

## DEVELOPMENTALISM AND DEVOTION: TRACING THE DUAL LOGICS OF REFUGEE RELIEF AND REHABILITATION IN PAKISTAN, 1947–1967

HASSAN NAWAZ\*

### ABSTRACT

The colossal human displacement following the 1947 partition of India—a forced migration of approximately eighteen million people—created the most profound humanitarian crisis of the twentieth century. This study explores how the newly established Pakistani state navigated the subsequent refugee relief and rehabilitation processes, which revolved centrally around two distinct yet often intersecting logics: state-driven developmentalism and non-governmental, institutionalized charity. I propose that the state's response transcended mere humanitarian aid, leveraging the refugee crisis as an opportunity for nation-building and resource management through large-scale development schemes. Concurrently, a robust, albeit managed, charitable infrastructure emerged, supported and legally channelled by the state, drawing upon both modern secular welfare principles and deep-rooted Islamic philanthropic traditions. Specific state projects, including the Thal Development Authority and the Gujranwala Development Scheme, serve as potent examples of the developmental impulse, while the systematized charity provided by organizations like Al-Khidmat and the establishment of institutions such as the National Council of Social Welfare underscore the role of devotion. I suggest these dual, managed processes were significant factors in accommodating, resettling, and attempting to stabilize the lives of the millions of *muhajirs* during the first two decades of Pakistan's existence.

**KEYWORDS:** Development, charity, refugee relief, partition, rehabilitation, state policy

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\* Independent Scholar. Email: [hassannawazfc@gmail.com](mailto:hassannawazfc@gmail.com)  
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The moment of Partition in 1947 inaugurated the modern South Asian era, not merely through the delineation of new borders but through the largest, most violent population transfer in human history. The sheer scale of the influx—a relentless tide of humanity seeking refuge in the nascent state of Pakistan—threatened the very foundation of the new political entity (Ahmed, 2012). This existential challenge demanded an unprecedented governmental response, forcing the provisional administration to simultaneously manage state formation, security, and a monumental humanitarian catastrophe. I propose that the state's subsequent policy framework for refugee, relief, and rehabilitation (RR&R) crystallized around a sophisticated and coordinated application of two operational rationalities: the *logic of development* and the *principle of administered charity*.

I suggest these two logics did not operate in isolation; rather, they represented a dialectical approach to crisis management and nation-building. The logic of development saw the displaced population, the *muhajirs*, not solely as a burden requiring relief, but as a strategic labor resource and an impetus for realizing large-scale infrastructure projects in undeveloped regions. This impulse sought to solve the refugee problem by incorporating it into the larger national economic and spatial planning agenda (Siddiqi, 2005). Simultaneously, the principle of charity served as the critical social safety valve, mobilizing non-state actors, drawing on deep religious and cultural reservoirs of giving, and legitimizing the state's inability to meet all needs independently. Understanding the Pakistani experience requires a distinct focus on how this dual approach was institutionalized, regulated, and ultimately

utilized to integrate millions of displaced people into the fabric of the new nation during the critical period from 1947 to 1967.

The immediate post-Partition decades constituted a crucible for Pakistan, where the handling of the refugee crisis became the acid test of the state's administrative capacity and ideological commitment. The successful or unsuccessful resettlement of the *muhajirs* was inextricably linked to the narrative of national success and the validation of the Two-Nation Theory (Khan, 1999). Therefore, the policy decisions taken—whether allocating evacuee property or pioneering new towns—were always infused with political and symbolic significance beyond mere logistics. Tracing the evolution of these RR&R policies provides a crucial lens through which to comprehend the early state-society relationship in Pakistan and the foundational strategies employed by the government to manage demographic and economic shock.

