit should have for it to be categorized as a state. Normally a state has

(a) a geographically defined territorial base or boundary, which captures its territorial integrity

(b) a stable population that resides within the boundary

(c) a government to which the population (citizens) owe allegiance

(d) diplomatic recognition from other states, thus acknowledging its existence within the international system.[7]

Yet, it should be admitted that the above criteria are not cast in iron as there could be certain peculiarities from one instance to another. Some states may not have the precise extent of the boundary as a result of a boundary dispute. The experience of the Palestinian State in the Middle East suffices here, yet it has been recognized as a matter of diplomatic expediency. The criterion of a stable population is also fluid as illegal migrants often cross borders undetected as we often have with Fulani nomads in Northeastern Nigeria. Also, it is not absolute that a state must have a specific type of government. It is only expedient that the government enjoys acknowledgment of its legitimacy by the greater majority of its people since the institutional legitimacy of government is continuously questioned by people. Lastly, it is difficult to determine the extent to which diplomatic recognition can legitimize the existence of a state. Where such recognition is not pervasive, it becomes insufficient.

In the Nigerian civil war years, the defunct Republic of Biafra enjoyed diplomatic recognition from some countries, but this was not sufficient to keep it alive for too long. Arising from the above analysis is that while the four features as outlined are fundaments as a yardstick for statehood, they cannot be measured in absolute terms. Thus some geopolitics that does not command all the four features are still stated in their own right. While it serves no useful purpose to be detained here with details of contending conceptualizations of the state, it is pertinent to further examine the nation-state as a congruence arising from nation and state.[8]

Nation-state: A nation-state is better conceived as a coincidence or congruence between nation and state. While nations could establish their state as a legal, institutional superstructure with most of the afore-noted features of a state, some states came into existence through a process of integration (willing or forced) of different nations. In the former, like France, the emergent nation-state becomes the foundation for national self-determination. In the latter category, like the USA, South Africa, and Nigeria among several others, such a state would have within its

borders a number of different nations. Palmer and Perkins define a nation in a tone that sets it as a synonym of the state as "a body of inhabitants of a country united under one government". But they draw a further and more informing clarification that a nation may be taken as "any aggregation of people having like institutions and customs and a sense of social homogeneity and mutual interest".

It is suspected that writers often use 'state', 'nation', 'country' and 'nation-state' interchangeably as a means to avoid repeated use of one word, but not necessarily because they have exactly the same meaning. However, for the present purpose, it is considered safer to take Nigeria as, at best, a nation-state following the forced cohabitation (integration) of different nations that the 1914 amalgamation represented, and continues to represent, in contemporary Nigerian history. Ever since then, the country has always exhibited features of a geo-polity that is made up of different ethnic nationalities, most of which have the potentials of developing individually into full-fledged nations.

NATIONAL IDEOLOGY: Ordinarily, ideology is a form of social or political philosophy in which practical elements are as prominent as theoretical ones. It is a system of ideas that aspires both to explain the world and to change it.[9] It is quite difficult to define ideology more so because while it is a term with marked emotive content, it is also often taken to be a dry, technical term. The subject of ideology is a controversial one, and, arguably, at least some part of this controversy derives from disagreement as to the definition of the word *ideology*. One can, however, discern both a loose way and strict sense of using it. In the loose sense of the word, ideology may mean any kind of action-oriented theory or any attempt to approach politics (or ways of life generally) in the light of a system of ideas. On the other hand, ideology in the strict sense may be identified by five characteristics

(a) it contains an explanatory theory of a more or less comprehensive kind about human
   experience and the external world;
(b) it sets out a program, in generalized and abstract terms, of social and political organization;
(c) it conceives the realization of this program as entailing a struggle;
(d) it seeks not merely to persuade but to recruit loyal adherents, demanding what is sometimes called commitment;
(e) it addresses a wide public but may tend to confer some special role of leadership on Intellectuals.[10]

For the present purpose, national ideology is therefore conceptualized as that action-driven, conviction-based philosophy, which can be adopted by citizens of a given nation to approach the task of building their nation or nation-state (in the

Nigerian instance) for their overall benefits. Such philosophy would benefit tremendously from the above-noted features and particularly on commitment, which serves as the connecting bond between the citizen and the nation-state.