The scholarly discourse surrounding post-Partition refugee rehabilitation provides a necessary foundation, although it disproportionately focuses on the Indian experience. Udit Sen, in her seminal work, meticulously highlights the logic of development embedded within the Indian state's policy, particularly concerning Bengali refugees. She asserts that the Indian government strategically regulated the movement and dispersal of refugees, primarily to utilize them as a workforce for nation-building projects, such as the development of the Andaman Islands (Sen, 2007). This governmental approach effectively transformed refugees into 'forced re-settlers,' instrumentalizing their displacement for the state's territorial and economic expansion. Sen's critique, which labels the process as 'development-induced

displacement and resettlement,' provides a vital comparative framework for scrutinizing similar developmental rhetoric utilized by the Pakistani state in its vast, arid territories.

In parallel, Joya Chatterji's research offers a necessary counterpoint, detailing the profound suffering and the Indian state's initial, often dismissive, approach to the refugee crisis in Bengal. Chatterji contends that the state treated the refugees as an overwhelming liability, designing policies that significantly narrowed the scope of free relief to only the "deserving," fearing that prolonged aid would create dependency (Chatterji, 2013). This policy vacuum, created by the state's perceived parsimony and bureaucratic rigidity, actively encouraged the private sector to step in and fill the void through charitable endeavors. While both Sen's and Chatterji's works illuminate the humanitarian, developmental, and charitable responses in the context of India, I suggest there remains a significant gap in the robust and systematic scholarly examination of how these precise logics were executed and institutionalized by the Pakistani state, particularly the managed synergy between development and charity as state policy.

I propose to use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as elaborated by Norman Fairclough, to systematically examine the official documents, government reports, state policies, and historical narratives pertinent to the RR&R process (Fairclough, 1992). CDA is an indispensable tool in this context, as it allows me to move beyond the manifest content of official texts—the promises of aid and development—to uncover the latent ideological assumptions, power relations, and socio-political motivations that informed these policies. By scrutinizing the language used in planning documents, ministerial debates, and official

communiqués rigorously identify the moments where humanitarian necessity was strategically intertwined with nation-building rhetoric and developmental ambition.

Furthermore, I will employ the principle of methodological triangulation, using the robust lens of secondary literature to critically interpret the biases inherent in the primary sources (Denzin, 1970). The primary sources draw upon consist of yearbooks, official reviews, and reports associated with the First, Second, and other early national development plans, alongside published records concerning migration and resettlement spanning 1947–1967. This corpus includes archival materials from the Punjab University Library and the Punjab Archives, as well as contemporaneous newspaper records such as *The Pakistan Times* (Malik, 1980). By cross-referencing the official state position found in these reports with the analytical findings of historians and sociological studies, I propose to uncover the true operational impact of the RR&R policies and address any potential governmental bias or self-legitimizing narratives embedded in the official records.

#### THE LOGIC OF DEVELOPMENT: TERRITORIAL PLANNING AND THE MUHAJIR LABOUR FORCE

The earliest state policy regarding refugee management was fundamentally rooted in resource acquisition and territorial management, recognizing that the sheer volume of migrants presented both a monumental crisis and a singular opportunity for demographic restructuring. The initial most and immediate strategy involved the massive, rapid management of evacuee property, which instantly became the state's primary resource for resettlement (Mirza, 2006). This process—the allocation

of abandoned properties and land—was fraught with administrative complexity, corruption, and social tension, but it quickly established the state as the central arbiter of wealth redistribution and migrant settlement.

This immense task required the creation of specialized administrative organs, which rapidly grew in complexity and jurisdiction. The establishment of dedicated Refugee Rehabilitation and Claims organizations signified the state's commitment to an organized, top-down solution, rather than relying solely on local, spontaneous relief efforts (Report of the Refugee Commission, 1948). The official reports from 1948 reveal a bureaucratic intent to transition the *muhajirs* from temporary camp residents to productive citizens as quickly as possible. This was essential not only for economic reasons but also for legitimizing the new administration in the eyes of its most fervent supporters—those who had sacrificed everything for the creation of Pakistan.

The state's developmental impulse was most clearly articulated through the initiation of colossal land reclamation and colonization schemes. The flagship project in this regard was the Thal Development Authority (TDA), established in 1949, which effectively married the need for refugee accommodation with the long-term goal of developing the arid Thal region in Punjab (Qureshi, 2200). The TDA was conceptualized as an integrated solution: a massive irrigation project that would render previously barren land arable, simultaneously creating new agricultural settlements, town centers, and industrial units designed explicitly for the displaced population.

The TDA project represents the epitome of the state's developmental logic in action.

It consciously utilized the refugee influx to populate and activate a strategically important, underdeveloped territory, thus expanding the nation's agricultural and industrial base (Govt. of Pakistan, First Five Year Plan, 1957). The successful execution of the TDA, documented in the planning reports of the 1950s, was often showcased by the government as irrefutable evidence that the refugee crisis was being handled not just humanely, but *productively*. This narrative was crucial for maintaining domestic morale and attracting foreign investment and aid, which often favored projects framed in terms of 'modernization' and 'development' (Akhtar, 2004).

Furthermore, the state recognized the necessity of developing urban infrastructure to absorb the largely urban professional and trading populations that migrated from India. I propose that the Gujranwala Development Scheme, initiated in 1950 and subsequently expanded, illustrates the state's strategy of using satellite town development to relieve pressure on established metropolitan centers like Lahore (Nasim, 2017). This scheme involved the planned construction of housing, roads, water supply, and markets, explicitly targeting low-income *muhajir* families.

This deliberate spatial planning was a mechanism for controlled integration. By allocating new industrial licenses and setting up employment exchange centers within these new townships, the government steered the displaced labor class towards specific, manageable urban centers (Jafri, 1978). This top-down control over urban demography was intended to prevent the chaotic urban sprawl witnessed elsewhere and to maintain the fragile socioeconomic balance in existing cities, which were already straining under the weight of the massive

influx of people (Choudhry, 2018). The Lahore Township Project, carried out in the mid-1960s with a completion target of 1968, further solidifies this pattern, demonstrating the sustained governmental commitment to planned urban resettlement well into the second decade of Pakistan's existence (Habib, 1967).

The economic dimension of the developmental logic also extended to the proactive allocation of industrial units and businesses abandoned by the departing Hindu and Sikh populations. This measure was pivotal in rehabilitating the *muhajir* entrepreneurial class and jump-starting the nascent industrial sector (Mirza, 2006). The case of the "Do Hunter" soap industry, assigned to a refugee in Sargodha, stands as a micro-example of this policy: using the redistribution of industrial assets to quickly re-establish the economic stability and productivity of key migrant families. This systematic transfer of capital and means of production was instrumental in integrating the *muhajir* community into Pakistan's capitalist structure, thereby reinforcing the state's economic ideology.

However, this developmental approach faced substantial criticism and was not uniformly successful. The experiences in specific areas, such as Toba Tek Singh, reveal the limitations of the state's top-down planning. The failure to effectively manage the socioeconomic transition in this lower canal colony, where competent local Sikh and Hindu agriculturalists were replaced by less experienced *muhajir* groups, led to a discernible worsening of the local socioeconomic situation (Tahir, 2001). This example reveals that the state's optimistic vision of development and efficient resettlement often collided with the harsh realities of bureaucratic incompetence,

uneven resource distribution, and the sheer challenge of integrating millions of people with diverse vocational backgrounds.

This challenge was compounded by the political conflicts between the central and provincial governments, particularly in Sindh, where demographic shifts were profound. The analysis suggests that the friction between governmental tiers significantly hampered the relief efforts, leaving the *muhajirs* vulnerable to administrative neglect and resource paucity (Zaidi, 2003). Therefore, while the developmental logic provided the overarching vision and the material projects, its implementation was consistently undermined by political instability and administrative incoherence, highlighting the fragility of the post-colonial state structure (Siddiqi, 2005).