NATION-BUILDING

COLONIAL RULE, PLAINTIVE AND RADICAL NATIONALISM IN NIGERIA: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

While it is a truism that in 1914, Nigeria was created by the British as a new country through the amalgamation exercise as formalized in the 1914 Amalgamation Ordinance, there was no evidence to show or suggest that the peoples of the different political units spread across the Northern and Southern halves of the country were consulted to discuss and give their consent to live together as one people and one country, under one constitution. This was a replica of the partitioning of Africa at the Berlin 'Africa' conference of 1884-85, in which European colonial powers sliced the African land and waters among themselves as a way of staving off what would possibly have been a European inter-state war in Africa. Yet, this imposition that the amalgamation represented notwithstanding, it has become a reality in contemporary Nigeria as the peoples *have been made* to live together for a century even if so amid deep-seated, inter-ethnic distrust and disharmony.

In the colonial years, resistance to colonial rule in Nigeria began, at first, as strident calls for accommodation made mainly by the western educated elite in what may be termed plaintive nationalism. The strides of colonial policies that followed amalgamation were such that bred discontent in the people across their various divides. As Christine Scott notes;

Colonial policies generated discontent among the people – especially the elite who originally demanded reforms, and later on, independence. Among the issues that displeased the people were racism and the damage to traditional values during European rule. Nigerians in the civil service complained of racial discrimination in appointments and promotions. The aspiring ones among them were envious of the status and privileges enjoyed by the white officials.[11]

The above grim reality, which traversed the whole colonial period, was sufficient to motivate Nigerians into evolving an enduring platform that would emplace the country in a strong pedestal for efficiency in both domestic and international engagements after independence. While some Nigerians made efforts to express their nationalism in cultural ways, such efforts were too feeble and less collective in mainstreaming Nigerian nationalism in the requisite cultural context.[12]

The plaintive nationalism graduated later to radical nationalism particularly from 1945 after World War II when the tempo for nationalist agitation and

decolonisation politics increased substantially. In all the phases, however, the nationalist leaders would seem to be tremendously influenced by some primordial tendencies against the pan-Nigerian over-arching interest that predictably brought them together. This manifested in the fact that Nigerians appeared not convinced of the reality of their new-found identity that amalgamation foisted on them. Apparently, despite the 'national unity' or at least, national unification, which the amalgamation signaled, the peoples were not truly *Nigerian* in feelings and pursuits. This position, which was a major challenge to the nationalist struggle, endured for the most parts of the decolonization years and found copious articulation in the expressions of two of the most prominent Nigerian leaders (Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) who made unambiguous declarations that Nigeria was not a nation. Chief Awolowo set the tone when he averred that:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no "Nigerians" in the same sense as there are "English", "Welsh", or "French". The word "Nigeria" is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not.[13] In a similar vein, Sir Balewa strengthened this view in 1948 in his remark to the Nigerian Legislative Council audience that:

> Since 1914, the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any signs of willingness to unite…. Nigerian unity is only a British invention.[14]

It was based on the failure to grow a nation out of the disparate ethnic nationalities that amalgamation forced together in 1914 that the two leading Nigerian nationalist leaders (Chief Awolowo and Sir Balewa) made their assertions, which of course, appear to command eternal veracity. Yet, it should be added that from all indications, the sustenance of the Nigerian nation-state is reversible only with some deleterious consequences, and if Nigerians desire to stave off such consequences, there is the pressing need to find ways and means of managing the Nigerian diverse nationality. In tandem with this line of thought, it has been argued that, "…it is doubtful if there is any modern plural state that is not a product of an artificial creation, but the largely successful states in nation-building have been aided by building a workable consensus among the elites on the appropriate direction for their countries".[15]

What is more, the two postulations evidently suggest that the radical nationalism of the decolonization years was not sufficiently pan-Nigerian to stimulate a process of sustainable nation-building that would have guaranteed a stable and progressive post-colonial Nigeria nation. Indeed, as has been remarked elsewhere, Nigeria is made up of a heterogeneous collection of people with little or no bond holding them together.[16] The situation grew worse and became more apparent towards the end of the colonial era when it was apparent that the British were favourably disposed to granting independence. This scenario culminated in a palpable atmosphere of dichotomy and disharmony across the country, which has been severally entrenched and exploited by the influential ruling elite.[17]

While the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which Post calls 'the modern independence movement', had been formed and led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in 1944, the working out of the new (McPherson) Constitution in 1950/51, stimulated the formation of more political parties. The Action Group (AG) and the Northern People's Congress (NPC) were formed in 1951. These parties, including the NCNC that would seem to have begun as a national party, were region-based particularly as a result of the electoral provision of the 1951 Constitution that, members of the regional legislative councils would elect people to the central legislature from among themselves. This provision, which passes for 'ladder election', threw up each region as the necessary strategic base for political harvest. What the following experience portended was an expression of regional rivalry through political party platforms.[18] Consequently, as Post observes;

....the period 1951-8 became a period of the adjustment of interests between three major parties, between the north and the two southern regions, have taken together, and between the majority and the minority ethnic groups in each region; the first and second of these adjustments resulting in the adoption of a fully federalized constitution in 1954.[19]

More importantly, these protracted rivalries and their accompanying divisions, which were not properly ironed out, delayed the country's march to independence. This was beneficial to the colonial authorities in their *divide et impera* game. It also culminated in a federal government that ushered Nigeria into independence as more of an amalgam of strange bedfellows, or put more succinctly, an uneasy coalition of very disparate interests.[20] It has not abated ever since, and from 1960 till the present, inter-ethnic rivalry particularly among the three major ethnic groups; Hausa/Fulani in the North, Igbo in the East, and Yoruba in the West on the one hand, and between these major ethnic groups and minority groups on the other, has remained a recurrent decimal.[21]

At best, what we have thus far is a nation-state and not a nation as it were. That is a major reason that explains the penchant of Nigerian leaders in the successive epochs of decolonization and post-colonial history for using the national office for ethnic patronage. This has been commonplace in Nigeria, at least from 1954 when regions were under the administrative control of Premiers. This trend continued into the post-colonial epoch and has remained a critical but regressive feature of Nigeria ever since. Following the attainment of independence in Nigeria in 1960, the quest for nation-building and development has remained an enduring, common agitation by all Nigerians of different shades and persuasions. While this is a mere continuity of the radical agitation of the colonial years, it further points to the much-expressed view that the country is well-endowed with diverse human and material resources that are sufficient in terms of quantity and quality to fast-track the process of nation-building such that greater majority of Nigerians will easily experience decent life and living.

IMBALANCED NATIONALISM AS IMPEDIMENT TO NATION-BUILDING

Nationalism in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, had begun as early as the 19th century mainly as a response to foreign conquests and alien policies. The wars of resistance (even if feeble) in various places later inspired the more articulate nationalist drive of the 20th century. Agitations of early African thinkers like Edward Wilmot Blyden, Alexander Cromwell, and the famous African American scholar; W.E.B. Du Bois had made the early attempts at conceiving a common African cultural identity as a means to confront the racial discriminatory tendencies of their age. Their efforts were a platform of courage and impetus with which the latter, radical nationalism was well calibrated. As Eze succinctly puts it,

I bring a sympathetic understanding to the efforts of earlier generations of African and African diaspora thinkers who had to fight their overwhelmingly racist world. Thus, their recourse to nativist, relativist, and autochthonous arguments were employed as a means to fight erasure. I understand that nativism has a political relevance as a stage in the liberatory (sic) process of a people. Marcus Garvey's 'Africa for Africans', considered to be the theoretical source of African nationalism, was expedient at the time it was propounded.[22]

This implies that the early agitation was mainly (if not merely) against racial discrimination. Yet it provided the foundation for what emerged in the mid-to-late 19th century as nationalist movements. The resistance was not only against the commercial officers but also against the church. Even among Christian converts, there was a pervasive atmosphere of discontentment, which culminated in a mix-grill of secessionist tendencies and protest against domination. Essentially, radical

nationalism in the Nigerian context may be taken to have both traditional and modern phases of development. While the former entails the spontaneous, sporadic, and ill-organized movements of resistance and revolts against the British early intrusion into different parts of the geo-polity, the latter is a more explicit, better organized, objective-driven resistance promoted by the educated elite whose main target was self-government for Nigeria. According to Coleman, the defining features of radical nationalism, in the Nigerian context, include (a) the explicit goal of Nigerian self-government (b) the concept of Nigerian unity (c) the predominance of Westernized elements in leadership groups (d) the development of permanent political associations to pursue nationalist objectives; and (e) the predominance of modern political values and ideals.

However, a keen observation readily indicates that this pan-Nigerian agitation, driven by radical nationalism, and the availability of resources, have not culminated in the much-anticipated pace of development and nation-building, and the enthronement of an effective international engagements architecture. Indeed, after a hundred years of nationhood by the 1914 amalgamation, there is no Nigerian nation, but a mere nation-state, where ethnic interest is held in higher esteem than the national interest. As already hinted, ethnicity has become the main tool of national life in Nigeria such that "From the system of job recruitment, resource allocation, party politics to sporting activities, Nigerians have used the weapon of ethnicity to advance one or two interests in such a way as to generate crisis and disruption at different points in time".[23] This is a contradiction to nationhood as it impedes the process of nation-building. As it has been noted;