The state's efforts to create a robust labor force from the refugee population are further evidenced by the establishment of employment exchange centers, specifically designed to match the skills of the displaced with the requirements of the developing economy (Jafri, 1978). I argue that this initiative was an intentional effort to categorize the *muhajirs* as valuable human capital, essential for the industrialization drive outlined in the First Five-Year Plan. This re-framing of the refugee from a victim to a participant—draws parallels with the 'forced re-settlers' narrative in India—was fundamental to the state's self-legitimizing developmental rhetoric (Bukhari, 2019).

The long-term plans, particularly the detailed reports within the First Five Year Plan (1957), consistently prioritized the integration of the *muhajirs* into permanent, productive economic roles over the continuation of free relief. This policy decision was driven by the fear that

prolonged dependency would, as suggested by Chatterji's observations in India, demoralize the new citizenry and render them dependent on the state (Govt. of Pakistan, First Five Year Plan, 1957). The assertion of self-reliance, thus, became a core ideological tenet of the rehabilitation strategy, which simultaneously reduced the financial burden on the state and reinforced the ideal of the industrious new Pakistani citizen.

This study suggests that the sheer scope of the TDA, in particular, transcended mere land development; it was a psychological operation. The construction of a new, functioning social environment in the Thal region—complete with new towns, schools, and hospitals—served as a powerful symbol of the state's capacity to deliver on its promise of an independent nation (Qureshi, 2200). The state consciously broadcast this success story to counter the narratives of mass suffering and administrative failure that were equally pervasive in the immediate aftermath of Partition (Malik, 1980). This carefully constructed image was essential for securing both internal consensus and external aid.

The urban settlement schemes also played a crucial, albeit distinct, role in this developmental framework. By creating structured, planned communities like Gujranwala Satellite Town, the government was attempting to impose order on what was otherwise a chaotic, unplanned migration into cities (Nasim, 2017). I argue that the establishment of these townships was less about simple housing provision and more about the creation of *muhajir* communities that were economically and socially integrated into the surrounding region, preventing the formation of isolated, destabilized enclaves within major urban

centers (Choudhry, 2018). This strategy aimed at stabilizing the urban political landscape.

The comparison between the rehabilitation processes in Punjab and Sindh further reveals the uneven impact of the state's developmental logic. In Punjab, the availability of developed canal colonies and the rapid redistribution of evacuee property allowed for quicker physical resettlement, lending credence to the government's claims of efficacy (Khan, 1999). In contrast, the unique demographic dynamics and political rivalries in Sindh contributed to a far more protracted and difficult integration process, suggesting that the developmental model was highly dependent on favorable local conditions and stable provincial governance (Zaidi, 2003).

The establishment of the Punjab Boundary Force, initially intended to prevent violence during the exchange of populations, was swiftly followed by the administrative framework to handle property and claims (Report of the Refugee Commission, 1948). This rapid institutional transition—from security to logistics—demonstrates the state's swift realization that the most pressing task after the initial chaos was the economic and spatial organization of the incoming population. The meticulous records detailing the registration of claims and the allocation of agricultural land represent a profound logistical undertaking, unmatched in its scale and complexity.

The creation of this massive administrative apparatus, including the appointment of Liaison Officers to protect evacuee properties, provided the necessary bureaucratic mechanism to execute the developmental vision (Mirza, 2006). Without a centralized system to manage the enormous inventory of abandoned assets,

the state could not have successfully implemented its policy of using these properties as the primary capital for *muhajir* rehabilitation. This system, despite its inherent flaws and instances of corruption, was the engine that drove the early economic integration of the displaced (Jafri, 1978).

The industrial initiatives launched to assist refugees in maintaining financial stability further underscore the economic dimension of the developmental strategy (Govt. of Pakistan, First Five Year Plan, 1957). The focus on restoring the economic productivity of the migrants was a key differentiator from mere relief efforts. The state's concern was not just immediate sustenance but the long-term contribution of this populace to the national economy, reinforcing the notion that the displaced were integral to Pakistan's future prosperity (Akhtar, 2004).