The dilemma of the Nigerian case is not that it has been faced with the challenges of nation-building but that half a century after independence, the challenges seem to be even greater. The problem has not been the lack of efforts to deal with the problem of national integration. Indeed, over the decade of Nigeria's independence conscious efforts have been made to build "national institutions" in order to forge national cohesion.[24]

Therefore, the elusiveness of genuine and strong architecture for enduring peace, sustainable development and effective international engagements in post-colonial Nigeria can justifiably be taken as a by-product of the very precarious colonial foundation of what is herein termed the unbalanced Nigerian nationalism. More specifically, this unbalanced nature of the extant Nigerian nationalism can be located and highlighted in some critical aspects of Nigeria's national life, which include, but in no way limited to, diversity and inter-ethnic relations; entrenched colonial legacy as evident in the elitist influence in public space; postcolonial politics and power-sharing among others.

On diversity and inter-ethnic relations, Nigeria has not fared well since 1960. With its foundation well laid in the colonial period, inter-ethnic disunity became a major factor that whittled down any potential gains accruable from diversity. In this vein, Ajayi argues that disunity in Nigeria is traceable to the colonial policy of divide and rule, which often pitched one ethno-religious group against another.[25] He adds more elaborately that,

While the colonial policy of divide and rule which pitched one ethno-religious group against another safeguarded colonial rule and interests, this policy did nothing (good) for the post-colonial unity of the diverse people. After independence, the nationalists' activities were mostly carried out in an uncoordinated fashion by regionally based political parties and their parochial leaders. Consequently, the various ethnic nationalities were developing at different paces (in the decolonization years) with the tacit endorsement of the colonial administration. This was when a seed of discord that was to have a deleterious impact on post-colonial Nigeria was planted.[26] *The two emphases in bracket are mine*

In a related vein, Ikime examines the character of Nigerian politics in the decolonization years and submits that, it is common knowledge that the politics of decolonization witnessed a worsening of inter-ethnic and inter-regional relations. Essentially, those politics involved little more than negotiations aimed at reconciling the competing interests of the three regions into which the country was divided at the time, with the British taking full advantage of the situation which they had helped to create in the first instance.[27]

In essence, the inter-ethnic disunity that has destroyed the emergence of genuine nationhood and enthronement of real and balanced nationalism in post-colonial Nigeria is one of the wicked consequences of colonial rule, which, unfortunately, continued in the post-colonial years up to the present.

This unpleasant reality was strengthened by the full entrenchment of colonial legacy as particularly witnessed in the elitist leadership that took power from the colonial authorities. This new crop of leadership, who emerged as a new bourgeois class in the colonial era as an educated elite did not enjoy the same latitude of autonomy as their European aristocratic tutors. But, they helped the latter to finally nail the coffin of the pre-existing traditional aristocracy across Africa. And, by way of rewarding them and concluding the well-scripted project of cultural imperialism, the European colonizers transferred power to them gradually in the decolonization years and finally at independence. A ringing opinion about them runs thus:

In the course of colonization a new bourgeois class emerged in Africa composed of Africans who acquired Western education in the hands of the

colonizers, and their missionary collaborators, and who accordingly was the most exposed to European colonial ideologies of all groups of Africans.[28]
Ekeh adds that,

> In many ways, the drama of colonialism is the history of the clash between the European colonizers and this emergent bourgeois class. Although native to Africa, the African bourgeois class depends on colonialism for its legitimacy. It accepts the principles implicit in colonialism but it rejects the foreign personnel that ruled Africa. It claims to be competent enough to rule, but it has no traditional legitimacy. In order to replace the colonizers and rule its own people it has invented a number of interest begotten theories to justify that rule.[29]

The African bourgeois' justification was (and still is) in no significant sense, different from that provided by the colonizers on the eve of colonial rule. More than anything else, it has thrown up a baseless thought of superiority/inferiority complex between the Western-educated ruling elite and the uneducated natives respectively in postcolonial African public life. In Nigeria for example, this sustained thinking trajectory has gravely widened the gap between state and society such that is not dissimilar to that between Ekeh's two publics; primordial and civic Ekeh.[30] Indeed, the sociology of postcolonial governance in Nigeria is a scenario of the dichotomy between the numerical minority ruling class and the multi-numbered masses who, more often, feel alienated and dispossessed of the apparatus of governance. With this wide disconnect, the masses who daily exhibit and live by the rubrics of society's extant culture do not enlist into the compelling need for evolving a culture-based nationalism.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the contents and quality of Nigerian nationalism from the beginning of colonial rule and has established some revealing fundamentals on Nigeria's bumpy ride to genuine nationhood in its postcolonial history. Since 1960, the Nigerian nation-building experience has been a dramatic narrative of contradictions. While the march to independence was motivated and enhanced by the hope for a lofty height of peace, development, and international prestige, the subsequent reality of abysmal failure to get the hope fulfilled has plummeted the hoopla of freedom which the 1960 feat symbolized. The largely unstable political atmosphere up to 1999 had worsened the situation, while the exciting contemporary history of the unbroken civil rule of more than two decades up to the

present has made no significant difference in addressing the national question. Dichotomy, disharmony, discontent, and discord are terms that are more popular and familiar than development in the Nigerian reality. Consequently, palpable fear of domination, complaints of marginalization, and pervasive tension are common features in the trajectories of inter-group relations among ethnic nationalities across Nigeria, particularly to sharing of political power, office, and patronage. This is summed up in what Kirk-Greene calls psychological fear. He states that;

Fear has been constant in every tension and confrontation in political Nigeria. Not the physical fear of violence, not the spiritual fear of retribution, but the psychological fear of discrimination, of domination. It is the fear of not getting one's fair share, one's dessert.[31]

One, Nigerian nationalism began in a plaintive shape as an inclusion-seeking agitation to achieve integration of Blacks to the emerging colonial governmental structure. It had the unintended consequence of consolidating the European conquest of the pre-existing traditional ruling class and the people's culture over which they were the custodial authority. Later, the nationalism grew radical after World War II with its ruinous impact. This phase of nationalism helped in fully mainstreaming the emerging educated African bourgeois into the colonial administration in the years of decolonization, and in preparing them for eventual take-over of leadership. Indeed, their emergence marked the final annihilation of the traditional aristocracy and served as the starting point of creating a gulf between citizen and state. This was because the people's collective identity, and the vestiges of extant culture and pristine values of Africa were eroded, while Western cultural orientations were fully enthroned. This was calibrated with the flaunting of the concept of modern government as introduced, nurtured, and approved by the colonial masters. It was a hoax!

Consequently, for the most part, the much-lauded agitations of Nigerian nationalists in the decolonization years clothed in vibrant radicalism was significantly bereft of the necessary cultural elements of collective bonding which were essential for systematic inclusion and involvement of the masses and their deep sense of identity ownership into the nation-building process. Thus, the so-called radical nationalism agitations which were ostensibly geared towards national emancipation were inherently motivated by sectional interests. This created a wide gap that has alienated the greater majority of Nigerians from their government over time. This readily explains why many of them easily resort to promoting ethnic sentiments and interests over and above the collective national aspirations. It is no surprise therefore that many Nigerians, in their daily life, manifest nonchalance, with no sense of ownership towards the Nigerian government and public

structures. It is common knowledge that even those involved in government business by way of civil service career, election and appointment see their inclusion as an opportunity for them to serve the turn of their ethnic group and have a meaty bite of the proverbial national cake. They serve the nation 'on behalf of their people' and use the tenure of office to promote their group's narrow interests in the process of allocation and usage of political power, public utilities, and other resources. This underscores the country-wide subscription to 'we-versus-them' feelings by ethnic chauvinists, thus rendering the claim to national unity as a red herring; more symbolic, less real, more cursory, and far less profound.

This study conclusively offers that, the need to revisit the national question to build a formidable architecture for enduring peace, sustainable development in both municipal and international pursuits has become more compelling. Not only will peace promote local businesses, but it will also assure foreign investors and other intervention agencies of their safety to conduct mutually beneficial businesses in Nigeria. By extension, a well-groomed Nigerian national identity in its interesting diversity is capable of emplacing Nigeria in a vantage footing of strength and prestige in its international engagements. And to achieve this, a balanced nationalism heavily subsumed in a national culture template that accommodates Nigeria's diversity and superimposes national interests over and above sectarian aspirations remains the cardinal antidote. Critical stakeholders including the political elite, civil society, youth, intelligentsia, captains of religious cathedrals, and community leaders among others need to come together to promote sincere enlightenment on, and subsequent enthronement of, a truly national culture beyond the rhetoric of integration initiatives like the extant federal character principle and national youth service corps, which have failed to address the national question.

A scrutiny of the mythology passed down from 19th Europe readily shows that the common identity and strong sense of nationhood found in many European countries did not precede the states. Instead, they were deliberately 'produced' by the states through the mechanisms of common language and culture, which were usually spread by public education. In the Nigerian case, this new-found national culture will predictably serve as the launching pad for a new and balanced nationalism that will, in turn, promote elements of national consciousness among Nigerians. Before long, the balanced nationalism will serve as a new national compass with which to navigate the complex labyrinth of the contemporary world system for rewarding the conduct of the local and global business of government.

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