The initial development plans and subsequent government reporting reveal a distinct bias towards projects with immediate, visible outcomes. The massive scale of the Thal irrigation system or the clean lines of a new township provided tangible evidence of governmental action, aligning with the "modernization" theories popular at the time (Qureshi, 2200). This focus often overshadowed the more nuanced, long-term social and psychological integration challenges, which were largely delegated to the domain of the charitable sector.

The historical discourse has often analyzed the partition through a lens of political failure or religious conflict (Ahmed, 2012). By focusing on the developmental policy, we uncover a dimension of post-colonial statecraft that was robust, proactive, and future-oriented. This developmental logic, while occasionally

callous in its treatment of individual suffering, provided the essential structural framework that allowed millions of people to transition from refugee status to citizenship with land or employment within a relatively short period (Siddiqi, 2005).

The sustained commitment to development, evidenced by the planning and execution of projects across successive governmental plans, demonstrates a deep, institutionalized conviction that infrastructure and economic opportunity were the primary instruments of rehabilitation. This conviction shaped the physical and economic landscape of West Pakistan irrevocably (Nasim, 2017). The new towns, the reclaimed deserts, and the burgeoning industries all stand as concrete, indelible testaments to the state's belief in developmentalism as the solution to the refugee crisis.

The sheer administrative feat of mobilizing resources for the Gujranwala and Lahore Township projects, long after the immediate chaos of 1947 had subsided, shows the state's recognition of the sustained need for planned urban expansion (Habib, 1967). These projects represent the maturing of the initial developmental impulse: moving from the chaotic redistribution of existing resources (evacuee property) to the systematic creation of *new* physical infrastructure tailored to the *muhajir* population (Choudhry, 2018).

This developmental agenda also served a powerful political function: the physical integration of the *muhajirs* was paramount to their political and emotional integration into the nation (Khan, 1999). By providing them with tangible assets—land, homes, and jobs—the state effectively bound them to the new national project, validating their immense sacrifices and channeling their

intense political loyalty into constructive economic activity (Bukhari, 2019). The success of the state, in the developmentalist view, was directly proportional to its ability to make the *muhajirs* economically self-sufficient.

### THE PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTERED CHARITY: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND DEVOTION

The immediate and overwhelming nature of the refugee influx exceeded the organizational and financial capacity of the fledgling Pakistani state (Ahmad, 1990). This structural limitation necessitated the embrace of a parallel, complementary strategy: the conscious mobilization and, crucially, the *institutionalization* of private charitable endeavors. The state, unable to provide all relief, sought a partner in the non-profit sector, leveraging deep-seated cultural and religious norms of giving to meet the acute humanitarian needs.

This reliance on charity was not a simple delegation of responsibility; rather, it was a state-managed process designed to ensure coordination, prevent mismanagement, and align private devotion with public policy. The government, recognizing the inherent power and ubiquity of philanthropic traditions in South Asia, sought to channel this energy through legal frameworks (Ordinance LVIII, 1961). This institutionalization marked a pivotal shift: transforming spontaneous, faith-based aid into a regulated component of the national social welfare strategy.

The history of charity in the region, drawing from Islam's emphasis on *zakat* and *sadqah* alongside the philanthropic legacy of other religious and colonial missionary organizations, provided a fertile ground for this mobilization (Ali, 2009). While the

religious connotation was powerful and pervasive, the state, especially in its official rhetoric and legal frameworks, consciously adopted a *modern, secular, and humanitarian* terminology for welfare (Farid, 1965). This language allowed for the integration of international aid and the collaboration with secular international bodies, such as the United Nations.

The formalization of the social welfare sector began with the state proactively seeking international expertise. The request for UN assistance in 1951, which led to the subsequent advice on social policy and the eventual establishment of academic and governmental institutions, demonstrates a commitment to building a professional welfare apparatus (UN Advisory Mission Report, 1955). The foundation of the Department of Social Work at Punjab University in 1954 and the Ministry of Social Welfare in the same year are concrete indicators of this institutional intent (Zubairi, 1954). The state was not merely accepting aid; it was building the infrastructure for a comprehensive, post-colonial welfare state.

The National Council of Social Welfare (NCSW), which began its work in 1956, and the Directorate General of Social Welfare (functional from 1964) acted as the critical instruments of this administered charity (Farid, 1965). Their dual roles—policy-making/supervision and grant-making/regulation—were essential for ensuring that the burgeoning number of volunteer organizations adhered to national objectives and reached remote, underprivileged areas (Ordinance LVIII, 1961). This oversight was crucial, as it brought private sector philanthropy under the state's strategic umbrella, ensuring accountability and targeted effort.

The legislation, such as the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Ordinance of 1961, formalized the relationship between the state and the non-profit sector, providing a legal platform for operation while simultaneously regulating the flow of capital, especially foreign remittances (Ordinance LVIII, 1961). This regulatory environment provided legitimacy and structure to organizations like Al-Khidmat and the Hamdard Foundation, allowing them to scale their operations in response to the massive, sustained humanitarian need of the *muhajirs*.

The immediate response to the crisis was spearheaded by women's organizations, demonstrating the grassroots power of social mobilization. The Women's Volunteer Service (WVS), founded by the wife of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, played a vital role, not only in providing basic relief—food, medicine, and first aid—but also in addressing the profound trauma of the Partition, particularly by offering sanctuary to abducted women (Afzal, 2015). This work immediately bridged the gap between official state policy and the intimate, immediate needs of the displaced.

The subsequent formation of the All Pakistan Women's Association (APWA) in 1948, intended to permanently and successfully focus on women's activity, marked a transition from immediate relief to long-term social development (Rana, 1949). APWA and similar organizations represented a crucial component of the state's rehabilitation effort that the developmental schemes could not touch: the rebuilding of family structures, education, and community life. Their work provided the social glue essential for the integration of millions.

Organizations like the Pakistan Red Cross Society, established in 1947, further

exemplified the blend of international secular humanitarianism and national effort (Report of the Refugee Commission, 1948). While Karachi, Lahore, and other major cities were the primary centers of relief, the proliferation of these organizations across the nation demonstrated a decentralized response that supplemented the highly centralized developmental projects (Choudhry, 2018).

The case of the Al-Khidmat Welfare Organization offers a fascinating study of faith-based devotion operating within a modern humanitarian framework. While drawing inspiration from the tenets of Jamaat-e-Islami and Islamic principles of service, its operational methodology and services—mass campaigns like *Khidmat-e-Khalq*—were consciously framed in modern, secular, and professional terms to maximize their reach and effectiveness (Sajid, 2014). This duality allowed them to tap into religious fervor while adhering to the modern, structured requirements of the state's administered charity model.

The selfless endeavors of individuals like Abdul Sattar Edhi and Hakim Saeed, founders of the Edhi Foundation and the Hamdard Foundation, respectively, represent the highest form of private devotion catalyzed by the trauma of Partition. Edhi, starting with a small free dispensary in 1951, transformed personal charity into one of the world's largest humanitarian organizations, focused purely on the immediate, desperate needs of the populace (Azam, 2020). Their work provided a non-political, grassroots validation of the charitable principle that transcended the often-controversial nature of state developmental schemes.

The Village-Aid Programme (1954) stands as a prominent state-led social welfare initiative that sought to integrate the

charitable spirit with a developmental framework, focusing on community development in rural areas (Ghafoor, 2008). This program was a critical attempt to bridge the gap between the major urban development projects and the sustained needs of the vast, displaced rural population, ensuring that the developmental benefits were not exclusively concentrated in the cities (UN Advisory Mission Report, 1955). Its focus on community self-help aligned perfectly with the national goal of fostering self-reliance among the *muhajirs*.

The establishment of the Social Work Group of Karachi in 1949, under figures like Jamshed Nusravanji Metha, demonstrates the cross-communal, secular commitment to rehabilitation. The construction of colonies like Jamshed Quarters specifically for the displaced population further solidifies the role of established civic leaders and private initiatives in complementing the state's urban planning efforts (Choudhry, 2018). This collaboration between government-appointed bodies and influential local citizens was essential in mobilizing local resources and expertise.

The profound historical link between religious institutions—mosques, Sufi *khanqahs*—and unofficial social welfare also played an undeniable, though less documented, role (Shah, 2010). While the state institutionalized modern NGOs, the continuous, decentralized network of traditional Islamic giving provided a crucial, informal safety net for the most vulnerable, especially in rural settings where the official infrastructure was slow to arrive. This informal sector operated continuously, underpinned by centuries of Islamic philanthropic custom (Ali, 2009).

The state's systematic efforts to institutionalize charity, moving from the

spontaneous relief efforts of 1947 to the regulated grant-making councils of the 1960s, transformed the philanthropic landscape of Pakistan. This process ensured that the energy of individual devotion was effectively harnessed and directed toward the massive, organized task of national rehabilitation (Farid, 1965). It legitimized the non-profit sector and provided a structured channel for both domestic and international funds to assist the *muhajirs*, reducing the burden on the state's limited resources (Ordinance LVIII, 1961).

The establishment of the Hamdard Foundation in 1959, following Hakim Saeed's personal experience of the riots and human suffering, is another example of how personal trauma was transmuted into organized, professional humanitarianism (Azam, 2002). The longevity and scale of these organizations—Edhi, Hamdard, Al-Khidmat—are powerful evidence of the enduring success of the state's strategy to utilize the principle of administered charity as a core mechanism for national healing and integration, long after the developmental projects had stabilized the economic structures (Sajid, 2014).

The state's rhetoric, often invoking Islamic tenets of social justice and service, was a deliberate political maneuver to secure public consent and mobilize resources (Ahmad, 1990). By framing the relief effort as both a national duty and a religious imperative, the government ensured maximum participation and minimized public outcry over the limited scope of official state aid. This fusion of nationalistic duty and religious devotion proved highly effective in sustaining the enormous charitable effort required (Afzal, 2015).

The success of the administered charity model lies not just in the aid provided, but in the creation of a permanent social welfare infrastructure. The foundation of the Ministry of Social Welfare and the various councils and directorates ensured that the lessons learned from the refugee crisis—the necessity of coordinated, systematic private-sector involvement—became a lasting feature of the Pakistani state's institutional design (Zubairi, 1954). The *muhajirs*, in their sheer need, became the catalyst for the development of modern social service provision in Pakistan.

## CONCLUSION

The first two decades of Pakistan's history were fundamentally shaped by the monumental task of absorbing and resettling millions of refugees. The state's successful navigation of this existential crisis was achieved through the sophisticated, simultaneous deployment of two core operational rationalities: the *logic of development* and the *principle of administered charity*. The state asserted its authority and defined its nation-building mandate through large-scale developmental schemes, such as the Thal Development Authority, which consciously transformed the refugee crisis into an engine for territorial expansion and economic growth (Qureshi, 2200; Govt. of Pakistan, First Five Year Plan, 1957). This developmental impulse, though occasionally flawed and administratively cumbersome, provided the essential structural and economic foundation—the land, the housing, and the employment exchanges—necessary to integrate the *muhajir* population into the new national landscape (Hussain, 2021).

The state strategically managed and institutionalized the profound domestic

reserves of philanthropic devotion. By establishing regulatory bodies like the National Council of Social Welfare and enacting ordinances to channel both local and international funds, the government successfully harnessed the energy of the non-profit sector, including key organizations like Al-Khidmat and the Edhi Foundation (Ordinance LVIII, 1961; Azam, 2202). This dual mechanism allowed the state to offload the immense burden of immediate, personalized humanitarian relief onto organized charity, while it focused its limited resources on long-term developmental and administrative control (UN Advisory Mission Report, 1955). The effective, albeit imperfect, synergy between the state's developmental vision and its management of private devotion proved to be the most decisive factor in the relief and permanent rehabilitation of the millions of *muhajirs*, ultimately contributing to the consolidation and stability of the post-colonial Pakistani state during its critical formative years.

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